[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Dangers of public whois

Greg Shatan gregshatanipc at gmail.com
Thu Feb 9 17:37:40 UTC 2017


Access to Whois data is also necessary for protection -- protection of
internet users (some of whom are registrants, some not) and even non-users
(since you can be a victim of Internet-based abuse without being on the
Internet yourself (e.g., bank fraud, identity theft, child porn, etc.)).
As Greg A. pointed out, registrants have options in terms "protection"
(e.g., privacy/proxy, getting a third level domain (so common for blogs),
forming an entity, etc.  Victims often don't have options (or if they do,
the link between the failure to pick the right option and the harm is much
more attenuated).  If we have to choose between protecting people from
their own stupidity and protecting people from other people's abusive,
illegal and/or malicious acts, I'll choose the latter one.  I don't think
we have to make that choice (at least not in a binary fashion), but it's
important to weigh both sides of the equation.

Greg Shatan


*Greg Shatan *C: 917-816-6428
S: gsshatan
gregshatanipc at gmail.com

On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 12:26 PM, allison nixon <elsakoo at gmail.com> wrote:

> After registering my very first domain, I started receiving spam and
> learned pretty quickly that the information was public.
>
> Only so much can/should be done to protect the Spicers of this world from
> themselves.
>
> Pivoting off domain whois is my #1 valued resource in cybercrime
> investigations.
>
> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 12:16 PM, benny at nordreg.se <benny at nordreg.se>
> wrote:
>
>> Dnsservers, domainstatus, various dates, Registrar
>>
>> None of these data are personal data imo
>>
>> The only info you see in Whois are the contact ID the user have at the
>> registrar/ registry
>>
>>
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>> On 9 Feb 2017, at 18:10, nathalie coupet <nathaliecoupet at yahoo.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Benny,
>>
>> All personal info on personal domains are hidden by default. What are the
>> info that remain available for public view - after personal information
>> have been hidden by default - which still enable technical operability?
>>
>>
>> Nathalie
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, February 9, 2017 11:46 AM, "benny at nordreg.se" <
>> benny at nordreg.se> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Maybe not but there are nothing who prevent us from trying to protect
>> people from there mistakes and stupidity and still be able to have certain
>> level of technical operability with whois data.
>>
>> A good example are .se which have a whois policy where all personal info
>> on personal domains are hidden by default. The registrant need to opt out
>> of the privacy actively by making a decision. That might be the way we
>> should think instead of what to do to hide data.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Med vänliga hälsningar / Kind Regards / Med vennlig hilsen
>>
>>
>> Benny Samuelsen
>> Registry Manager - Domainexpert
>>
>> Nordreg AB - ICANN accredited registrar
>> IANA-ID: 638
>>
>> Phone: +46.42197080 <+46%2042%2019%2070%2080>
>> Direct: +47.32260201 <+47%2032%2026%2002%2001>
>> Mobile: +47.40410200 <+47%20404%2010%20200>
>>
>> On 09/02/2017, 17:38, "gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org on behalf of
>> Greg Aaron" <gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org on behalf of
>> gca at icginc.com> wrote:
>>
>>     Is ICANN (or anyone else) responsible for protecting Spicer from
>> himself?  A lot of the articles about this subject point out that Spicer
>> was neglectful and occasionally incompetent.
>>
>>     Here are some facts to consider:
>>     * Privacy protection was available and Spicer didn’t obtain it.  That
>> was his choice.
>>     * Spicer agreed to have his data published in WHOIS.  So that was
>> either OK with him, or he didn't read the terms of service in his domain
>> registration agreement.  Either way, it was his choice.
>>     * Spicer tweeted out his own Twitter password.  He's responsible for
>> that.
>>     * Spicer himself published his email address in many, many public
>> places over the years.  A simple Google search will tell you what his email
>> address was.
>>     * Those data breaches that Volker mentions have nothing to do with
>> domain registration data.  They did not reveal domain registration data.
>> Domain registration data didn't allow hackers to penetrate Dropbox,
>> LinkedIn, and MySpace, and the other places where Spicer's credentials were
>> lost over the years.  Bad corporate security allowed those breaches to
>> happen.
>>     * Spicer has a very different risk profile than the average person.
>> He's been a prominent PR and political operative for many years (and is now
>> working for the most scrutinized entity in the world).  A key tenet of risk
>> assessment is that exceptional cases may not justify making rules that
>> affect everyone.
>>
>>     All best,
>>     --Greg
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>     -----Original Message-----
>>     From: gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Volker Greimann
>>     Sent: Thursday, February 9, 2017 4:28 AM
>>     To: gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
>>     Subject: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Dangers of public whois
>>
>>     As we tend to get lost in the thick and nitty gritty from time to
>> time, this recent article should remind us what we are working for:
>>
>>     mashable.com/2017/02/07/sean-spicer-who-is
>>
>>     also here:
>>     http://domainnamewire.com/2017/02/08/sean-spicer-brings-atte
>> ntion-whois-privacy/
>>
>>     While it could not have hit a nicer guy, he completely and accurately
>> followed policy and look where it lead. Hi private address and telephone
>> number as well as email address known to the world, other domains he
>> registered for himself and his family published, etc. As his email address
>> was compromised in no less than three leaks (plus one honorable mention on
>> Wikileaks), and he recently tweeted his password, it may even be possible
>> to dig deeper.
>>
>>     I hope this helps remind folks that getting private data out of the
>> public view is a good thing.
>>
>>     --
>>
>>     Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
>>
>>     Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
>>
>>     Volker A. Greimann
>>     - Rechtsabteilung -
>>
>>     Key-Systems GmbH
>>     Im Oberen Werk 1
>>     66386 St. Ingbert
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>>
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>>
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>>     - legal department -
>>
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>
>
> --
> _________________________________
> Note to self: Pillage BEFORE burning.
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