[CWG-Stewardship] Composition of MRT

[Milton L Mueller]

Christopher,
There are a number of errors in your message below, for the sake of the others who might not know, let me list them.


*        First, you assert that the ICG, of which I am a member, is expected to "seek and propose a collective solution." This is incorrect. No such expectations are enumerated in our charter. We do not propose, we assemble and integrate the proposals given to us by the three operational communities in a bottom up manner. Our charter was designed to give each of them the autonomy to propose whatever they want, within the NTIA criteria.


*        Second, you hint that ICG should unilaterally revise or modify the proposals they receive to conform to the expectations you have invented. But if you read our charter you will see that if and when we identify unworkable elements or violations of the NTIA criteria in the proposals, we will merely return it to the relevant operational community for them to revise.



You can review the ICG charter here: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/charter-icg-27aug14-en.pdf We also have a FAQ: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/icg-faqs-2014-10-10-en



*        Third, with respect to 'economy of oversight' you are wrong again; there are no such economies to be had. The IETF already has its own, separate SLA for the protocol-related functions, the numbers people have a separate set of processes, and the NTIA and ccNSO and gTLDs have overseen the DNS part. In other words, we already have a 3 distinct pairwise monitoring relationships between IANA and the three operational communities. The DNS community does not spend time monitoring IANA's publication of IETF protocols, and the IETF/IAB do not spend time monitoring the accuracy of DNS root zone modifications. There are a few IANA functions that touch on more than one operational community, and there is some need for coordination across names, numbers and protocols in some very limited instances, but they are technical coordination functions not 'oversight'.


*        Fourth, with respect to separability, you conveniently overlook the fact that both the IETF and the NRO/ASO people either already have, or are creating, their own form of separability.



*        Fifth, and most distressing, when you mention vertical integration and issues of "fair competition" you are revealing utter confusion between ICANN-related policy development and IANA-related implementation issues. Whether a registrar and registry can be vertically integrated is an economic policy matter (one that was resolved several years ago, by the way) and does not in the slightest bit affect how IANA works or who the contractor should be. There is no intersection between these things. A root zone modification for a vertically integrated registry works in exactly the same way as a root zone modification for a non-integrated operator.



*        Sixth, it was ICANN's board that passed the vertical integration policy despite the absence of a consensus policy from the relevant GNSO working group. I find it ironic that you are so enraged about the vertical integration policy and yet are also such an enthusiastic proponent of ICANN controlling IANA. Perhaps you need to revise some of your assumptions and conclusions now that you know the facts.

Milton L Mueller
Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
Syracuse University School of Information Studies
http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
Internet Governance Project
http://internetgovernance.org<http://internetgovernance.org/>



From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Christopher Wilkinson


Dear Greg:

Further to your message of 18 December:

1.         When the ICG finally gets to assessing the respective proposals from IETF, CRISP and the CWG, with advice from SSAC, some rationalisation and simplification will become necessary. Since the status quo appears to be largely acceptable to several major stakeholders, I rather expect that ICG will be expected to seek and propose a collective solution.

Regarding 'separability', I consider that it would be less difficult to obtain acceptable accountability on the part of ICANN through existing processes, than it would be to ensure accountability of any new separate entities. Small, new entities would be at risk of capture, particularly as the balance of financial power in the DNS industry is increasingly distorted.

Regarding 'severability', I would recall that in addition to the requirement of technical and economic efficiency, there is an issue with the economy of oversight. None of the IANA functions are exclusive to their current 'customers'. They all pertain to significant public interests which are  currently articulated through different SOs and ACs in the ICANN context. Severaribility would aggravate, indeed exaggerate the cost of oversight to the other stakeholders concerned.

In that context, may I recall that there is no question of any future IANA entity charging fees. Obviously, ICANN and its constituent parts would contest the rationale of creating new unfunded entities to undertake tasks that they are currently fulfilling themselves, financed from existing resources.

2.         ICG is tasked with proposing an unique solution to NTIA. I would have thought that the communities concerned would have been facilitating that difficult task in substance and in time-line, but No! The initial CWG document is a long and rambling text which, from the editorial perspective, is professionally disgraceful. Indeed it compares most ill with the  structured, clear and succinct submissions from IETF, CRISP and SSAC. What do we expect ICG to do with the CWG texts?

3.         Regarding eventual alternative suggestions, I would not proceed through CWG. Following the 'vertical integration' decision - recommended (if I am not mistaken) by GNSO - the Registry and Registrar community have lost credibility as custodians of fair competition in the DNS markets. Specifically, to my mind, any future ICANN or IANA structure which would give rise to Registrar block voting on behalf  of multiple owned Registries would be totally unacceptable.

I shall not ask you whether this is helpful, but I trust that it is clear.

Regards to you all and with the Season's Greetings

CW
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