[CWG-Stewardship] Strickling Remarks from 4 December re IANA Transition and Accountability

[Seun Ojedeji]

Hi Greg,

I have been off the internet for a while. I see this thread has become a
long one. I just like to mention a few things:

- The current CWG proposal was developed by this entire group and with
access to resources including staff. It started as an idea and was
developed with a mindset of us looking at a possible route. It is not
appropriate for us not to spend similar resources to fashion out details of
us trying another route.
- I agree that the cwg-accountability may be looking at broader level of
accountability but my point is if those IANA specific ones are identified
and implemented, wouldn't that remove the need for a contract co and
further reduce the over reaching power assigned to the MRT?
- You speak about MRT meeting the NTIA requirement of global
multistakeholder. I wonder how you determined that when the details of it's
composition is yet to be released/ascertained.
- I think we should have known by now that IANA function operation is at
full automation so when we threaten movement of IANA from ICANN is it
because of the service delivery or because of board
interpretation/implementation of policy. The former is most likely not
going checkmate anything because that aspect is fully and well operated,
the later is the major aspect and you don't fix that from outside, you fix
that from inside.
- The earlier we view ICANN as home for gTLD the better we "think-of" and
go through a route that builds the organisation with mechanism that makes
it sustainable. We are here talking about taking IANA away, but ICANN will
still be policy source and it will still be the same experience and if
ICANN is not, what's the assurance that the new body will not act the same
way.

Regards
sent from Google nexus 4
kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 8 Dec 2014 19:49, "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:

> My replies are inline.
>
> Greg
>
> *Gregory S. Shatan **ï* *Abelman Frayne & Schwab*
>
> *666 Third Avenue **ï** New York, NY 10017-5621*
>
> *Direct*  212-885-9253 *| **Main* 212-949-9022
>
> *Fax*  212-949-9190 *|* *Cell *917-816-6428
>
> *gsshatan at lawabel.com <gsshatan at lawabel.com>*
>
> *ICANN-related: gregshatanipc at gmail.com <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> *
>
> *www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>*
>
> On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 5:06 AM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 6:18 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> My responses are inline below.
>>>
>>>> In fact, it's up to us to identify the *IANA-specific* aspects of
>>>>> accountability and then determine how the IANA Functions Operator should be
>>>>> held accountable for failures to implement policy and for failures of
>>>>> operational excellence. That is our "accountability track."  And this has
>>>>> been true since we started.
>>>>>
>>>>> If i may ask, if this group is able to put in place mechanisms that
>>>> ensure the function operator is indeed accountable...why/what then is the
>>>> need for the MRT and CSC?
>>>>
>>>>
>>> The MRT and CSC are integral parts of our accountability mechanisms,
>>> along with the contract (and the ability to terminate it) and the
>>> independent Appeals Panel.  What do you think our accountability mechanisms
>>> are?
>>>
>>
>> Greg i think you did not get my point. My point is that the major
>> accountability requirement that is IANA specific is that which is related
>> to ensuring implementation based on existing policies. So if this group (or
>> the cwg on accountability) is able to fashion out an internal mechanism
>> that guarantees that aspect. Why will we still need MRT?.
>>
>
> This group has always been "able," *as a matter of scope*, to fashion an
> internal-to-ICANN accountability mechanism.  Similarly, NASA, as a matter
> of scope, has always been "able" to fly a rocket to Mars fueled by a jar of
> peanut butter.  So, what is stopping us and NASA from accomplishing these
> objectives?  At the very least, the lack of any sort of plan or proposal
> showing *how* one would accomplish this.  So it is not a question of
> scope, it's a question of putting together a plan.  Is this group "able" *as
> a practical matter* to put together a plan for an internal-to-ICANN
> accountability mechanism that meets the requirements and concerns of the
> NTIA and various stakeholders?  So far, the answer seems to be "no."  I'm
> open minded -- if someone puts forth a plan with a reasonable level of
> detail (e.g., strawman or draft proposal level of detail) and everyone
> probes it for flaws and asks for further details, which then get filled in,
> and if that plan, after making it through the gantlet of this group, looks
> viable, that would be a good thing.  (And, of course, that plan might not
> include an MRT, or it would include a different sort of multistakeholder
> body.) However, it hasn't happened and I don't see any real movement toward
> it, and the time for such action is growing short.  Unless there is some
> realistic movement forward on an "internal-to-ICANN" plan, the continued
> reference to the "internal-to-ICANN" concept has no shape and thus no
> value.  Continuing to advocate for "internal-to-ICANN" is very much like a
> NASA scientist wandering the halls of NASA with a jar of peanut butter,
> shouting "To Mars!!"  No matter how much that scientist critiques other
> plans for going to Mars, his "Peanut Butter Plan" will never be credible
> without more from him.
>
>
>> I may not have any issue if MRT's role does not include RFP and if the
>> Contract Co is just signing of an MOU that is not term based, because at
>> that point, the MRT will just be something similar to the cwg and will
>> become very much less attractive (except that its waste of resources).
>>
>
> It seems you have an essential issue with separability -- you don't want a
> term and you don't want an RFP.  So, essentially you want to give ICANN the
> right in perpetuity to be the IANA Functions Operator, subject perhaps to
> some completely undefined method for some completely undefined group to
> remove that right due to a completely undefined failure to meet completely
> undefined criteria.  Well, I can't give the "undefined" any weight
> whatsoever.
>
> I'm sorry you think that multistakeholder oversight of the IANA Functions
> is a "waste of resources."  The NTIA and most of the people on this list
> (myself included) seem to think it is very valuable -- indeed, for the NTIA
> it is the essence of the transition.  How do you propose to transfer the
> NTIA's functions to the global multistakeholder community without any sort
> of multistakeholder group?
>
>
>
>> This also will not in anyway reduce the possibility of moving IANA if
>> need be.
>>
>
> I don't see how you can say this.  You want to eliminate the only
> possibilities this CWG has defined to move IANA if need be.  You propose no
> method or group or criteria by which moving IANA if need be could be
> achieved.  Until you provide some alternative, you have reduced --
> effectively to zero -- the possibility of moving IANA.
>
>>
>> You are perhaps quite experienced in the gTLD space than i am, and
>> realistically speaking i think the gTLD are the ones who should seek a
>> permanent solution that makes the role reside within ICANN because
>> everything about the gTLD currently exist within ICANN and it will not make
>> any economic sense to move it out. So i find it strange that even if there
>> is adequate accountability in place within ICANN, you will still insist on
>> going the contracting route.
>>
>
> Adequate accountability within ICANN is a necessity before we move forward
> with any transition.  However adequate accountability within ICANN is not
> sufficient -- we need adequate accountability within ICANN *directly
> related to performance of (or failure to properly perform) the IANA
> Functions*.  This type of accountability is within the scope of this CWG
> (and not the Accountability CCWG), and so far, we have not seen any plan or
> proposal for such accountability that is adequate and responds to the
> concerns regarding separability, etc.  I am not insisting on anything with
> regard to the contracting route.  To the contrary, I remain open-minded.
> If we had an "internal to ICANN" plan that looked like it worked for all
> our purposes and didn't involve a contract, I would love to look at it and
> subject it to the same scrutiny that the current proposal has been
> subjected to.  After that, who knows what would happen?
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>>> In my view (and the view of many others in this group), the current
>>>>> CWG proposal was (and is) seen as the most efficient, effective, and
>>>>> independent method for achieving this result, and also the best method for
>>>>> replacing NTIA's other pre-transition roles as well.  I believe we arrived
>>>>> at this in spite of ICANN's current *general* accountability issues,
>>>>> not because of them.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Negative...i don't agree that is the best approach and again i don't
>>>> know how you already determine the proposal is efficient especially when we
>>>> don't even have the details yet. There are definitely other options that
>>>> allows moving of IANA from ICANN (if absolutely required) one of which does
>>>> not even require any contracting/MOU/agreement (which can be implemented by
>>>> the technical community)
>>>>
>>>> We don't have all the details, but we have 10 pages of detail, enough
>>> to make a preliminary judgment. These other options -- what detail is there
>>> for these options?  What framework is there for these options?  Until there
>>> is at least a "strawman" level of detail, these other "options" aren't
>>> options at all -- they are just empty catchphrases.
>>>
>>
>> Greg, please do not over-estimate multistakeholder settings especially
>> when it has not been put to practice (as it is in this particular case).
>> That 10page details has not touched critical aspect of MRT which is mainly
>> its formation and charter plus the connection between MRT and contract co
>> (it is not enough to call this a self company....the details is what is
>> important)
>>
>
>  Perhaps I have greater faith in the multistakeholder model than you do.
> Of course, we will not know how it works in practice until it is in
> practice -- but that's true of any plan.  We are developing details and we
> will be subjecting the model to stress tests, so we should know as much
> anyone with a plan knows about how that plan will work in practice.  Given
> that our goal is to transition NTIA's roles to the global multistakeholder
> community, we have to have some level of faith in the multistakeholder
> model.  Otherwise, we should just tell the NTIA that transitioning their
> role to the global multistakeholder community can't be done.  I agree that
> we need to flesh out how the MRT will be formed and what its charter might
> look like -- what are your suggestions for these aspects that would give
> you greater comfort?  The connection between MRT and Contract Co. does need
> to be fleshed out as well -- I envision this as being written into Contract
> Co.'s bylaws.  And by the way, I never called Contact Co. a "shelf company"
> -- it will be lightweight and limited but by definition, it can't be a
> shelf company.  A shelf company (at least as this term is used in the U.S.,
> refers to an inactive (and never activated) corporation -- it has no assets
> or liabilities, it has entered into no contracts or other obligations of
> any kind, it typically has a single "incorporator" rather than a full slate
> of officers and directors, and it has generic short-form documents rather
> than any kind of specially-drafted articles of incorporation or bylaws.
> Contract Co. should be as close as possible to a "shelf corporation".while
> still being able to perform its duties and meet the needs of the framework
> (which actually requires a fairly specifically-developed set of by-laws to
> keep it small and limited).
>
> Without diminishing the importance of details -- the details are only
> important if the general framework looks promising and appropriate.  I
> think we have that, and we have a good understanding of the principles that
> the details must meet to be acceptable to this group and the larger
> multistakeholder community.  Now it's just a matter of following those
> principles and filling in the details -- not a small task, but not one to
> be overestimated either.
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>>> To answer your question directly, I don't believe that the current
>>>>> proposal is in any way based on the premise that the current operator lacks
>>>>> -- *and will continue to lack *-- appropriate *general*
>>>>> accountability mechanisms.  It is based on the premise that removing the
>>>>> NTIA from the equation requires us to recommend *IANA-specific*
>>>>> accountability mechanisms, regardless of how improved ICANN's general
>>>>> accountability mechanisms might be (before or after the IANA Transition).
>>>>> That is what we have been tasked to do, and that is what we have done.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Greg, you mentioned earlier that the ability to move IANA is required
>>>> (although i don't necessarily agree but it doesn't hurt to have it) so if
>>>> there are adequate mechanism within ICANN wouldn't all that will be
>>>> required is for the mechanism to trigger movement of IANA from ICANN? Why
>>>> then do we require all the MRT/CSC structure? I also don't agree that NTIA
>>>> said we should replicate contracting processes (you may direct me to what
>>>> part of NTIA announcement that implied such)
>>>> .
>>>>
>>> There is broad support for separability in the CWG.  It's in our
>>> Principles (letter h) and it's in our Draft Proposal.  You are entitled to
>>> disagree, but unless you can convince the CWG to change the Principles and
>>> the Proposal, any option we recommend must include separability.,
>>>
>>
>> Well the principles is still in draft state (unless you mean it has just
>> been finalised), in anycase, i have no problem with maintaining the current
>> separability and this is something that can still be maintained internally
>> by adding a few lines in the by-law
>>
>
> The Principles may be in draft but they have broad support, and they are
> heading toward finality.  So it is certainly most appropriate to consider
> them heavily in examining any proposal.  Right now, the current
> separability is entirely a creation of the IANA Contract -- I"m glad you
> have no problem maintaining the type of separability now embodied in the
> contract.  However, you go on to say that this separability "can still be
> maintained internally by adding a few lines in the by-law."  I find this
> assumption completely unsupported and thus completely lacking in
> credibility and value.  Why do you think this is true?  What would you put
> in the by-laws (by-laws aren't magic, they require words that work)?  How
> would this work? What and who would trigger the separation?  What would be
> the method for actually separating and finding a new Operator?  Without
> answers to these questions, you are just running through the halls of the
> CWG with a jar of peanut butter, shouting "To Mars!"  I'm not buying it --
> not because I believe it's impossible -- but because I've been shown
> nothing on a functional level that makes me believe it is possible.
>
>>
>>
>>> You say "if there are adequate mechanisms within ICANN...."  What are
>>> these "adequate mechanisms"?  Where would they come from?  Remember, it's
>>> up to our CWG to come up with mechanisms relating to IANA accountability.
>>>
>>
>> .....and this is the issue, we treat IANA accountability as if its rocket
>> science, i think it may have been a mistake to have separated the CWG as
>> its making it all look like the accountability this group is looking for is
>> different from what the CWG-accountability is looking for.
>>
>
> It's not rocket science, and I don't believe we are treating it that way.
> It's just hard work.  Whether having two CWGs is a mistake is beside the
> point.  The accountability this group is looking for *IS* different from
> the accountability the CWG-Accountability is looking for.  As I pointed out
> earlier in this thread:
>
> *The key point I am making is that the "IANA specific aspect of the
> accountability" is within the scope of our CWG, and has been since the
> beginning of our work.  As it says in our Charter: "Accountability for the
> administration of the IANA functions (i.e.,implementation and operational
> accountability), however, is properly within the scope of this working
> group."  **Conversely, the Charter of CCWG-Accountability says
> "Accountability for the administration of the IANA functions (i.e.,
> implementation and operational accountability) is not within the scope of
> the CCWG-Accountability as it is being dealt with by the CWG-Stewardship."*
>
> The CWG-Accountability is looking at the much broader question of
> enhancing ICANN's accountability to its stakeholders in all of its
> policy-making, implementing, operations, etc. -- everything *but* the
> accountability we are looking for.
>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Your "mechanism" is a complete mystery.  If you want this group to
>>> consider an "internal to ICANN" mechanism that would move the right to
>>> perform the IANA Functions out of ICANN (and meet all the other
>>> requirements in this transition), you'll need to propose one.
>>>
>>
>> The NTIA asks us to develop a proposal that transitions its stewardship
>> to multi-stakeholder. It didn't say that the proposal has to be able to
>> take the right to perform IANA function out of ICANN.
>>
>
> I agree that the NTIA did not say that our proposal has to be able to take
> the right to perform the IANA functions out of ICANN.  However, the NTIA
> also did not preclude a proposal that takes the right to perform the IANA
> Functions out of ICANN.  There was broad support within the CWG for a
> proposal that included the possibility and ability to take the right to
> perform the IANA Functions out of ICANN, and therefore that is in our
> proposal.
>
>
>> The way i interpreted it is that ICANN currently has a growing
>> multi-stakeholder environment and this is the opportunity to transition the
>> stewardship to that community so if this require updating ICANN-by law...so
>> be it.
>>
>
> First, the NTIA did not refer to the "ICANN multistakeholder community,"
> it referred to the "global multistakeholder community."  These are not the
> same things.  Nonetheless, I don't believe that this necessarily precludes
> an "internal-to-ICANN" solution, but it does mean that any such solution
> would have to bring stakeholders not present in ICANN into the oversight
> and accountability process.  As for updating the ICANN by-laws, this not a
> magic wand.  Without some idea of what this means (and I've asked a few
> questions above so that I and others can get some idea), saying "update the
> ICANN by-laws" is no more valuable than that NASA scientist saying "peanut
> butter."
>
> Please note that I am not categorically precluding an "internal-to-ICANN"
> proposal.  But right now, I don't see where that proposal is coming from,
> much less how it will satisfy even the most basic concerns of various
> stakeholders.
>
>
>> It is when we propose such and it gets rejected by ICANN board that we
>> can justify that ICANN is not yet mature enough and a contracting route
>> will suffice until there is significant indications of the organisation's
>> maturity
>>
>>
> First, we have to have a reasonably tangible and concrete
> "Internal-to-ICANN" proposal before the CWG, and that proposal has be
> further developed by and win the support of the CWG.  We don't have even
> the first step of that , so your scenario above never happens.  If it does
> happen, it's because the CWG decides that this "internal-to-ICANN" is the
> best proposal, not because we want to test the ICANN Board's "maturity",
> before putting forth the current draft proposal.  I am confident we will
> put forth the proposal that gains the most support from the CWG and the
> stakeholders, regardless of whether the ICANN Board will like it.  Right
> now, that seems likely to be a proposal growing out of the current draft
> proposal, since there is no other tangible proposal on the table.  In any
> event, whether the ICANN Board would or even has the power to "reject"
> the proposal is open to question.  As the ICG FAQ states:
>
> *15.  How will ICANN Board handle the final proposal submitted by the ICG?*
>
> *The ICG expects that its proposal, having achieved consensus on the
> Coordination Group and within the Operational Communities, will be welcomed
> by the ICANN Board and dutifully transmitted to NTIA*
>
>>
>>> Finally, I never said that the NTIA said we should replicate contracting
>>> processes. What makes you say that?
>>>
>>> Well you have just implied that in your statement below
>>
>
> No, I have not.  I didn't even mention the NTIA. Please don't put words in
> my mouth.
>
>>
>>
>>>   However, unless we have another way to accomplish our objectives, the
>>> contract remains the most practical option.
>>>
>>
>> I have "paraphrased" what i believe to be our objective above.
>>
>> I'm not sure what you are referring to, or what your point is.  Whatever
> your paraphrase is, our objectives are already well stated in the NTIA's
> announcement, the ICG RFP and our charter, so hopefully your paraphrase is
> consistent with those base document.
>
> Regards,
>
> Greg
>
>> Regards
>>
>>>
>>> Greg
>>>
>>>> Thanks
>>>>
>>>> Regards!
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Greg
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Gregory S. Shatan **ï* *Abelman Frayne & Schwab*
>>>>>
>>>>> *666 Third Avenue **ï** New York, NY 10017-5621*
>>>>>
>>>>> *Direct*  212-885-9253 *| **Main* 212-949-9022
>>>>>
>>>>> *Fax*  212-949-9190 *|* *Cell *917-816-6428
>>>>>
>>>>> *gsshatan at lawabel.com <gsshatan at lawabel.com>*
>>>>>
>>>>> *ICANN-related: gregshatanipc at gmail.com <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> *
>>>>>
>>>>> *www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>*
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Dec 6, 2014 at 2:53 AM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Greg,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am definitely not also in any form of agreement with an extension
>>>>>> of the timeline especially as it may not be the same story after USA
>>>>>> elections. I am also not sure I have seen much people calling for extension
>>>>>> on this list... We both know what has been paramount subject of discussion
>>>>>> in the last few weeks and timeline is the least of them.
>>>>>> I am saying since it is definite ( it's a requirement) that some
>>>>>> level of accountability will/MUST happen before transition, will it not
>>>>>> already handle some of our fears that actually lead to the creation of the
>>>>>> current transition proposal. My understanding is that the current
>>>>>> transition proposal was mainly inspired on the premise of the current
>>>>>> operator lacking appropriate accountability mechanism... No? As you seem to
>>>>>> be implying otherwise by your mail.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> sent from Google nexus 4
>>>>>> kindly excuse brevity and typos.
>>>>>> On 6 Dec 2014 08:36, "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Seun:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I don't see how Strickling's remarks provide an "opportunity" for
>>>>>>> anything.  I presume you are referring to the "spin" that some are putting
>>>>>>> on this speech as a "hint" that the timeline should be extended.  I think
>>>>>>> that is a baseless assertion.  The NTIA has indicated since March that they
>>>>>>> have the option to extend the agreement, so not only is this not "new news"
>>>>>>> it's no news.  It's also not news that both the IANA transition and
>>>>>>> accountability "issues must be addressed before any transition
>>>>>>> takes place."  Not only is this not news to the CWG  or the
>>>>>>> community, it is in our proposal.  So, I think the direct answer to your
>>>>>>> question is "No," and wishing won't make it so.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The remarks also clearly recognize that there are two work streams
>>>>>>> -- IANA transition and enhanced ICANN accountability. Not to belabor the
>>>>>>> obvious but we are the "IANA transition" work stream.  Of course, there are
>>>>>>> elements of accountability in our scope as well -- as Strickling refers to
>>>>>>> it, a process that will "result in ICANN’s becoming even more
>>>>>>> directly accountable to the customers of the IANA functions."  It is that
>>>>>>> type of accountability that we have to worry about, and which I believe our
>>>>>>> proposal (while still a work in progress) addresses.  I don't believe that
>>>>>>> there is anything in our proposal that can be categorized as
>>>>>>> "overreaching."  Indeed, I think we have been quite mindful of staying
>>>>>>> within our scope.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm not sure what you are driving at -- do you want us to take on
>>>>>>> the task of enhancing ICANN's accountability beyond the IANA function?
>>>>>>> This would be massively "overreaching." Or do you want us not to deal with
>>>>>>> accountability at all, leaving it to the CCWG-Accountability to handle all
>>>>>>> elements of accountability, with the result that ICANN would then somehow
>>>>>>> be "safe" for an "internal to ICANN" IANA transition?  I think this would
>>>>>>> be "underreaching." It also assumes that the only thing standing between us
>>>>>>> and an "internal to ICANN" IANA transition is enhanced ICANN
>>>>>>> accountability; I do not think this is the case.  I think there is a need
>>>>>>> for IANA-specific accountability regardless of the overall state of ICANN
>>>>>>> accountability, and I think our proposal meets that need.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In any event, we can neither grab the entire accountability mandate
>>>>>>> or leave it all to the CCWG-Accountability.  Rather, we need to deal with
>>>>>>> the elements of accountability that fall within our bailiwick -- as we have
>>>>>>> done all along -- and which are an integral part of satisfying the
>>>>>>> requirement for transition, as it has been all along.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Greg
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Gregory S. Shatan **ï* *Abelman Frayne & Schwab*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *666 Third Avenue **ï** New York, NY 10017-5621*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Direct*  212-885-9253 *| **Main* 212-949-9022
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Fax*  212-949-9190 *|* *Cell *917-816-6428
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *gsshatan at lawabel.com <gsshatan at lawabel.com>*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *ICANN-related: gregshatanipc at gmail.com <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> *
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 6, 2014 at 1:31 AM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com
>>>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thanks for the share Greg, wouldn't this then give us the
>>>>>>>> opportunity to rethink the accountability measures we propose to put in
>>>>>>>> place in lieu of ICANN's accountability; Since ICANN accountability is a
>>>>>>>> requirement for transition then there may be no need for the current
>>>>>>>> overreaching transition structure we are proposing.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Cheers!
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> sent from Google nexus 4
>>>>>>>> kindly excuse brevity and typos.
>>>>>>>> On 6 Dec 2014 00:43, "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> All:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I thought that Larry Strickling's remarks at a seminar yesterday
>>>>>>>>> would be of interest to the group.  Here is the portion of his speech that
>>>>>>>>> appears germane to our work and that of the CWG-Accountability:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I will finish up by addressing the challenges and opportunities
>>>>>>>>> facing us in 2015 with respect to Internet policy.  Our core mission at
>>>>>>>>> NTIA is to ensure that the Internet remains an engine for economic growth,
>>>>>>>>> innovation and free expression.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Internationally, the United States has been a vocal advocate of
>>>>>>>>> the bottom-up, consensus-based approach to Internet governance known as the
>>>>>>>>> multistakeholder model.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The multistakeholder model has enabled the Internet to develop
>>>>>>>>> into an engine for innovation, free speech and economic growth.  Under this
>>>>>>>>> model, all stakeholders, whether they be from industry, civil society, or
>>>>>>>>> government, come together in an inclusive, transparent, accountable forum
>>>>>>>>> to make decisions and solve problems.  As the Internet agency, NTIA’s job
>>>>>>>>> is to strengthen and promote that model.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In 2014, we have seen a growing acceptance of the multistakeholder
>>>>>>>>> model around the world, but particularly in developing countries.  Earlier
>>>>>>>>> this year, Brazil hosted the successful NetMundial conference, which
>>>>>>>>> brought together a wide range of stakeholders including technical experts,
>>>>>>>>> civil society groups, industry representatives and government officials,
>>>>>>>>> all on an equal footing with each other.  At this meeting not only did
>>>>>>>>> participants agree that Internet governance should be built on democratic
>>>>>>>>> multistakeholder processes,” the entire meeting was a demonstration of the
>>>>>>>>> open, participative, and consensus-driven governance that has allowed the
>>>>>>>>> Internet to develop as an unparalleled engine of economic growth and
>>>>>>>>> innovation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A month later, a High-Level Panel, headed by the president of
>>>>>>>>> Estonia, Toomas Ilves released a report once again affirming the power of
>>>>>>>>> multistakeholder policy development.  The panel said it “recognizes, fully
>>>>>>>>> supports, and adopts the Internet governance principles produced in the
>>>>>>>>> NetMundial Statement.”
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Most recently, at the International Telecommunication Union’s 2014
>>>>>>>>> Plenipotentiary conference in Busan, Korea, last month, we saw the fruits
>>>>>>>>> of all our work to preserve multistakeholder Internet governance.  The
>>>>>>>>> United States achieved all of its objectives in Busan, including keeping
>>>>>>>>> the ITU’s work focused on its current mandate and not expanding its role
>>>>>>>>> into Internet and cybersecurity issues.  The U.S. delegation, led by
>>>>>>>>> Ambassador Danny Sepulveda, successfully built consensus across nations to
>>>>>>>>> protect the robust, innovative, multi-stakeholder Internet we enjoy today.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This validation of the multistakeholder model comes at a critical
>>>>>>>>> time.  Last March, NTIA announced its intention to complete the
>>>>>>>>> privatization of the Internet Domain Name System (DNS), currently managed
>>>>>>>>> by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).  This
>>>>>>>>> process began in 1998, when ICANN took over important technical functions
>>>>>>>>> related to the domain name system, known as the IANA functions, under a
>>>>>>>>> contract with NTIA.  In our March announcement, NTIA asked ICANN to convene
>>>>>>>>> a multistakeholder process to develop a proposal to transition the U.S.
>>>>>>>>> stewardship role over the IANA functions to the international community. We
>>>>>>>>> did this to ensure that the multistakeholder model for DNS coordination
>>>>>>>>> continues.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we announced this transition, we outlined some specific
>>>>>>>>> conditions that must be addressed before this transition takes place.
>>>>>>>>> First, the proposal must support and enhance the multistakeholder model of
>>>>>>>>> Internet governance, in that it should be developed by the multistakeholder
>>>>>>>>> community and have broad community support.  More specifically, we will not
>>>>>>>>> accept a transition proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a
>>>>>>>>> government-led or intergovernmental organization solution.  Second, the
>>>>>>>>> proposal must maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the
>>>>>>>>> domain name system.  Third, it must meet the needs and expectations of the
>>>>>>>>> global customers and partners of the IANA services.  And finally, it must
>>>>>>>>> maintain the openness of the Internet.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Now that we are eight months past our IANA announcement, it is
>>>>>>>>> important to take stock of where this transition stands.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We are pleased that the community has responded enthusiastically
>>>>>>>>> to our call to develop a transition plan that will ensure the stability,
>>>>>>>>> security and openness of the Internet.  Acting as a facilitator, ICANN
>>>>>>>>> announced this summer the formation of a group representing more than a
>>>>>>>>> dozen Internet stakeholder communities that will help develop a transition
>>>>>>>>> proposal.  As set forth in its charter, the IANA Stewardship Transition
>>>>>>>>> Coordination Group is “conduct[ing] itself transparently, consult[ing] with
>>>>>>>>> a broad range of stakeholders, and ensur[ing] that its proposals support
>>>>>>>>> the security and stability of the IANA functions.”
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The community is in the process of developing proposals for the
>>>>>>>>> specific IANA functions.  Earlier this week, a working group focused on
>>>>>>>>> domain names released a 100-page proposal for community review and
>>>>>>>>> comment.  We expect proposals for other of the functions to surface over
>>>>>>>>> the next month or so.  The community hopes to submit its transition
>>>>>>>>> proposal to NTIA by the end of next July, which would allow us to review
>>>>>>>>> the proposal before the current contract expires at the end of September
>>>>>>>>> 2015.  I want to emphasize that we did not set a deadline for this
>>>>>>>>> transition.  If for some reason the community needs more time, we have the
>>>>>>>>> option to extend the current contract for up to four years.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ICANN has also launched a process to examine how to ensure it
>>>>>>>>> remains accountable to the global Internet community.  Specifically, this
>>>>>>>>> process will examine how ICANN can strengthen its accountability mechanisms
>>>>>>>>> to address the absence of its historical contractual relationship with
>>>>>>>>> NTIA.  NTIA believes that this accountability process needs to include the
>>>>>>>>> stress testing of solutions to safeguard against future contingencies such
>>>>>>>>> as attempts to influence or takeover ICANN functions that are not currently
>>>>>>>>> possible with the IANA functions contract in place.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The two work streams on the IANA transition and enhanced
>>>>>>>>> accountability are directly linked and NTIA has repeatedly said that both
>>>>>>>>> issues must be addressed before any transition takes place.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I am confident that engaging the global Internet community to work
>>>>>>>>> out these important issues will strengthen the multistakeholder process and
>>>>>>>>> will result in ICANN’s becoming even more directly accountable to the
>>>>>>>>> customers of the IANA functions and to the broader Internet community.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Getting the transition right will be a major project for NTIA in
>>>>>>>>> 2015.
>>>>>>>>> The full remarks are at:
>>>>>>>>> http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2014/remarks-assistant-secretary-strickling-plifcba-telecommunications-policy-regula
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> An article about these remarks by Kieren McCarty in the Register
>>>>>>>>> is at:
>>>>>>>>>  http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/05/us_government_tells_icann_no_accountability_no_iana/
>>>>>>>>> <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/05/us_government_tells_icann_no_accountability_no_iana/>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Greg
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Gregory S. Shatan **ï* *Abelman Frayne & Schwab*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *666 Third Avenue **ï** New York, NY 10017-5621*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Direct*  212-885-9253 *| **Main* 212-949-9022
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Fax*  212-949-9190 *|* *Cell *917-816-6428
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *gsshatan at lawabel.com <gsshatan at lawabel.com>*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *ICANN-related: gregshatanipc at gmail.com <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> *
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> CWG-Stewardship mailing list
>>>>>>>>> CWG-Stewardship at icann.org
>>>>>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb:
>>>> http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt
>>>> email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng
>>>> <seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng>*
>>>>
>>>> The key to understanding is humility - my view !
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb:
>> http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt
>> email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng
>> <seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng>*
>>
>> The key to understanding is humility - my view !
>>
>>
>>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/attachments/20141212/98108e0d/attachment-0001.html>