[CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue

Greg Shatan gregshatanipc at gmail.com
Mon Feb 29 20:12:24 UTC 2016


By my reading, the GAC position completely sidesteps the issue of whether
they will participate as a "decisional participant" (i.e., whether they
will be counted one way or the other when a decision must be made).  Am I
misreading this?

Greg

On Mon, Feb 29, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz>
wrote:

> Hi all
>
> In three versions of the proposal from this group the GAC has been a
> decisional participant. I firmly agree with what Thomas said, that is what
> our proposal says and that is how it has to remain.
>
> We haven't demanded any SO/AC has to say they are in. We have just said
> that we take them out if they insist.
>
> Anything else would be an utter travesty at this point and undermine our
> process.
>
> On the point raised by the letter that started this thread, I only
> re-state my view that IF the list of decisional participants changed, THEN
> the thresholds would have to change, BECAUSE we cannot have a situation
> where formal total unanimity is required to exercise community powers.
>
>
> cheers
> Jordan
>
>
> On 1 March 2016 at 07:27, Robin Gross <robin at ipjustice.org> wrote:
>
>> Unless the GAC can reach a consensus and decide to be “in" the EC, it
>> would have to be considered “out” of the EC.  If GAC can’t decide to accept
>> this new role and its responsibility, we have no place on insisting that it
>> does accept this change in its role and responsibility.  We can’t leave
>> loose ends like this in our report without expecting disastrous results -
>> we must have certainty about what we are proposing.
>>
>> Robin
>>
>>
>> On Feb 29, 2016, at 10:07 AM, Phil Corwin <psc at vlaw-dc.com> wrote:
>>
>> +1. The GAC needs to decide whether they want to be in or out of the EC,
>> and the decision time is now.
>>
>> If the GAC can’t reach a consensus on something that basic then trying to
>> use the accountability measures with them in the EC will be like trying to
>> drive a car with the parking brake engaged.
>>
>> *Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal*
>> *Virtualaw LLC*
>> *1155 F Street, NW*
>> *Suite 1050*
>> *Washington, DC 20004*
>> *202-559-8597 <202-559-8597>/Direct*
>> *202-559-8750 <202-559-8750>/Fax*
>> *202-255-6172 <202-255-6172>/cell*
>>
>> *Twitter: @VlawDC*
>>
>> *"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey*
>>
>> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [
>> mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Mueller,
>> Milton L
>> *Sent:* Monday, February 29, 2016 10:12 AM
>> *To:* Martin Boyle; Kavouss Arasteh; Bruce Tonkin
>> *Cc:* accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue
>>
>> This discussion is an example of the absurdity of making participation in
>> the empowered community (EC) optional. You were all warned about this
>> months ago. The boundaries of the EC need to be fixed and completely
>> unambiguous. You must be either in or out. There should be no “oh, today I
>> think I am part of it but tomorrow I may not be.” It should not be
>> determined on a case-by-case basis.
>>
>> My understanding is that all 3 SOs are part of the empowered community,
>> as is ALAC. My understanding is that GAC has not decided whether it is in
>> or out. But once it does decide, it should be in or out, full stop, for all
>> cases except the narrow carve out related to GAC advice.
>>
>> If the individual entities who are in the EC (ACs and SOs) do not support
>> a vote to spill the board, reject an IANA review decision, etc. they are
>> voting against it, full stop. They are not “unable to cast a vote.” So a
>> lower threshold never means that there is a chance that one SO or AC can
>> make the decision. The threshold only changes based on whether GAC is in or
>> out.
>>
>> --MM
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [
>> mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Martin
>> Boyle
>> *Sent:* Sunday, February 28, 2016 3:09 PM
>> Kavouss makes a good point:  if views are so divided in the SO/ACs that
>> many are not able to cast a vote, there is an indication that something is
>> wrong.
>>
>> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [
>> mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Kavouss
>> Arasteh
>> *Sent:* 28 February 2016 17:32
>> *To:* Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au>
>> *Cc:* accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue
>>
>> Bruce
>> Accruing to some established rule ,out if seven SO/AC, the minimum would
>> be simple majority ( 4) bellow that the process does have no longer any
>> legal validity
>> Ksvouss
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>>
>> On 28 Feb 2016, at 00:02, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hello Keith,
>>
>> I assume there also needs to be some lower limit of participants that
>> applies to the concept of “*preventing the need for unanimous support”.*
>>
>> Taking an extreme case,  what if only one SO or AC “chooses” to be part
>> of the decisional process?   Every decision taken would be unanimous by
>> default.
>>
>> How many participants of the 7 SOs and ACs makes a viable Empowered
>> Community?  Should it be 2, 3, or 4.   I hope we get at least 4 out of 7
>> for it  to genuinely represent a significant portion of the community.
>>
>> So rather than “If fewer than 5”, it could be “If at least 4”
>>
>> Regards,
>> Bruce Tonkin
>>
>>
>> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [
>> mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Drazek,
>> Keith
>> *Sent:* Sunday, 28 February 2016 7:04 AM
>> *To:* accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>> *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue
>>
>> Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I’m submitting the following on behalf of
>> the undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:
>>
>> ---------------------------------------------
>> Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,
>>
>> We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request for
>> clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the Empowered
>> Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional participants
>> is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2 regarding this
>> possibility is ambiguous:
>>
>> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
>> assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
>> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be
>> adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have
>> more SOs or ACs.”
>>
>> In our view, there is no question that the thresholds *must* be adjusted
>> if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have acknowledged
>> repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there should not be a
>> requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered Community to exercise
>> its powers. Yet, if there are less than five decisional participants,
>> unless the thresholds are adjusted it would require unanimous support for
>> the Empowered Community to:
>>
>> ·         Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;
>> ·         Recall the entire Board of Directors; and
>> ·         Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA
>> functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process.
>>
>> These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to
>> the Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary purpose
>> of the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the Board has
>> noted in its own formal comments, “Leaving this issue for future
>> consideration raises the potential for renegotiation of the community
>> thresholds.  This potential for renegotiation adds a level of instability
>> and a lack of predictability.”
>>
>> Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over
>> thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally different.
>> There is a great distinction between an SO or AC *choosing* to not
>> participate, and an SO or AC being *blocked* from participation in a
>> specific instance, as was the case in the case of the GAC carve-out. We
>> were willing to accept a unanimous threshold for Board recall in the unique
>> circumstances of the GAC carve-out, where the GAC was blocked from
>> participation, but we believe firmly that if any SO or AC *elects*,
>> whether through a conscious decision or an inability to decide, to not
>> participate, then the non-unanimity principle must be upheld.
>>
>> However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC
>> carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to resolve
>> this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to the official
>> transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when it could have
>> significant negative ramifications on the transition through a failure to
>> resolve it during the implementation phase.
>>
>> Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1 and
>> Annex 2 be edited to replace “may” with “shall” and add an additional
>> explanatory clause:
>>
>> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
>> assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
>> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support *shall* be
>> adjusted *to prevent the need for unanimous support among the decisional
>> Participants to exercise any of the seven Community powers*. Thresholds
>> may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.”
>>
>> Signed,
>>
>> Phil Corwin
>> Steve DelBianco
>> Keith Drazek
>> James Gannon
>> Robin Gross
>> Ed Morris
>> Brett Schaefer
>> Greg Shatan
>> Matthew Shears
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
> --
> Jordan Carter
>
> Chief Executive
> *InternetNZ *
>
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