[CWG-Stewardship] Fwd: Stress Tests for IANA transition proposals

Fri Nov 28 11:16:37 UTC 2014

Dear Chuck,

Agree that we must be prepared.  We could prepare solutions for some of the
scenarios already outlined, and if there are new scenarios that are prone
to capture the imagination, there could be a quieter way of contemplating
and preparing for such scenarios.

Thank you.

Sivasubramanian M <https://www.facebook.com/sivasubramanian.muthusamy>

On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 4:35 PM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes at verisign.com> wrote:

>  Siva,
>
>
>
> I would not characterize these as ‘imaginary extreme scenarios’ .  For
> some of them it is easier for me to see they ‘might give ideas that might
> actually lead to such scenarios’ than for others.  Regardless, they all
> seem like scenarios that we need to prepare for.
>
>
>
> Chuck
>
>
>
> *From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
> cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Sivasubramanian M
> *Sent:* Friday, November 28, 2014 2:39 AM
> *To:* Greg Shatan
> *Cc:* cwg-stewardship at icann.org
> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Fwd: Stress Tests for IANA transition
> proposals
>
>
>
> Greg,
>
>
>
>
>
> Apart from the scenarios that are pertinent to IANA, identified by Steve
> DelBianco with red coloring, more scenarios could be outlined in the
> specific context of transition, and if we do, we may have to outline
> strategies to deal with each of these scenarios and assess if IANA would
> get past such scenarios ?
>
>
>
> One problem with this approach is that some of such imaginary extreme
> scenarios vividly outline ways by which IANA can be harmed, and might give
> ideas that might actually lead to such scenarios. Certain degree of caution
> is required in outlining some scenarios that point to ways of doing harm. I
> could already see one or two examples that could make someone consider it
> to be interesting ways of causing trouble.
>
>
>
> Just a thought.
>
>
>
>
>
> Sivasubramanian M
>
>
>   Sivasubramanian M <https://www.facebook.com/sivasubramanian.muthusamy>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 12:14 PM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> All,
>
> Further to our recent discussions of stress tests, scenarios and the like,
> I am forwarding to the group an email from Steve DelBianco of the Business
> Constituency with a number of examples of stress tests and links to further
> discussion.
>
> This is particularly relevant to RFP4 (which requests a "Description  of
>  how  you  have  tested  or  evaluated  the  workability  of any  new
>  technical  or operational  methods proposed  in this  document and  how
>  they  compare  to  established arrangements") and RFP3 (to inform our
> discussion of various alternatives and their strengths and weaknesses).
>
> Greg
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: *Steve DelBianco* <sdelbianco at netchoice.org>
> Date: Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 3:24 PM
> Subject: Stress Tests for IANA transition proposals
> To: "gregshatanipc at gmail.com" <gregshatanipc at gmail.com>
> Cc: Steve Metalitz <met at msk.com>, Tony Holmes <tonyarholmes at btinternet.com>,
> Phil Corwin <psc at vlaw-dc.com>, Aparna Sridhar <aparnasridhar at google.com>,
> "skawaguchi at fb.com" <skawaguchi at fb.com>, Jonathan Zuck <
> JZuck at actonline.org>, Kristina Rosette <krosette at cov.com>, Rick Lane <
> RLane at 21cf.com>, Elisa Cooper <Elisa.Cooper at markmonitor.com>
>
>    Greg — as you requested on our call today, here are ’stress tests’
> from the BC's  June comments (link
> <http://www.bizconst.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/BC-reply-comment-on-Enhancing-ICANN-Accountability-FINAL.pdf> to
> comments).   The stress tests in a standalone doc are also available at
> http://bizconst.org/StressTests
>
>
>
> Some of these stress tests relate to general ICANN accountability
> concerns.  But several are relevant to the IANA role you are looking at for
> Naming Functions  (Numbers 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10, in red below):
>
>
>
> The BC recommends use of scenarios, or ‘stress tests’ to help design and
> evaluate ICANN accountability structures and mechanisms. Today, ICANN is an
> effective organization that generally performs its core functions. Although
> it can be uncomfortable to imagine a scenario where a future ICANN fails
> dramatically or is confronted with a serious threat, we should consider
> challenging scenarios that could arise, such as those described below:
>
> 1.       Scenario: ICANN unilaterally cancels the *Affirmation of
> Commitments*, which it may do with just 120 days notice. And if not
> outright cancellation, ICANN could refuse to implement recommendations of
> an * Affirmation *review. Presently, the discipline imposed by needing to
> win the IANA contract forces ICANN to adhere to the only external
> accountability it has today: the *Affirmation of Commitments*. If the *Affirmation
> *is to remain part of the new ICANN accountability framework, it is
> essential that the leverage formerly conveyed by the IANA contract be
> replaced with a new mechanism, which may or may not include parties
> external to ICANN.
>
> 2.       Scenario: ICANN takes steps to eliminate its legal presence in a
> nation where Internet users and domain registrants are planning to seek
> legal remedies for ICANN’s failure to enforce contracts. This scenario is
> not about ICANN opening new offices around the world as part of its global
> outreach. Rather, it is about ICANN creating a new legal entity distinct
> from its present status as a California non-profit corporation, and
> eventually relocating its legal presence. ICANN’s current corporate
> presence in California creates legal certainty for businesses; presence in
> a new jurisdiction might not.
>
> 3.       Scenario: ICANN becomes financially insolvent, due to lawsuits
> or gross mismanagement. However unlikely, this scenario should explore the
> orderly continuation of IANA functions and ICANN contract enforcement in
> the event ICANN could not maintain the necessary qualified technical
> resources.
>
> 4.       Scenario: ICANN expands scope beyond its limited technical
> mission by using domain registration fees to fund grants for developing
> nations or other worthy causes. ICANN has the power to determine fees
> charged to TLD applicants, registry operators, registrars, and registrants,
> so it presents a big target for any Internet-related cause seeking funding
> sources. This scenario should examine how a fully independent ICANN could
> be held to its limited technical mission, and whether its fees and spending
> are subject to external accountability.
>
> 5.       Scenario: ICANN attempts to add a new top-level domain in spite
> of security and stability concerns expressed by technical community
> leaders. This scenario actually came close to occurring when ICANN
> management did not respond to recommendations of its own Security and
> Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) regarding risks of new TLDs interacting
> with security certificates and internal domains already in use. SSAC
> recommendations from prior years were not acted upon until late 2013, after
> significant pressure from a root server operator, Internet service
> providers, and system integrators. In the actual event, ICANN responded
> with a collision mitigation plan. This scenario should assess how proposed
> new accountability mechanisms could respond to similar technical risks
> expressed before a TLD delegation, as well as reactive responses to
> problems reported after a delegation.
>
> 6.       Scenario: Governments in ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee
> (GAC) amend their operating procedures to change from consensus decisions
> to majority voting. Today GAC adopts formal advice according to its
> Operating Principle 47: “*consensus is understood to mean the practice of
> adopting decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal
> objection*.”13 But the GAC may at any time change its procedures to use
> majority voting, where each government has equal voting power, such as in
> the UN and ITU. (Notably, only 61 governments were present at the GAC
> meeting in Singapore during March 2014, where several GAC members expressed
> dissatisfaction with the multistakeholder process and consensus threshold
> for new gTLD program advice.) While ICANN’s board is not strictly obligated
> to follow GAC advice, this scenario should assess how ICANN could respond
> to GAC advice with strong majority support but less than consensus. This
> scenario might also indicate need to amend ICANN bylaws regarding deference
> to GAC advice that is not supported by consensus.
>
> 7.       Scenario: As described in scenario 6, the GAC might issue
> majority-supported advice instructing ICANN to suspend a TLD that refuses
> to remove domains with content critical of governments (e.g., *.*corrupt
> ). Today, this kind of censorship routinely occurs at the edge of the
> Internet when governments block domestic access to websites, such as Turkey
> blocking Twitter. This scenario envisions censorship moving from the edge *to
> the core of the internet *– the root table of TLDs used by the entire
> world. The stress test would ask how a proposed accountability mechanism
> could respond if a future ICANN board bowed to GAC advice for censorship at
> the root of the DNS.
>
> 8.       Scenario: ICANN attempts to re-delegate a gTLD because the
> registry operator is determined to be in breach of its contract. The
> registry operator challenges the breach determination and obtains an
> injunction from a national court. What procedures or appeal mechanisms
> would be used by the entity charged with maintenance and publication of the
> root zone?
>
> 9.       Scenario: A court grants an injunction against delegation of a
> new gTLD that’s a plural version of another TLD that has already been
> delegated. (for example, .hotels following after .hotel, or .coms following
> after .com) The court may have ruled on infringement of rights or on
> arbitrary and capricious behavior by ICANN, but that’s beside the point.
> The point of this scenario is to ask how a post-transition ICANN and IANA
> would be empowered to respond to a court injunction granted by a
> jurisdiction where ICANN has a legal presence. Would ICANN/IANA be able to
> defer a delegation until court proceedings were concluded? How would
> ICANN/IANA be accountable for its decision if it ignored the court
> injunction?
>
> 10.   Scenario: A government telecom minister instructs ICANN to
> re-delegate a country-code top-level domain (ccTLD), despite objections
> from many current registrants and user communities in the country
> concerned. Faced with this re-delegation request, what response options and
> measures could be available to ICANN and the entity charged with
> maintenance of the root zone?
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> *Gregory S. Shatan **ï* *Abelman Frayne & Schwab*
>
> *666 Third Avenue **ï** New York, NY 10017-5621*
>
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>
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>
> *gsshatan at lawabel.com <gsshatan at lawabel.com>*
>
> *ICANN-related: gregshatanipc at gmail.com <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> *
>
> *www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>*
>
>
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