[CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue

[Seun Ojedeji]

Dear Co-Chairs,

Before I make my comment, I like to raise 2 points based on my
understanding of current status:

1. If my timing is right, I believe the proposal is currently on the table
of the chartering organisations hence no changes can be done on the
proposal.

2. Any comment regarding any change would emerge from the formal response
of the chartering organisations(not even from individual members unless
endorsed by the CO).

Now to substance, I agree with changing the "may" to "shall" but such
threshold review must be discussed and endorsed by the EC based on the
threshold for amending fundamental bylaw or in the case where it happens
before initial bylaw implementation, then it must be approved by the
current chartering organisation. I am saying this just incase the intent is
to enable such automatic threshold change during the bylaw drafting.

Secondly, I disagree with the follow-up explanation indicated in red
(except the "shall"). For the obvious reason that anything below 4 AC/SO to
exercise those critical powers would not be representative of the ICANN
community with all its diversity.

Regards
Sent from my LG G4
Kindly excuse brevity and typos
On 27 Feb 2016 21:04, "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek at verisign.com> wrote:

> Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I’m submitting the following on behalf of the
> undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------
>
> Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,
>
>
>
> We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request for
> clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the Empowered
> Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional participants
> is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2 regarding this
> possibility is ambiguous:
>
>
>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
> assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be
> adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have
> more SOs or ACs.”
>
>
>
> In our view, there is no question that the thresholds *must* be adjusted
> if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have acknowledged
> repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there should not be a
> requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered Community to exercise
> its powers. Yet, if there are less than five decisional participants,
> unless the thresholds are adjusted it would require unanimous support for
> the Empowered Community to:
>
>
>
> ·         Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;
>
> ·         Recall the entire Board of Directors; and
>
> ·         Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA
> functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process.
>
>
>
> These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to the
> Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary purpose of
> the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the Board has noted
> in its own formal comments, “Leaving this issue for future consideration
> raises the potential for renegotiation of the community thresholds.  This
> potential for renegotiation adds a level of instability and a lack of
> predictability.”
>
>
>
> Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over
> thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally different.
> There is a great distinction between an SO or AC *choosing* to not
> participate, and an SO or AC being *blocked* from participation in a
> specific instance, as was the case in the case of the GAC carve-out. We
> were willing to accept a unanimous threshold for Board recall in the unique
> circumstances of the GAC carve-out, where the GAC was blocked from
> participation, but we believe firmly that if any SO or AC *elects*,
> whether through a conscious decision or an inability to decide, to not
> participate, then the non-unanimity principle must be upheld.
>
>
>
> However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC
> carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to resolve
> this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to the official
> transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when it could have
> significant negative ramifications on the transition through a failure to
> resolve it during the implementation phase.
>
>
>
> Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1 and
> Annex 2 be edited to replace “may” with “shall” and add an additional
> explanatory clause:
>
>
>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
> assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support *shall* be
> adjusted *to prevent the need for unanimous support among the decisional
> Participants to exercise any of the seven Community powers*. Thresholds
> may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.”
>
>
>
> Signed,
>
>
>
> Phil Corwin
>
> Steve DelBianco
>
> Keith Drazek
>
> James Gannon
>
> Robin Gross
>
> Ed Morris
>
> Brett Schaefer
>
> Greg Shatan
>
> Matthew Shears
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>
>
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