[CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue

Mon Feb 29 10:01:47 UTC 2016

Dear Martin,
I have been dealing with the issue of "shall", should, would could might
may for forthy years
I belive that " may "deals with the prevailing circumostances that we do
not know yet
However, I coud agree to replace " may" by "should " at the extreme case.
In addition we need to clearly indicate the minimum no. of SO/AC below
which the entire process is legally invalid
Kavouss

2016-02-29 10:14 GMT+01:00 Martin Boyle <Martin.Boyle at nominet.uk>:

> In this case one support and two deeply divided would trounce one
> opposition even if there is no actual majority of SO/AC?
>
> As I noted yesterday, there is a fundamental difference between no
> opposition because we don't see the issue causing that led to the process
> as one that impacts us, so we don't want to support or prevent its
> resolution and no opposition because the SO/AC is too divided to agree a
> position.
>
> I think that would worry me!
>
> Martin
>
>
> Martin Boyle
>
> Senior Policy Advisor
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>
>
> [image: cid:image001.jpg at 01D0FCF7.DEE0F1F0]
>
>
>
> *nominet.uk* <http://nominet.uk/>    DD: +44 (0)1865 332251
> <+44%20(0)1865%20332251>
>
> Minerva House, Edmund Halley Road, Oxford, OX4 4DQ, United Kingdom
>
>
> On 29 Feb 2016, at 01:06, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek at verisign.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Bruce,
>
> Thanks for your reply.
>
> I agree fully there needs to be a minimum. Speaking personally, I think 4
> SO/ACs should be the minimum level of participation, with 3 of those 4 in
> support/not objecting required to use the powers.
>
> I hope we can all confirm a common understanding so the bylaw drafters
> will have clear and unambiguous direction.
>
> Regards,
> Keith
>
>
> On Feb 27, 2016, at 6:03 PM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au>
> wrote:
>
> Hello Keith,
>
>
>
> I assume there also needs to be some lower limit of participants that
> applies to the concept of “*preventing the need for unanimous support”.*
>
>
>
> Taking an extreme case,  what if only one SO or AC “chooses” to be part of
> the decisional process?   Every decision taken would be unanimous by
> default.
>
>
>
> How many participants of the 7 SOs and ACs makes a viable Empowered
> Community?  Should it be 2, 3, or 4.   I hope we get at least 4 out of 7
> for it  to genuinely represent a significant portion of the community.
>
>
>
> So rather than “If fewer than 5”, it could be “If at least 4”
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Bruce Tonkin
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [
> mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
> <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Drazek,
> Keith
> *Sent:* Sunday, 28 February 2016 7:04 AM
> *To:* accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue
>
>
>
> Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I’m submitting the following on behalf of the
> undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------
>
> Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,
>
>
>
> We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request for
> clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the Empowered
> Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional participants
> is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2 regarding this
> possibility is ambiguous:
>
>
>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
> assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be
> adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have
> more SOs or ACs.”
>
>
>
> In our view, there is no question that the thresholds *must* be adjusted
> if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have acknowledged
> repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there should not be a
> requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered Community to exercise
> its powers. Yet, if there are less than five decisional participants,
> unless the thresholds are adjusted it would require unanimous support for
> the Empowered Community to:
>
>
>
> ·       Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;
>
> ·       Recall the entire Board of Directors; and
>
> ·       Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA
> functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process.
>
>
>
> These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to the
> Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary purpose of
> the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the Board has noted
> in its own formal comments, “Leaving this issue for future consideration
> raises the potential for renegotiation of the community thresholds.  This
> potential for renegotiation adds a level of instability and a lack of
> predictability.”
>
>
>
> Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over
> thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally different.
> There is a great distinction between an SO or AC *choosing* to not
> participate, and an SO or AC being *blocked* from participation in a
> specific instance, as was the case in the case of the GAC carve-out. We
> were willing to accept a unanimous threshold for Board recall in the unique
> circumstances of the GAC carve-out, where the GAC was blocked from
> participation, but we believe firmly that if any SO or AC *elects*,
> whether through a conscious decision or an inability to decide, to not
> participate, then the non-unanimity principle must be upheld.
>
>
>
> However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC
> carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to resolve
> this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to the official
> transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when it could have
> significant negative ramifications on the transition through a failure to
> resolve it during the implementation phase.
>
>
>
> Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1 and
> Annex 2 be edited to replace “may” with “shall” and add an additional
> explanatory clause:
>
>
>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
> assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support *shall* be
> adjusted *to prevent the need for unanimous support among the decisional
> Participants to exercise any of the seven Community powers*. Thresholds
> may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.”
>
>
>
> Signed,
>
>
>
> Phil Corwin
>
> Steve DelBianco
>
> Keith Drazek
>
> James Gannon
>
> Robin Gross
>
> Ed Morris
>
> Brett Schaefer
>
> Greg Shatan
>
> Matthew Shears
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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