[CWG-Stewardship] Strickling Remarks from 4 December re IANA Transition and Accountability

[Alan Greenberg]

At 10/12/2014 07:12 PM, Milton L Mueller wrote:
>
>From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org 
>[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On 
>Behalf Of Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond
>
>I would say that this has already been 
>demonstrated in the making up of the ICG and the 
>current CWG, both of which include non ICANN 
>participants from the global multistakeholder community.
>
>MM: Hello Olivier. Both the ICG and this CWG 
>have been empowered by an external entity – the 
>NTIA. It was the NTIA that kicked off the 
>process by signaling its willingness to let go. 
>It was NTIA that told ICANN to convene but not 
>control the process. It was the NTIA that set 
>the parameters and basic criteria a transition 
>proposal had to meet. It is the NTIA, and the US 
>government more broadly, that will ultimately 
>determine whether the proposals we develop will 
>be implemented. To look at these processes as 
>outgrowths of processes internal to ICANN is to 
>be fundamentally out of touch with what is going 
>on here. As Jordan Carter pointed out in a 
>message a few minutes ago, given the concessions 
>we had to wring out of ICANN to make these 
>processes as independent as they are, it is 
>evident that these examples you hold up would 
>have been very different had they been internal to ICANN.

You seem to ignore the powerful draw of keeping 
IANA without the Contract Co. complexity, cost 
and potential for instability. Those are strong reason for ICANN to adapt.


>Similarly, I would point out that a totally 
>independent MRT that does not make use of 
>ICANN's existing structures as a convenor would 
>be missing a coordinated Governmental 
>involvement. Indeed, only ICANN has the ability 
>to make use of its members to relate back to the 
>GAC and for the GAC to express points. A totally 
>independent MRT would have individual 
>governments speaking. Of course, individual 
>governments were able to speak outside of ICANN 
>at, say ITU meetings or at NetMundial - but they 
>were not restricted to a handful of seats for the whole world.
>
>MM: The MRT _will_ make use of ICANN’s 
>institutionalized representational structures. 
>No one who has thought seriously about the 
>composition of the MRT has proposed anything 
>different from that. The GNSO SGs will be 
>putting people on to the MRT, so will the ccNSO, 
>so will the GAC, so will SSAC, so will ALAC. So 
>will entities outside of ICANN. But it will be 
>independent of ICANN legally, which as Greg explained is essential.

But we have not yet explored exactly who will be 
convening this body, or what exact structure it 
has. Greg has explained that for a body to have 
contractual terms which it will be compelled to 
honour (whether by contract or MoU), it has to 
have some formal status, but this undefined body 
will have a very complex relationship with 
Contract Co and I have seen no discussion about how that will happen.


>MM: As a sideline, I am a bit disturbed by the 
>special emphasis you are placing on governmental 
>involvement. Outside of their jurisdiction, 
>Governments’ only claim to involvement in ICANN 
>is as one of many voices in the policy 
>development process. I do hope you, and all ALAC 
>members, understand that the IANA functions 
>contractor is not a policy making institution, 
>nor is it supposed to be a vehicle for circumventing or vetoing policy.

Are you saying that in this case, a MS body will 
not have any government involvement.

I am more than a bit troubled that now 
"multistakeholder" means the multistakeholders 
that someone decide need to be involved, but not others.

If that is indeed true, I would suggest that this 
be said VERY clearly and openly.


>MM: When it comes to the IANA functions, we do 
>not need governments “speaking,” collectively or 
>individually, about implementation. We need them 
>in their role as ccTLD administrators, in which 
>case they are just another IANA customer. 
>Insofar as they are indirectly affected by the 
>IANA functions, they are just another internet 
>user stakeholder group – no different from or 
>more important than noncommercial organizations 
>or business users. There is no legitimate reason 
>to afford governments a special collective voice 
>in the MRT. Even in the terms of the Tunis 
>Agenda, a document written by and for 
>governments, IANA qualifies as “day to day 
>technical and operational matters” and thus as 
>something to be left to the private sector.
>
>At this stage, I could use exactly the same 
>wording about the current CWG first draft, 
>replacing "other than to be 'internal-to-ICANN" 
>with "other than to be separable from ICANN".
>
>MM: The rationale for separability has been 
>explained countless times. It is an 
>accountability measure, a way of giving the 
>community the most meaningful form of redress in 
>case the functions are abused or not performed 
>well. Moreover, the IANA functions have always 
>been under a contractual relationship. The 
>burden of proof is on those who would say IANA 
>functions should be perpetually locked in to one 
>corporation. And I completely agree with Greg on 
>this question: we hear your discomfort with 
>Contract Co but we have no idea what positive 
>value you are seeking to advance by opposing it, 
>other than to keep everything within ICANN.

Yes, separability *IS* a method of forcing 
accountability. But it is not the ONLY such method.

Alan


>Clearly we have some work ahead of us to make 
>either proposal, or a mix, workable.
>
>There will be and can be no mix; either ICANN 
>owns IANA or it is contracted. I think there is 
>work to be done on this plan, but have seen no 
>serious challenges to its inherent workability. 
>On the other hand, the workability of an 
>internal to ICANN option is lying in a heap of 
>rubble at the bottom of Greg’s last message.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/attachments/20141210/689cd682/attachment.html>