[CPWG] Verisign

Wed Jan 8 00:07:39 UTC 2020

Hi Bill.
Thanks for answering my question.

The reason why I was asking for data is that I am very suspicious about analyses based only on suppositions, in particular when suppositions are addressed in one direction only.

Since we are in the domain (pun not intended) of hypotheses, I will propose mine - supported, when possible, by observation - going in a different direction.

IDNs are being deployed for years now. Had reputable organizations felt the risk of registrations of IDNs that are confusingly similar (personally I find the qualification of “indistinguishable” factually incorrect) as a serious risk, we would have witnessed a spike in defensive registrations. To me, the fact that it did not happen is, if not a proof, at least an indication that the vast majority of these organizations do not see this as a serious threat.

As you say, ICANN has produced a few months ago tables of the potential threats. My observation is that crime normally acts fast - generally before the potential pitfall is brought to the general public. Why would this case be different?

My observation is that a cure that limits the effects of a problem without addressing the root cause is seldom effective. In this case the root cause is, IMHO, that the “real” url is not the displayed one, therefore potentially inducing the user in error. Maybe to solve this problem is not trivial, but it seems to me that addressing the behaviour of the browsers will produce far better results in the long term than creating blacklists, regulating the domain name market, forcing defensive registrations, or whatever else. Unless, of course, the objective is not solving the problem but influencing the domain name market.

I would like to conclude with a provocative question. How come that the potential problems supposedly originated by the introduction and deployment of IDNs are raised only by people and interest groups that are operating in a plain ASCII environment - and more often than not of English mother tongue?

Cheers,
Roberto

On 07.01.2020, at 18:45, Bill Jouris via CPWG <cpwg at icann.org<mailto:cpwg at icann.org>> wrote:

Hi Roberto,

I don't work for Citi Bank, and am not aware of knowing anyone who does.  So I have no idea.

I would note that, at this moment, we are probably 6 months from ICANN publishing the IDN effort's tables of all the variations on the Latin alphabet.  Having that readily available will make coming up with indistinguishable domain names much easier for bad actors.  And thus the need for defensive registrations.

In short, the problem wrt the need for defensive registrations is still at the readily foreseeable stage, rather than the already exploding in our face stage.

Bill

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On Tue, Jan 7, 2020 at 2:16 AM, Roberto Gaetano
<roberto_gaetano at hotmail.com<mailto:roberto_gaetano at hotmail.com>> wrote:
Hi Bill.
Just a couple of questions wrt:

The only obvious defense, for registrants who want their customers to arrive reliably at their website, will be defensive registrations.  Lots of defensive registrations.  (I did a quick calculation for Citi Bank.  4 letter domain name.  Close to 300 readily confusable variations.  Longer names would have more, of course.)

How many actual defensive registrations has Citi Bank?

Thanks,
R.

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