[CWG-Stewardship] Agenda item 5 - Alternate proposals

Seun Ojedeji seun.ojedeji at gmail.com
Thu Dec 18 18:19:54 UTC 2014


Just to say i agree with Bertrand 100%,

Thanks

On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 7:08 PM, Bertrand de La Chapelle <
bdelachapelle at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Milton,
>
> As I mentioned on the call, we need to be careful even when we label this
> "internal to iCANN" solution. Because we then confuse, as we too often do,
> ICANN staff, ICANN Board and ICANN community.
>
> I think what people exploring alternatives or potential improvements mean
> is that they want to build upon the existing building blocks of the ICANN
> community rather than something entirely external.
>
> One of the arguments that I think underpins this effort is the perceived
> vulnerability of any entirely new, unfunded and unstaffed architecture that
> would in many ways resemble the vulnerability of the early ICANN.
>
> Just to try and clarify the terms of the debate.
>
> B.
>
> "*Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes*", Antoine de
> Saint Exupéry
> ("*There is no greater mission for humans than uniting humans*")BERTRAND
> DE LA CHAPELLEInternet & Jurisdiction Project | Directoremail
> bdelachapelle at internetjurisdiction.netemail bdelachapelle at gmail.com
> twitter @IJurisdiction <https://twitter.com/IJurisdiction> |
> @bdelachapelle <https://twitter.com/bdelachapelle>mobile +33 (0)6 11 88
> 33 32www.internetjurisdiction.net[image: A GLOBAL MULTI-STAKEHOLDER
> DIALOGUE PROCESS]
>
> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 6:10 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:
>>
>>  Bertrand
>>
>> Correction accepted: I should say the “internal to ICANN solution”….
>>
>>
>>
>> ;-)
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Bertrand de La Chapelle [mailto:bdelachapelle at gmail.com]
>> *Sent:* Thursday, December 18, 2014 11:10 AM
>> *To:* Milton L Mueller
>> *Cc:* Alan Greenberg; CWG Stewardship
>> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Agenda item 5 - Alternate proposals
>>
>>
>>
>> Milton,
>>
>>
>>
>> can I respectfully but firmly ask you to refrain from labeling people who
>> have concerns with the complexities of the currently discussed architecture
>> as "advocates of ICANN controlling everything".
>>
>>
>>
>> You know it is not true and are too well versed in these discussions not
>> to see that the issues are a bit more complex than that.
>>
>>
>>
>> Such an attitude does not serve the feeling of mutual respect and trust
>> that I would like to prevail in designing a community solution.
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>>
>>
>> Bertrand
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>       "*Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes*",
>> Antoine de Saint Exupéry
>> ("*There is no greater mission for humans than uniting humans*")
>>
>> BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE
>>
>> Internet & Jurisdiction Project | Director
>>
>> email bdelachapelle at internetjurisdiction.net
>>
>> email bdelachapelle at gmail.com
>>
>> twitter @IJurisdiction <https://twitter.com/IJurisdiction> |
>> @bdelachapelle <https://twitter.com/bdelachapelle>
>>
>> mobile +33 (0)6 11 88 33 32
>>
>> www.internetjurisdiction.net
>>
>> [image: A GLOBAL MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE PROCESS]
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 12:20 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu>
>> wrote:
>>
>>  Interesting that Shawn’s membership proposal (the one published in The
>> Hill) is put forward as something “simpler” than the CWG proposal. Though I
>> am sympathetic to this proposal, establishing a membership would be an
>> extremely complicated and drawn-out change, fraught with all kinds of
>> unanticipated implications and implementation difficulties.
>>
>>
>>
>> Likewise, Alan is suggesting that a set of yet-unknown changes coming out
>> of an incomplete process is also “less complicated.” That is not a
>> supportable claim. It would be more accurate to say that the separability
>> we propose here dramatically simplifies the work of the CCWG-Accountability.
>>
>>
>>
>> Del Bianco’s “cross-community membership group” (described at the end of
>> Alan’s message below) is another proposal mentioned. That would be an
>> alternative board that could second-guess ICANN’s board in numerous ways
>> and would create a competing power center. The complications caused by such
>> a structure are _*enormous*_, far more so than the Contract Co. It is
>> interesting that advocates of ICANN controlling everything see such
>> problems with the MRT but no such problems with a committee that not only
>> mirrors the composition of the MRT but has an unrestricted mandate to
>> overrule the board.
>>
>>
>>
>> --MM
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
>> cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Alan Greenberg
>>
>> Although I believe that the ALAC proposal (
>> http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011.html
>> ) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not
>> advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see
>> http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/
>> and
>> http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability),
>> but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler
>> mode for the new IANA coupled with *real multistakeholder accountability
>> in ICANN*.
>>
>> I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor
>> that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the
>> complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level
>> of control could be provided by a change such as this?
>>
>> Alan
>>
>> ===================
>>
>> From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org>
>> To: Accountability Cross Community <
>> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000
>> Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent
>> cross-community group as ultimate authority
>>
>>
>> This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent,
>> cross-community "˜Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management
>> accountable to the community.  It was described this way in draft3
>> <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accountability%20suggestions%20%5Bdraft%203%5D.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1418610739000&api=v2>
>> for work area 2:
>>
>> Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community
>> representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
>>
>> Appoint members of Affirmation review teams
>>
>> Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent
>> panel)
>>
>> Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval
>>
>> Approve annual proposed ICANN budget
>>
>> Recall one or all ICANN Board members
>>
>> One of the groups proposing
>> <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/>
>> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed
>> <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability>
>> in a Washington paper today.  Daniel Castro of the Information Technology &
>> Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
>>
>> California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit
>> corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit
>> organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to
>> provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create
>> statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This
>> authority could include removing board members, overturning board
>> decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of
>> the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees,"
>> such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP
>> address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO)
>> responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that
>> the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be
>> limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
>>
>> We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification
>> to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
>>
>> Steve DelBianco
>> Executive Director
>> NetChoice
>>
>> http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and
>> http://blog.netchoice.org
>>
>> +1.202.420.7482
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> CWG-Stewardship mailing list
>> CWG-Stewardship at icann.org
>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> CWG-Stewardship mailing list
> CWG-Stewardship at icann.org
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
>
>

-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------





*Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb:      http://www.fuoye.edu.ng
<http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email:
<http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng
<seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng>*

The key to understanding is humility - my view !
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/attachments/20141218/262e8ed6/attachment-0001.html>


More information about the CWG-Stewardship mailing list