[Gnso-epdp-team] "Abusive" use of SSAD

Volker Greimann vgreimann at key-systems.net
Wed Oct 9 16:23:17 UTC 2019


You are right, intent is hard to track when the requestr is not being 
honest. OTOH, when such behavior is detected, this abusive use would 
serve to exclude them from the system henceforth. And any behavior that 
matched paterrns of requests where such intent is likely would be 
subject to increased scrutiny and review.

Finally, our resources are finite and any SSAD must remain economically 
feasible as well. If it is not, we'd be better advised to stick to legal 
process for disclosure.

Volker

Am 09.10.2019 um 18:08 schrieb Mark Svancarek (CELA):
>
> Joking aside, we can argue about exact numbers to no avail if we don’t 
> establish some operational principles first.  Those principles need to 
> be grounded in SLAs and cost recovery models.  A registrar will 
> definitely have backlogs even at low volume if they do not invest in 
> appropriate staffing and infrastructure to achieve the agreed-upon SLA.
>
> As I mentioned in my initial comments, Harvesting and Mining are 
> presumed intents of a requestor, and I don’t know how you plan to 
> determine that it is happening if a requestor is following all the 
> other policy requirements.  We’ve already planned safeguards against 
> indiscriminate access.  What is the specific behavior, in addition to 
> the policy safeguards we already envisage, that should be prohibited?
>
> *From:*Volker Greimann <vgreimann at key-systems.net>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 9, 2019 8:45 AM
> *To:* Mark Svancarek (CELA) <marksv at microsoft.com>; 
> gnso-epdp-team at icann.org
> *Subject:* Re: [Gnso-epdp-team] "Abusive" use of SSAD
>
> Hi Mark,
>
> one per minute still sounds reasonable to me as it allows you 1440 
> queries per day, which should be sufficient for most legitimate 
> purposes (with most registrars), especially given that each request 
> will have to be reviewed. I can tell you right now that if our 
> registrars would get the full quota of such a rate limit, requests 
> would get backed up pretty quickly.
>
> And I guess no one will want a response like this:
>
> "Thank you for sending a disclosure request. Your request is currently 
> number 356.152.425 in the queue, which means you can expect a response 
> on or before December 21, 2119. "
>
> So setting realistic limitations will be essential for this system to 
> work.
>
> Harvesting and mining to me is any activity that is designed to 
> indiscriminately access registration records either with the purpose 
> of finding records that match a specific search parameters (mining) or 
> is designed to create a duplicate copy of the registration base (or 
> parts thereof).
>
> So harvesting is basically the preparatory activity of actors such as 
> spear phishers, spammers, DomainTools, autocrat governments, etc, e.g. 
> everyone who has an interest in obtaining a (partial) copy of the 
> database for whatever purpose.
>
> And mining is digging in the database with the hope of finding 
> specific "gems".
>
> Others may have other or broader definitions, and these definitions 
> may need more work, but these are my assiociations with these terms.
>
> Best,
>
> Volker
>
> Am 09.10.2019 um 17:31 schrieb Mark Svancarek (CELA):
>
>     As we have not defined high volume, I think it is premature to say
>     that its utility has passed.  Recall, a few days ago you said that
>     1 request per minute would be an acceptable rate limit.  That
>     tells me we have a long way to go.
>
>     Harvesting and mining are similarly undefined.  What detectible
>     behavior would you prohibit?
>
>     *From:*Gnso-epdp-team <gnso-epdp-team-bounces at icann.org>
>     <mailto:gnso-epdp-team-bounces at icann.org> *On Behalf Of *Volker
>     Greimann
>     *Sent:* Wednesday, October 9, 2019 1:53 AM
>     *To:* gnso-epdp-team at icann.org <mailto:gnso-epdp-team at icann.org>
>     *Subject:* Re: [Gnso-epdp-team] "Abusive" use of SSAD
>
>     Hi Mark,
>
>     I think the times of legitimate high volume requests have passed.
>     There are now less invasive methods of confirming domain ownership
>     - such as modifications to the DNS records - that do not require
>     knowing the personal data whom the domain belongs to. High volume
>     requests are almost always an indicator for abuse.
>
>     You have a point about request formats and we should allow some
>     leeway for formats that have been accurate recently.
>
>     If the data has actually changed, then that would not be a request
>     for the same data anymore. But I I think we need to have some form
>     of cap for requests for the dame domain by the same requestor. 
>     Two to three requests over the course of as many months probably
>     would not count as abusive.
>
>     Circumventing legitimate rate limits is abusive use of the system
>     as those limits are there for a reason. If multiple vendors are
>     used that access the data, each of those vendors would have to be
>     accredited seperately and therefore not fall under the
>     circumvention rule. If those vendors are however affiliated
>     entities, this would be different. Which brings me to another
>     affiliation requirement: Provide list of all affiliated entities
>     that are already accredited, or have applied for accreditetion,
>     similar to the obligation of registrars to provide lists of all
>     affiliated registrars to ICANN.
>
>     I think the terms harvesting and mining speak for themselves but I
>     assume we can find a commonly acceptable definition.
>
>     Best,
>
>     Volker
>
>     Am 09.10.2019 um 04:25 schrieb Mark Svancarek (CELA) via
>     Gnso-epdp-team:
>
>         Thanks, James.  Here are my concerns:
>
>           * Some abuse may be high-volume, but high volume is not
>             inherently abusive.  If there are industry-standard
>             methods for distinguishing denial-of-service attacks from
>             other high-volume activity, we should adopt them here.
>           * Request formats may change over time.  Use of outdated
>             formats during a transition period is not abusive.
>           * Subsequent requests for data where the format has been
>             improved (e.g. missing fields have been populated; more
>             appropriate basis has been submitted; more information
>             that has been discovered during an ongoing investigation
>             is added; etc.) is acceptable.
>           * Repeated requests for a domain name record over are
>             justifiable when it is reasonable to assume that domain
>             name registration data is likely to have changed during an
>             investigation.
>           * In the Port 43 public WhoIs system some requestors used
>             multiple and/or spoofed IP addresses to avoid rate limits
>             imposed by registrars.  Until issues of SLAs and funding
>             are resolved, we cannot assume that rate limiting, or
>             quota systems, will apply to SSAD. Whatever systems are
>             ultimately put in place, the following observations about
>             IP addresses and distributed requests should be considered:
>
>               o It is not unusual to have a case worked on by multiple
>                 vendors/attorneys/platforms (e.g. one organization for
>                 initial take down requests, another to handle
>                 escalations, outside counsel for follow-up and/or suit).
>               o It is not unusual to have a case worked on from
>                 multiple geographies.
>               o It is not unusual for a requestor to use a VPN.
>               o Credentialed access should be based on credentials and
>                 be neutral to IP addresses - so mitigations based on
>                 IP addresses are only applicable for the
>                 noncredentialled users of SSAD, if at all.
>
>           * I am very concerned about the undefined terms “harvesting”
>             and “mining”, which seem to me to be more about intent
>             than any specific activity.  Until we specifically
>             describe the behavior to be blocked, we should remove the
>             last bullet.
>
>         /marksv
>
>         *From:*Gnso-epdp-team <gnso-epdp-team-bounces at icann.org>
>         <mailto:gnso-epdp-team-bounces at icann.org> *On Behalf Of *James
>         M. Bladel
>         *Sent:* Tuesday, October 8, 2019 7:15 PM
>         *To:* gnso-epdp-team at icann.org <mailto:gnso-epdp-team at icann.org>
>         *Subject:* [Gnso-epdp-team] "Abusive" use of SSAD
>
>         Colleagues –
>
>         Following up with my homework from last Thursday, here is the
>         non-exhaustive list of “abusive” SSAD behaviors.
>
>         I’ve been in discussions with Mark SV, and note that he has
>         some concerns.  Expect his comments/edits in a separate
>         message that will be a fast-follow to this post.
>
>
>         Thanks—
>
>         J.
>
>         -------------
>
>         *James Bladel*
>
>         GoDaddy
>
>         “Abusive” use of SSAD may include (but is not limited to) the
>         following behaviors/practices:
>
>         1.     High volume submissions of malformed or incomplete
>         requests.
>
>         2.     Frequent duplicate requests that were previously
>         fulfilled or denied.
>
>         3.     Use of distributed or spoofed source addresses or
>         platforms to circumvent quotas or rate limits.
>
>         4.      Use of false or counterfeit credentials to access the
>         system.
>
>         5.      Storing/delaying and sending high volume requests with
>         the intention of causing SSAD or other parties to fail SLA
>         performance.
>
>         6.      Attempts or efforts to mine or harvest the data
>         protected by SSAD.
>
>         As with other access policy violations, abusive behavior can
>         result in suspension or termination of access to the SSAD.
>
>
>
>
>         _______________________________________________
>
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>     -- 
>     Volker A. Greimann
>     General Counsel and Policy Manager
>     *KEY-SYSTEMS GMBH*
>
>     T: +49 6894 9396901
>     M: +49 6894 9396851
>     F: +49 6894 9396851
>     W: www.key-systems.net
>     <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.key-systems.net&data=02%7C01%7Cmarksv%40microsoft.com%7C6e6707304c3b4d06aec108d74ccfa5a9%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637062327032542879&sdata=JnnTx7%2Bx1BJ3AugvtApUsP6Nd03D01FiUJ3WT8hzNl0%3D&reserved=0>
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>     Key-Systems GmbH is a company registered at the local court of
>     Saarbruecken, Germany with the registration no. HR B 18835
>     CEO: Alexander Siffrin
>
>     Part of the CentralNic Group PLC (LON: CNIC) a company registered
>     in England and Wales with company number 8576358.
>
> -- 
> Volker A. Greimann
> General Counsel and Policy Manager
> *KEY-SYSTEMS GMBH*
>
> T: +49 6894 9396901
> M: +49 6894 9396851
> F: +49 6894 9396851
> W: www.key-systems.net 
> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.key-systems.net&data=02%7C01%7Cmarksv%40microsoft.com%7C6e6707304c3b4d06aec108d74ccfa5a9%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637062327032552873&sdata=L%2BP%2Bq51jxHgFGH349YwNGSS2K9CrNn6tu%2Bm4dFcpMGE%3D&reserved=0>
>
> Key-Systems GmbH is a company registered at the local court of 
> Saarbruecken, Germany with the registration no. HR B 18835
> CEO: Alexander Siffrin
>
> Part of the CentralNic Group PLC (LON: CNIC) a company registered in 
> England and Wales with company number 8576358.
>
-- 
Volker A. Greimann
General Counsel and Policy Manager
*KEY-SYSTEMS GMBH*

T: +49 6894 9396901
M: +49 6894 9396851
F: +49 6894 9396851
W: www.key-systems.net

Key-Systems GmbH is a company registered at the local court of 
Saarbruecken, Germany with the registration no. HR B 18835
CEO: Alexander Siffrin

Part of the CentralNic Group PLC (LON: CNIC) a company registered in 
England and Wales with company number 8576358.
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