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Root DNSSEC Design Team                                         J. Abley
                                                                   ICANN
                                                             J. Schlyter
                                                                   Kirei
                                                             May 7, 2010


           DNSSEC Trust Anchor Publication for the Root Zone

Abstract

   ICANN, as IANA Functions Operator, is responsible for the publication
   of trust anchors for the root zone of the Domain Name System.

   This document outlines the strategy by which those trust anchors are
   published, and specifies initial mechanisms to be implemented in
   conjunction with the initial signing of the root zone.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and
   Numbers.





























Abley & Schlyter                                                [Page 1]
                   Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication           May 2010


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Trust Anchor Publication Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Trust Anchor Set Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     3.1.  XML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     3.2.  Certificate Signing Request (PKCS#10) . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  Initial Publication Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     4.1.  HTTP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     4.2.  HTTP Over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   5.  Signature Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   Appendix A.  Trust Anchor Publication Document Schema . . . . . . . 7
   Appendix B.  Example Signed Trust Anchor Set  . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   Appendix C.  ASN.1 for Delegation Signer Extension  . . . . . . . . 9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9



































Abley & Schlyter                                                [Page 2]
                   Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication           May 2010


1.  Introduction

   The Domain Name System (DNS) is described in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035].
   Security extensions to the DNS (DNSSEC) are described in [RFC4033],
   [RFC4034] and [RFC4035].

   A discussion of operational practices relating to DNSSEC can be found
   in [RFC4641].

   In DNSSEC a secure response to a query is one which is
   cryptographically signed and validated.  An individual signature is
   validated by following a chain of signatures to a key which is
   trusted for some extra-protocol reason.

   ICANN, as IANA Functions Operator, is responsible for the publication
   of trust anchors for the root zone of the Domain Name System.

   This document outlines the strategy by which those trust anchors are
   published, and specifies initial mechanisms to be implemented in
   conjunction with the initial signing of the root zone.


2.  Trust Anchor Publication Strategy

   Each trust anchor will be published in two formats:

   o  in XML record format (as recommended in
      [I-D.ietf-dnsop-dnssec-trust-anchor]), i.e. as the hash of the
      corresponding DNSKEY in DS format,

   o  as a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in PKCS#10 format for
      further processing by Certificate Authorities and validation of
      proof of possession of the corresponding private key.

   Operational procedures for KSK generation will include the generation
   of a trust anchor and providing proof of possession of the
   corresponding private key.  Those operational procedures, including
   the specification of the signing mechanism are documented in
   [ICANNDPS].  The execution of those procedures are be subject to
   third-party audit.

   Paper-copy representations of trust anchors will be distributed to
   Key Generation Ceremony participants when the corresponding keys are
   generated.  These participants may attest to the generated key in any
   way they find suitable.

   Trust anchor sets and short-hand representations thereof will be
   distributed among the Key Generation Ceremony participants.  These



Abley & Schlyter                                                [Page 3]
                   Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication           May 2010


   participants may attest to the generated key in any way they find
   suitable.

   In addition, the Trust Anchor set will be transported to the ICANN
   Trust Anchor signing infrastructure (separate from the DNSSEC signing
   infrastructure) in a secure manner, to preclude substitution attacks.
   These signed Trust Anchor sets will then be published with these
   signatures along with the original Certificate Signing Request.

   This document specifies an initial set of publication mechanisms in
   Section 4.  It is anticipated that additional mechanisms may be added
   in the future.


3.  Trust Anchor Set Format

3.1.  XML

   Trust anchors are published in XML documents whose schema is
   described in Appendix A.  Each document contains a complete set of
   trust anchors for the root zone, including anchors suitable for
   immediate use and also historical data.

   Examples of trust anchors packaged and signed for publication can be
   found in Appendix B.

3.2.  Certificate Signing Request (PKCS#10)

   To facilitate signing the trust anchor by a public key
   infrastructure, the trust anchor is also published as a Certificate
   Signing Request (CSR) in PKCS#10 format [RFC2986].

   The CSR will have a Subject with following attributes:

   O: the string "ICANN".

   OU:  the string "IANA".

   CN:  the string "Root Zone KSK" combined with the timestamp (in ISO
      8601 format) when the key was generated, e.g.  "Root Zone KSK
      2009-10-10T01:08:42Z".

   resourceRecord:  the delegation signer (DS) resource record of the
      public key (see Appendix C for attribute definition).







Abley & Schlyter                                                [Page 4]
                   Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication           May 2010


4.  Initial Publication Mechanisms

4.1.  HTTP

   Signed key sets will be made available by HTTP [RFC2616].

   The URL for retrieving the CSR is
   http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/<key-label>.csr.

   The URL for retrieving the ICANN signed Certificate is
   http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/<key-label>.crt.

   The URL for retrieving the complete trust anchor set is
   <http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml>.

   The URL for a detached S/MIME signature for the current trust anchor
   set is <http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.p7s>.

   The URL for a detached OpenPGP [RFC4880] signature for the current
   trust anchor set is
   <http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.asc>.

4.2.  HTTP Over TLS

   Signed key sets will be made available by HTTP over TLS [RFC2818].

   The URLs specified in Section 4.1 are also available using HTTPS.
   That is:

   The URL for retrieving the CSR is
   https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/<key-label>.csr.

   The URL for retrieving the ICANN signed Certificate is
   https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/<key-label>.crt.

   The URL for retrieving the complete trust anchor set is
   <https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml>.

   The URL for a detached S/MIME signature for the complete trust anchor
   set is <https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.p7s>.

   The URL for a detached OpenPGP [RFC4880] signature for the current
   trust anchor set is
   <https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.asc>.







Abley & Schlyter                                                [Page 5]
                   Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication           May 2010


5.  Signature Verification

   The OpenPGP [RFC4880] keys used to sign trust anchor documents will
   themselves carry signatures from personal keys of ICANN operations
   staff who are able to personally attest to their validity.  Those
   staff members will endeavour to make their personal keys freely
   available for examination by third parties, e.g. by way of PGP key
   parties at operator and IETF meetings.  In this fashion a diverse set
   of paths through the PGP web of trust will be maintained to the trust
   anchor PGP keys.

   An OpenPGP keyring containing public keys pertinent to signature
   verification will be published at
   <http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/icann.pgp>.  The public keys on
   that keyring will also be distributed widely, e.g. to public PGP key
   servers.

   Certificates used to create S/MIME signatures will be signed by ICANN
   and well-known (WebTrust-certified) Certificate Authorities at their
   discretion, to facilitate signature validation with widely-available
   X.509 trust anchors.


6.  References

   [I-D.ietf-dnsop-dnssec-trust-anchor]
              Larson, M. and O. Gudmundsson, "DNSSEC Trust Anchor
              Configuration and Maintenance",
              draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-trust-anchor-03 (work in
              progress), March 2009.

   [ICANNDPS]
              Ljunggren, F., Okubo, T., Lamb, R., and J. Schlyter,
              "DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone KSK Operator
              (DRAFT)", May 2010.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.




Abley & Schlyter                                                [Page 6]
                   Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication           May 2010


   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              November 2000.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, March 2005.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

   [RFC4641]  Kolkman, O. and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC Operational Practices",
              RFC 4641, September 2006.

   [RFC4880]  Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
              Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880, November 2007.


Appendix A.  Trust Anchor Publication Document Schema

   A Relax NG Compact Schema for the documents used to publish trust
   anchors can be found in Figure 1.
























Abley & Schlyter                                                [Page 7]
                   Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication           May 2010


   datatypes xsd = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes"

   start = element TrustAnchor {
       attribute id { xsd:string },
       attribute source { xsd:string },
       element Zone { xsd:string },

       keydigest+
   }

   keydigest = element KeyDigest {
       attribute id { xsd:string },
       attribute validFrom { xsd:dateTime },
       attribute validUntil { xsd:dateTime }?,

       element KeyTag {
               xsd:nonNegativeInteger { maxInclusive = "65535" } },
       element Algorithm {
               xsd:nonNegativeInteger { maxInclusive = "255" } },
       element DigestType {
               xsd:nonNegativeInteger { maxInclusive = "255" } },
       element Digest { xsd:hexBinary }
   }


                                 Figure 1


Appendix B.  Example Signed Trust Anchor Set

   Figure 2 describes two trust anchors for the root zone such as might
   be retrieved using the URL
   <https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml>.


















Abley & Schlyter                                                [Page 8]
                   Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication           May 2010


   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

   <TrustAnchor
       id="AD42165F-B099-4778-8F42-D34A1D41FD93"
       source="http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml">

       <Zone>.</Zone>

       <KeyDigest id="42"
                  validFrom="2010-07-01T00:00:00-00:00"
                  validUntil="2011-07-01T00:00:00-00:00">
           <KeyTag>34291</KeyTag>
           <Algorithm>5</Algorithm>
           <DigestType>1</DigestType>
           <Digest>c8cb3d7fe518835490af8029c23efbce6b6ef3e2</Digest>
       </KeyDigest>

   </TrustAnchor>


                                 Figure 2


Appendix C.  ASN.1 for Delegation Signer Extension



   iana OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
                                dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
                                enterprise(1) 1000 }

   iana-dns    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iana 53 }

   resourceRecord ATTRIBUTE ::= {
     WITH SYNTAX IA5String
     EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseIgnoreIA5Match
     ID iana-dns
   }













Abley & Schlyter                                                [Page 9]
                   Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication           May 2010


Authors' Addresses

   Joe Abley
   ICANN
   4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 330
   Marina del Rey, CA  90292
   US

   Phone: +1 519 670 9327
   Email: joe.abley at icann.org


   Jakob Schlyter
   Kirei AB
   P.O. Box 53204
   Goteborg  SE-400 16
   Sweden

   Email: jakob at kirei.se
































Abley & Schlyter                                               [Page 10]


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