[CWG-Stewardship] Comments from .nz on CWG proposal

[Jordan Carter]

Dear all

Please see below our comments on the CWG's proposal. We largely support it.

In particular, we believe that the CWG model transitions stewardship to the
global Multistakeholder community, and that is something we strongly
support.

InternetNZ does not support transferring stewardship to ICANN, which is
what a number of other proposals seek to do. The reasons for this are
matters of principle and also practical, and explained below.

Thank you to the Working Group for pulling together a workable proposal.

best,
Jordan

PS - PDF version has been lodged in the formal comments process of ICANN,
and I can send it to anyone who wants a copy.

Submission to the Cross Community Working Group on Names Related Functions
(CWG-IANA) on the Draft Transition Proposal

22 December 2014


Introduction

This is InternetNZ's response to the public consultation on a Draft
Transition Proposal from the Cross Community Working Group on Names Related
Functions (the CWG-IANA), which has been developing a proposal to send to
the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group,


InternetNZ supports a transition of stewardship of the Internet's DNS from
NTIA to the global Internet community as announced on 14 March 2014.  It
believes that it can be achieved despite the complexities involved. The
Internet community is ready to do this.


 *The proposal is a very good beginning. InternetNZ thanks the members and
participants of the CWG-IANA for a crisp, well thought out proposal that
sets out the basic minimum requirements of a workable solution.*


In this response we deal with the following matters in turn:

·       Principles for a viable transition for the Names community

·       The importance of community, not ICANN, stewardship for IANA

·       Comments about the key elements of the CWG-IANA proposal

·       Timelines and the link with Accountability


This response deals with Names matters and does not discuss the linkages
with the other two customer groups. It is written from the perspective of a
designated ccTLD manager and of an organisation with a wider agenda of
supporting the open Internet and involving domestic civil society and
Internet community participants in these discussions.


We thank the CWG-IANA in advance for considering this input, and we would
be happy to provide more detail or information if required. Contact details
follow at the end of this response.

 Key principles


Today, there is a deeply embedded principle of *distributed** stewardship*
of the IANA functions. ICANN is the IANA Functions Operator; NTIA offers
the Functions Contract and is essentially the Functions Administrator; and
Verisign operates the Root Zone. InternetNZ supports distributed
stewardship as a matter of principle and practice. Erosion of this
principle creates an overly-powerful institution vulnerable to capture by a
small subset of stakeholders, leading to the resources of this institution
used to control, rather than support, the ongoing development of the open
Internet.


A second and related key principle is that of *separability.* There must be
the real and effective possibility that at some future point the IANA
functions can be operated by an institution other than ICANN should the
global multistakeholder community require this.  This possibility is key to
motivating the IANA functions operator to keep in close touch with their
customers and be led by them.


>From this comes the third principle, the importance of *customer
involvement.* Registries have the strongest possible interest in the
effective operation of the IANA functions and so it is right that the
proposed Customer Committee contains customers. That body must not be
compromised by adding those interested in but not *directly* affected by
the IANA functions.


Fourth, important is *broad community stewardship* of the IANA functions.
Stewardship must remain in the broad "global multistakeholder community" -
for example the breadth of interests participating in the IANA Stewardship
Transition Coordination Group (ICG). ICANN is only one part of that
community and as such would not be the appropriate vehicle for controlling
the IANA functions in total. More on this point below.


Finally, as a matter of principle we mention *ccTLD independence in
policymaking.* Country code TLDs are to be governed consistent with *local*
Internet community requirements and obligations. They are not creations of
or dependent on ICANN; few global policies are required or desired. The
ccTLD community recognises there are seldom one-size-fits-all solutions to
its needs, and local communities have provided intensively different models
for management. It is important that the stewardship model respect that
autonomy and independence.


InternetNZ sees these principles as:

·       consistent with or improvements on current practice in developing
and maintaining community and private sector stewardship and operation of
key Internet resources;

·       consistent with the requirements the NTIA has set out for accepting
a transition proposal; and

·       embedded in the CWG-IANA's proposal as detailed so far.


This principled basis explains why InternetNZ in general supports the
proposal.


 Community stewardship

Community stewardship of the IANA functions is essential, as a principle in
itself and as a means to securing other principles such as distribution of
powers and functions.  This relates in particular to discussion of some
sort of "internal to ICANN" solution being a better approach.


 *InternetNZ would not support a transition proposal that saw NTIA
stewardship replaced with ICANN stewardship of the DNS*.


The reasons for this include the following significant points:

 ·       It would erode the current distributed model & today's reality of
separability which we support in principle and in practice;

·       It would make the possibility for future reassignment of the
operation of the IANA functions theoretical at best and impossible at
worst, considerably worsening the accountability situation facing IANA
customers;

·       ICANN's track record shows that it has a fundamental cultural
difficulty in accepting its primary role as a limited purpose servant of
the Internet community -

o   in its attitudes to community attempts to control it (e.g. the debate
in 2014 about the accountability side of this transition);

o   in its practice of top-down decision-making (e.g. the President's
strategy panels, or the ongoing failure of the WHOIS review); and

o   in its adventures in the broader Internet Governance environment
without community mandate (e.g. the NetMundial Initiative).

As such, in practice it seems unlikely to be the sort of steward the
community as a whole could have confidence in;

·       ICANN's consistent arguments over many years that the law under
which it operates makes it impossible for the corporation to accept real
accountability to the Internet community. If that is correct in law, ICANN
can't be the overall steward. If that position is wrong and ICANN changes
its mind, it will have diminished further its credibility as a reliable and
dependable option for steward;

·       The scale of change and evidence of such change required to deal
with the practical matters set out in the previous two points cannot be
achieved in the timeframe required for the stewardship transition.

The CWG-IANA's proposal contains a workable model that does not have these
problems of principle and practice. It has gaps of detail that need to be
explained and resolved before it can be accepted, but what has been
produced so far is clearly preferable to a fully "internal to ICANN" model
both in principle and in practice.

 Comments on key elements

The CWG-IANA proposal is a strong one. If implemented, it would improve the
situation the Names community faces in terms of reliable stewardship and
accountability to mirror that enjoyed by the Numbers and Protocol
communities.


We endorse the elements set out in the CWG-IANA proposal at a high level
(Section 3.1) and believe they are fundamental to a workable transition.
They are:

 ·       Current performance of IANA functions is satisfactory

·       Maintaining the contract environment

·       Maintaining ICANN as operator for now

·       Not replicating ICANN's broader role in new, very narrowly focused
institutions (i.e. names policy broadly remains where it is)

·       Separation between policymaking and IANA functions operation needs
to be reinforced and strengthened

The CWG-IANA's proposal is the *lightest and simplest possible
institutional structure* required to allow an outcome consistent with these
elements and with the NTIA's requirements.

In particular we commend the CWG-IANA for dealing with operational
accountability for the IANA functions, which is clearly a requirement of
its Charter and is essential.

In respect of the specific entities proposed by the CWG-IANA:

Contract Company:

·       Should "own" or be the steward of the key IANA functions assets -
the root zone, the IP addresses of the A root server, the domain names, the
DNSSEC keys.

·       Needs a suitable set of indemnities from ICANN (or any future
Operator) such that ICANN protects both it, and the MRT that directs its
actions.

·       Structure and jurisdiction are important so as to prevent scope
creep and make sure there is accountability. There are advantages and
disadvantages to any jurisdictional choice. We look forward to seeing the
future work of the CWG on this matter.

 Multistakeholder Review Team:

·       Is the appropriate body for the global multistakeholder community
to exercise its stewardship.

·       Has a limited and narrow role which should not be extended.

·       There must be recognition of the work required of this body, and
appropriate support given to allow effective participation across the
community when required.

Customer Standing Committee:

·       Must retain a focus on the direct customers in its membership and
approach.

·       In particular, there should be no role for government or users'
representation on this Committee.

Independent Appeals Panel:

·       Specific requirements will need to be in place to protect ccTLD
sovereignty and independence, noting that this will be vital to get right
so as to secure support of the ccTLD community.

There is one issue on which the proposal is silent which we recommend
further work on: the Contract Company needs the ability to ensure that root
zone management is conducted consistent with decisions made by the IANA
Functions Operator it selects. That is not dealt with in the current
proposal so far as we can see.

Some other points of feedback for the CWG-IANA to consider:

·       A clear and transparent *audit chain and process* needs to be in
place for the entire system. The certification matter and public posting of
root zone change requests are useful, as is the IAP.

·       We look forward to further work by the CWG-IANA on what replacement
if any is required for the NTIA's root zone management process
administrator role (3.4.3 in the proposal), and express no view on this
matter at this time.

·       The *costs* of maintaining the infrastructure required for
effective stewardship of the IANA functions should properly fall on the
IANA Functions Operator - as such, it should finance the required expenses
of the CSC / MRT / Contract Company. The costs of operating the IANA
functions should be largely met by the customers of those functions in a
manner similar to today.

·       InternetNZ *supports the retention of a single integrated IANA
function* across the three customer groups (names, numbers & protocols),
but believes that in the event of a choice between an integrated IANA and
an acceptable settlement for the Names community, the choice should fall in
favour of the latter.

Finally, we note that in all this work *with more detail the vision will
become clearer* - important choices need to be fleshed out and we respect
the fact the CWG-IANA is still progressing much of the detail.

 Timelines and Accountability Links

The timeframe for this work is very compressed due to a desire by some to
complete a complete proposal for NTIA review in June 2015, and
implementation in time for the current IANA Functions Contract to expire on
30 September 2015.



*InternetNZ does not believe the planned timetable is workable.*


The main reason for this is that the CCWG-Accountability work, which is
integral to the IANA stewardship transition and must be completed (for the
IANA aspects of accountability) before the transition can be agreed, is
only starting work now and cannot complete a first draft of its proposals
before 15 April 2015.


It seems essential that there be some possibility for all three customer
groups (names, numbers & protocols) to review and if necessary adjust their
proposals to the ICG once the proposed accountability environment is known.
We do not see how that can be done with deadlines of January 2015 for final
community proposals, and April 2015 for a first Accountability strawman.


Rushing towards this September 2015 goal would require the community to be
focused on the NTIA stewardship transition to the extent that other
necessary and important debates aren't progressed - or that the community
faces total overload and is unable to participate effectively. Neither is
desirable.


The NTIA has made it clear that September 2015 is a goal not a requirement.
It does not seem impossible in law or in practice for a limited extension
of the IANA Functions Contract between the NTIA and ICANN to be agreed if
required.


As such, we think the CWG-IANA should consult with the ICG and the Internet
community more broadly to determine whether the current timeframe is
workable - and if not, what it should be adjusted to.
 Conclusion

The CWG has made a very good start to the Names community transition
proposal. InternetNZ again thanks all members and participants, and the
staff supporting this work, for the achievements so far.


Fundamental to this model is community stewardship of the IANA functions.
We support this strongly and commend the CWG for outlining an elegant,
light-weight approach to securing this for the future development and
evolution of the DNS.



*InternetNZ*


For further information or to offer any feedback, please contact:


Jordan Carter
Chief Executive, InternetNZ - jordan at internetnz.net.nz


Debbie Monahan
Chief Executive, Domain Name Commission - dnc at dnc.org.nz


Jay Daley
Chief Executive, NZ Registry Services - jay at nzrs.net.nz


* This document was submitted to the CWG-IANA on 22 Dec and will be
published on 23 Dec at **https://internetnz.nz/publications/submissions*
<https://internetnz.nz/publications/submissions>

-- 
Jordan Carter

Chief Executive
*InternetNZ*

04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Skype: jordancarter

*To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential.*
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