[CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles

[Mwendwa Kivuva]

>
> Independence of policy from IANA:  the IANA funtions  operator should be
> independent of the policy processes.  Its role is to implement changes in
> accordance with policy agreed through the relevant bottom up policy
> process [Note:  this does not pre-suppose any model for separation of the
> policy and IANA roles.  The current contract already requires such
> separation];
>

Is bottom up a cliche we want to see in our principles?

Diversity of IANA's Customers:
> For ccTLDs, the IANA should provide a service without requiring a
> contract and should respect the diversity of agreements and arrangements in
> place for ccTLDs.  In particular, the national policy authority or
> legislation (related to the ccTLD operator) should be respected and no
> additional requirements should be imposed unless it is directly and
> demonstrably linked to global security, stability and resilience of the DNS.
>

"unless it is directly and demonstrably linked to global security,
stability and resilience of the DNS"
Is there any example of a policy that can be implemented at the ccTLD level
that can threaten the DNS?

______________________
Mwendwa Kivuva, Nairobi, Kenya
L: https://www.linkedin.com/in/lordmwesh
B: http://lord.me.ke/
T: twitter.com/lordmwesh

"There are some men who lift the age they inhabit, till all men walk on
higher ground in that lifetime." - Maxwell Anderson

On 5 November 2014 20:40, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:

>  I agree 100% with Avri. Separability has to be a principle, otherwise we
> have failed the accountability test.
>
>
>
> *From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
> cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] * On Behalf Of *Avri Doria
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 4, 2014 9:16 PM
> *To:* cwg-stewardship at icann.org
> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles
>
>
>
> Hi,
>
> While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may
> be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate
> MUST be a principle any solution is built on.  It may never be exercised,
> but it would be unacceptable for there to be a solution that prohibited or
> did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from
> ICANN.
>
> This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for
> persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory.
>
> avri
>
>  On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote:
>
> Avri,
>
>
>
> While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't
>
> think it can be made a principle.
>
>
>
> There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe
>
> that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for
>
> separability does not exist.
>
>
>
> Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a
>
> principle for all solutions.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Guru
>
> On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri at acm.org> <avri at acm.org> wrote:
>
>
>
>   Hi,
>
>
>
> Comments:
>
>
>
>  a.       *Oversight, accountability and transparency*:  the service
>
> should be accountable and transparent.
>
>
>
>
>
> I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here.
>
>
>
>                       i.      *Independence of oversight*:  Oversight
>
> should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the
>
> accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder
>
> community;
>
>
>
>
>
> I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons:
>
>
>
> a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to
>
> the accountability issue.
>
> b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how
>
> it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so
>
> the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case.
>
> Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN
>
> corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as
>
> is ICANN.
>
>
>
> I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section:
>
>
>
> Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship
>
> function should be to the Internet stakeholder community.
>
>
>
> I also think we need to add a principle called separability
>
>
>
> Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its
>
> subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition
>
> of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and
>
> contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA
>
> service provider(s).  The power of removing the function to a different
>
> operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA
>
> function(s)
>
>
>
> Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels
>
> be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the
>
> Internet community on an annual basis.
>
>
>
> thanks
>
>
>
> avri
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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