[CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)

[Jonathan Robinson]

Apologies Alan,

 

I missed this when drafting my earlier email.

 

Jonathan

 

From: Alan Greenberg [mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca] 
Sent: 15 January 2015 06:12
To: CWG IANA
Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG
Proposal(s)

 

I believe that this is the minimalist list of accountability measures or
accountability-related processes that would be required based on the two
proposals currently under consideration.

I have explicitly not included the wider list of measures that the CCWG is
considering for possible inclusion in its WS1, specifically those which the
community would like to see and for which the IANA transition might provide
additional impetus for the Board to approve, but are not absolutely required
to ensure that the IANA transition can occur. I recognize that this is a
judgement call that not all might agree with.

During the last of the four weekend meetings, Chuck mentioned one additional
issue, and referred to a chat exchange between him and Donna during the
third meeting that listed several other potential accountability issues.
Unfortunately, that chat transcript was not preserved due to an error in
saving it.

The list of measures for the Contract Co. model is based on the list that
the Co-Chairs created in December, augmented by Chucks suggestion. I do not
believe that the December list has been negated by any work done in the
interim, but perhaps I have missed something. I could not find a rationale
for the inclusion of the first of the three items, but include it here so
that the CWG could decide if it is based on a real need associated with the
proposal or not. If included, I would suggest the CWG be more specific as to
under what conditions it would apply. Chuck's suggestion seems to conflict
with the 2nd measure in that the 2nd measure is specified as being binding.
I am also not sure if it could possibly be replaced by the more generalized
IAP (once the request goes to IANA).

The requirements for the internal-to-ICANN model are based on my discussions
with a number of people over the last weeks.

Contract Co. Model Requirements

1. Independent Review of Board Actions

Change the ICANN Bylaws to specify that under certain circumstances (to be
defined) the determinations of an Independent Review of Board Actions Panel
would be binding and not implemented at the Board's discretions.

2. Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests

This would be a replacement for the authorization function for all changes
to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently performed by the NTIA. The
replacement mechanism would have gTLD requests for delegations and
re-delegations authorized by an independent third party and its decision on
these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA. 

3. Independent Appeals Panel

An independent review panel must be set up to deal with contested changes to
the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database. Although discussions are still ongoing
as to the specifics of such a proposal, it is generally agreed that the
decisions of such a panel would be binding. There may also be a need for an
injunction-like mechanism to defer the change in question during the appeal
process.

4. gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN prior to the change
request going to IANA

A Registry could appeal an ICANN decision to delegate or redelegate and
gTLD, based on policy not being followed (or presumably contractual terms
not being followed).

Internal-To-ICANN Model Requirements

This model will require all of the above measures plus the following:

5. Control over ICANN Board decisions.

The ability for ICANN Stakeholders, potentially augmented by other non-ICANN
entities, to mandate or overrule, a particular Board decision, or to require
that the implementation of such a decision be subject to consideration of an
independent, binding review. These measures might need to be augmented by
advance notice of such decisions and allow the MS community to react. In the
most restricted form, this ability might be restricted to decisions related
to IANA, but in reality, it may not be practical to define this scope
limitation (ie how to recognize an IANA-related decision).

6. Ability to Remove Directors

The ability of the overall multi-stakeholder community to remove some or all
of the Board Directors. In the case of a full Board removal, a mechanism
would be required for appointing an Interim Board and then a replacement
regular Board. In addition, ACs and SOs could be given the right to recall
their appointed Director(s).









-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/attachments/20150115/1a458ed5/attachment.html>