[CWG-Stewardship] Agenda item 5 - Alternate proposals

Bertrand de La Chapelle bdelachapelle at gmail.com
Thu Dec 18 16:09:48 UTC 2014


Milton,

can I respectfully but firmly ask you to refrain from labeling people who
have concerns with the complexities of the currently discussed architecture
as "advocates of ICANN controlling everything".

You know it is not true and are too well versed in these discussions not to
see that the issues are a bit more complex than that.

Such an attitude does not serve the feeling of mutual respect and trust
that I would like to prevail in designing a community solution.

Thanks.

Bertrand


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On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 12:20 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:
>
>  Interesting that Shawn’s membership proposal (the one published in The
> Hill) is put forward as something “simpler” than the CWG proposal. Though I
> am sympathetic to this proposal, establishing a membership would be an
> extremely complicated and drawn-out change, fraught with all kinds of
> unanticipated implications and implementation difficulties.
>
>
>
> Likewise, Alan is suggesting that a set of yet-unknown changes coming out
> of an incomplete process is also “less complicated.” That is not a
> supportable claim. It would be more accurate to say that the separability
> we propose here dramatically simplifies the work of the CCWG-Accountability.
>
>
>
> Del Bianco’s “cross-community membership group” (described at the end of
> Alan’s message below) is another proposal mentioned. That would be an
> alternative board that could second-guess ICANN’s board in numerous ways
> and would create a competing power center. The complications caused by such
> a structure are _*enormous*_, far more so than the Contract Co. It is
> interesting that advocates of ICANN controlling everything see such
> problems with the MRT but no such problems with a committee that not only
> mirrors the composition of the MRT but has an unrestricted mandate to
> overrule the board.
>
>
>
> --MM
>
>
>
> *From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
> cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Alan Greenberg
>
>   Although I believe that the ALAC proposal (
> http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011.html
> ) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not
> advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see
> http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/
> and
> http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability),
> but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler
> mode for the new IANA coupled with *real multistakeholder accountability
> in ICANN*.
>
> I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor
> that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the
> complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level
> of control could be provided by a change such as this?
>
> Alan
>
> ===================
>
>  From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org>
> To: Accountability Cross Community <
> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000
> Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent
> cross-community group as ultimate authority
>
>
> This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent,
> cross-community "˜Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management
> accountable to the community.  It was described this way in draft3
> <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accountability%20suggestions%20%5Bdraft%203%5D.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1418610739000&api=v2>
> for work area 2:
>
> Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative
> structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
>
> Appoint members of Affirmation review teams
>
> Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent
> panel)
>
> Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval
>
> Approve annual proposed ICANN budget
>
> Recall one or all ICANN Board members
>
> One of the groups proposing
> <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/>
> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed
> <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability>
> in a Washington paper today.  Daniel Castro of the Information Technology &
> Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
>
> California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit
> corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit
> organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to
> provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create
> statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This
> authority could include removing board members, overturning board
> decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of
> the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees,"
> such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP
> address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO)
> responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that
> the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be
> limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
>
> We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification
> to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
>
> Steve DelBianco
> Executive Director
> NetChoice
>
> http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and
> http://blog.netchoice.org
>
> +1.202.420.7482
>
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>
>
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