[CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)

[Gomes, Chuck]

Alan,

First let me put in writing the what I said in the last weekend call:  We need the Accountability CCWG to provide an accountability process that registry operators (c's & g's) and possibly governments in the case of ccTLDs can use in cases where they think delegation and re-delegation decisions are not in line with approved policy or for governments local law.  This may be covered by your item 4 (gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN prior to the change request going to IANA) although I am not sure that appeals would always have to happen before going to IANA; that would be preferred though.

Alan - why do you think that this would conflict with item 2 (Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests)?  In the case of gTLDs, the decision whether or not a gTLD could be delegated or re-delegated would happen before any certification would occur.  The certification would simply confirm that required steps were followed properly.  For gTLDs I think that any appeal would preferably happen before any certification happened but I suppose it could happen afterwards; those details would need to be defined.  I won't try to venture into the ccTLD world.

On a totally different topic with regard to item 2, I don't think that is something that we need the Accountability CCWG to deal with that.  In my view, that seems to be clearly in our court.  Any accountability for a certification decision would probably be covered by general accountability processes.

Why is item 6 (Ability to Remove Directors) an action that the CWG needs from the CCWG.  I agree that we need some specific accountability mechanisms from the CCWG but we don't specifically need the one that would allow for the removal of Directors.  That option may provide some of the accountability that the CWG needs but we require that specific option.

Chuck

From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg
Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 1:12 AM
To: CWG IANA
Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)

I believe that this is the minimalist list of accountability measures or accountability-related processes that would be required based on the two proposals currently under consideration.

I have explicitly not included the wider list of measures that the CCWG is considering for possible inclusion in its WS1, specifically those which the community would like to see and for which the IANA transition might provide additional impetus for the Board to approve, but are not absolutely required to ensure that the IANA transition can occur. I recognize that this is a judgement call that not all might agree with.

During the last of the four weekend meetings, Chuck mentioned one additional issue, and referred to a chat exchange between him and Donna during the third meeting that listed several other potential accountability issues. Unfortunately, that chat transcript was not preserved due to an error in saving it.

The list of measures for the Contract Co. model is based on the list that the Co-Chairs created in December, augmented by Chucks suggestion. I do not believe that the December list has been negated by any work done in the interim, but perhaps I have missed something. I could not find a rationale for the inclusion of the first of the three items, but include it here so that the CWG could decide if it is based on a real need associated with the proposal or not. If included, I would suggest the CWG be more specific as to under what conditions it would apply. Chuck's suggestion seems to conflict with the 2nd measure in that the 2nd measure is specified as being binding. I am also not sure if it could possibly be replaced by the more generalized IAP (once the request goes to IANA).

The requirements for the internal-to-ICANN model are based on my discussions with a number of people over the last weeks.

Contract Co. Model Requirements

1. Independent Review of Board Actions

Change the ICANN Bylaws to specify that under certain circumstances (to be defined) the determinations of an Independent Review of Board Actions Panel would be binding and not implemented at the Board's discretions.

2. Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests

This would be a replacement for the authorization function for all changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently performed by the NTIA. The replacement mechanism would have gTLD requests for delegations and re-delegations authorized by an independent third party and its decision on these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA.

3. Independent Appeals Panel

An independent review panel must be set up to deal with contested changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database. Although discussions are still ongoing as to the specifics of such a proposal, it is generally agreed that the decisions of such a panel would be binding. There may also be a need for an injunction-like mechanism to defer the change in question during the appeal process.

4. gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN prior to the change request going to IANA

A Registry could appeal an ICANN decision to delegate or redelegate and gTLD, based on policy not being followed (or presumably contractual terms not being followed).

Internal-To-ICANN Model Requirements

This model will require all of the above measures plus the following:

5. Control over ICANN Board decisions.

The ability for ICANN Stakeholders, potentially augmented by other non-ICANN entities, to mandate or overrule, a particular Board decision, or to require that the implementation of such a decision be subject to consideration of an independent, binding review. These measures might need to be augmented by advance notice of such decisions and allow the MS community to react. In the most restricted form, this ability might be restricted to decisions related to IANA, but in reality, it may not be practical to define this scope limitation (ie how to recognize an IANA-related decision).

6. Ability to Remove Directors

The ability of the overall multi-stakeholder community to remove some or all of the Board Directors. In the case of a full Board removal, a mechanism would be required for appointing an Interim Board and then a replacement regular Board. In addition, ACs and SOs could be given the right to recall their appointed Director(s).







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