[CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue

Wed Mar 2 14:43:59 UTC 2016

Alles klar Thomas!
Danke

Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez
+506 8837 7176
Skype: carlos.raulg
Current UTC offset: -6.00 (Costa Rica)
On 29 Feb 2016, at 10:48, Thomas Rickert wrote:

> Dear Keith, all,
> below you find a quick summary of where we are on this with respect to
> our report:
>
> - GAC is a decisional participant unless we get a clear signal (as from
> RSAC and SSAC) that they don't want to be one.
>
> - All decisional particants can vote yes, no, abstain or do nothing.
>
> - If there is a change in structure, i.e. a decisional participants does
> not further want to be one, an SO / AC is closed down or if there is an
> addition, we need a bylaw change. This is what the group responded to
> the Board's wish to include percentages. The CCWG refused percentages as
> we need a bylaw change anyway if a change is taking place.
>
> - Should the Board refuse to make / support a required bylaw change, we
> have the tools in our report.
>
> - Any clarification needed to that effect can be made during the
> implementation phase.
>
> Thanks,
> Thomas
>
> Am 27.02.2016 um 21:03 schrieb Drazek, Keith:
>>
>> Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I’m submitting the following on behalf of
>> the undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:
>>
>>
>>
>> ---------------------------------------------
>>
>> Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,
>>
>>
>>
>> We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request
>> for clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the
>> Empowered Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional
>> participants is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2
>> regarding this possibility is ambiguous:
>>
>>
>>
>> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on
>> this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
>> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be
>> adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to
>> have more SOs or ACs.”
>>
>>
>>
>> In our view, there is no question that the thresholds /must/ be
>> adjusted if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have
>> acknowledged repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there
>> should not be a requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered
>> Community to exercise its powers. Yet, if there are less than five
>> decisional participants, unless the thresholds are adjusted it would
>> require unanimous support for the Empowered Community to:
>>
>>
>>
>> ·         Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;
>>
>> ·         Recall the entire Board of Directors; and
>>
>> ·         Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA
>> functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process.
>>
>>
>>
>> These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to
>> the Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary
>> purpose of the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the
>> Board has noted in its own formal comments, “Leaving this issue for
>> future consideration raises the potential for renegotiation of the
>> community thresholds.  This potential for renegotiation adds a level
>> of instability and a lack of predictability.”
>>
>>
>>
>> Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over
>> thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally
>> different. There is a great distinction between an SO or AC
>> */choosing/* to not participate, and an SO or AC being */blocked/*
>> from participation in a specific instance, as was the case in the case
>> of the GAC carve-out. We were willing to accept a unanimous threshold
>> for Board recall in the unique circumstances of the GAC carve-out,
>> where the GAC was blocked from participation, but we believe firmly
>> that if any SO or AC */elects/*, whether through a conscious decision
>> or an inability to decide, to not participate, then the non-unanimity
>> principle must be upheld.
>>
>>
>>
>> However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC
>> carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to
>> resolve this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to
>> the official transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when
>> it could have significant negative ramifications on the transition
>> through a failure to resolve it during the implementation phase.
>>
>>
>>
>> Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1
>> and Annex 2 be edited to replace “may” with “shall” and add an
>> additional explanatory clause:
>>
>>
>>
>> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on
>> this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
>> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support
>> */shall/*be adjusted */to prevent the need for unanimous support among
>> the decisional Participants to exercise any of the seven Community
>> powers/*. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to
>> have more SOs or ACs.”
>>
>>
>>
>> Signed,
>>
>>
>>
>> Phil Corwin
>>
>> Steve DelBianco
>>
>> Keith Drazek
>>
>> James Gannon
>>
>> Robin Gross
>>
>> Ed Morris
>>
>> Brett Schaefer
>>
>> Greg Shatan
>>
>> Matthew Shears
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>
> -- 
>
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