[CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue

Sun Feb 28 15:14:49 UTC 2016

Dear Ch-Chairs,

I understand that people start to bargaining what the results of poll in
brining another issue

Quote

*“Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1 and
Annex 2 be edited to replace “may” with “shall” and add an additional
explanatory clause:*

* “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support shall be
adjusted to prevent the need for unanimous support among the decisional
Participants to exercise any of the seven Community powers. Thresholds may
also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.”*

Unquote

First of all, while there may be a need to review the above text but we
should  be clear not to mixed up a general issue ( likelihood  of fewer
than x number of SO/(AC participating in decision making ) by the specific
carve-out concept  in regard with Board Recall as specified in in paragraph
72 of  Recommendation 2 which was settled. Consequently, whatever
adjustment we make for Annexes 1 and 2 ,that should specifically expect
Paragraph 72

Secondly, the structure proposed

Quote

*“**If** fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be decisional
Participants, these thresholds for consensus support **shall* *be adjusted
to prevent the need for unanimous support among the decisional Participants
to exercise any of the seven Community powers.”*

Does not seems to be consistent the* “conditional structure **Rule

i.e use of the conditional part in present tense must be followed by future
tense in the response( following  part ) of the conditional clause.

Example

If you come late I *will* not wait for you

It is never said

If you come late I *shal*l not wait for you

This is an important basic and fundamental issue to be respected.

Thirdly, There seems to be another  action we did in rush  when the added
text to Annexes 1& 2 was ahgreed. Please note comments from Bruce.

While we need to carefuzll study what to do , we may not be able to fix it
in a virtual call.

Perhaps that should be put on the agenda of physical meeting with a full
review of any possible scenario out of that.

Regards

Kavouss

2016-02-28 9:31 GMT+01:00 Dr Eberhard W Lisse <epilisse at gmail.com>:

> Dear Co-Chairs,
>
> Can we please do the call to discuss the unfinalizing of the refinalized
> Final Proposal on Monday, please? On Tuesday I am busy and this is
> something I don't want to miss.
>
> el
>
> --
> Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini 4
>
> On 27 Feb 2016, at 22:03, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek at verisign.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I’m submitting the following on behalf of the
> undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------
>
> Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,
>
>
>
> We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request for
> clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the Empowered
> Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional participants
> is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2 regarding this
> possibility is ambiguous:
>
>
>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
> assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be
> adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have
> more SOs or ACs.”
>
>
>
> In our view, there is no question that the thresholds *must* be adjusted
> if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have acknowledged
> repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there should not be a
> requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered Community to exercise
> its powers. Yet, if there are less than five decisional participants,
> unless the thresholds are adjusted it would require unanimous support for
> the Empowered Community to:
>
>
>
> ·         Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;
>
> ·         Recall the entire Board of Directors; and
>
> ·         Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA
> functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process.
>
>
>
> These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to the
> Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary purpose of
> the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the Board has noted
> in its own formal comments, “Leaving this issue for future consideration
> raises the potential for renegotiation of the community thresholds.  This
> potential for renegotiation adds a level of instability and a lack of
> predictability.”
>
>
>
> Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over
> thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally different.
> There is a great distinction between an SO or AC *choosing* to not
> participate, and an SO or AC being *blocked* from participation in a
> specific instance, as was the case in the case of the GAC carve-out. We
> were willing to accept a unanimous threshold for Board recall in the unique
> circumstances of the GAC carve-out, where the GAC was blocked from
> participation, but we believe firmly that if any SO or AC *elects*,
> whether through a conscious decision or an inability to decide, to not
> participate, then the non-unanimity principle must be upheld.
>
>
>
> However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC
> carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to resolve
> this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to the official
> transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when it could have
> significant negative ramifications on the transition through a failure to
> resolve it during the implementation phase.
>
>
>
> Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1 and
> Annex 2 be edited to replace “may” with “shall” and add an additional
> explanatory clause:
>
>
>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
> assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support *shall* be
> adjusted *to prevent the need for unanimous support among the decisional
> Participants to exercise any of the seven Community powers*. Thresholds
> may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.”
>
>
>
> Signed,
>
>
>
> Phil Corwin
>
> Steve DelBianco
>
> Keith Drazek
>
> James Gannon
>
> Robin Gross
>
> Ed Morris
>
> Brett Schaefer
>
> Greg Shatan
>
> Matthew Shears
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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>
>
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>
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