[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Why the thin data is necessary
Volker Greimann
vgreimann at key-systems.net
Wed Jun 7 14:49:23 UTC 2017
All good questions that we will no doubt come to later.
Am 07.06.2017 um 16:47 schrieb John Bambenek via gnso-rds-pdp-wg:
> I want to add. Requiring authentication means that you will be
> creating a database (potentially many of them) that will contain
> private data (usernames, emails, passwords, and api keys combined is
> some of the most sensitive private data there is) to access public
> data. You will be creating logs of what we search and why (what's the
> point of requiring purpose be disclosed if not to store it. For a
> subset of us that exposes our customer lists that could be easily
> derived.
>
> The first problem is, who has access to this data and under what
> conditions? Will every domain owner see who queries their domains?
> That inherently means targets of our investigations are not only
> tipped off that there is an investigation, but can expose specifically
> WHO is investigating. You are increasing the direct PERSONAL risk
> investigators take to solve the problems you have raised with anti-abuse.
>
> Further, you are inherently creating a database of high profile
> targets for intelligence agencies. System admins, network admins and
> investigators are targets of intelligence agencies because they have
> privileged access if not the full "keys to the kingdom". (See:
> https://www.usenix.org/conference/enigma2016/conference-program/presentation/joyce short
> version, the NSA says these are the exact people they try to
> compromise). This system almost exclusively has those people in it. If
> LE has access to the logs and this database, it is hard to see how
> intelligence agencies can't get it. Do you want the NSA knowing what
> domains you are looking at knowing its a mere NSL away?
>
> Further, creating this pool of high-profile targets also makes the RDS
> a major target of attack. By literally everyone. Considering the
> problem of password reuse, if this database were ever compromised, a
> huge number of organizations would face very immediate existential
> threats. Who is going to pay for the security of RDS? Who is going to
> accept the liability when its breached?
>
> Putting public info behind a gate creates huge liabilities, assumes
> great cost, and delivers no real anti-abuse features because domain
> status alone is not weaponizable via phishing (you need contact info,
> and if that's behind the gate or a proxy registration, lets just
> assume the spammer can't get to it; also a bad assumption).
>
> So the basic question for you guys even if you set the value of MY
> risk at 0 and completely irrelevant, what is the return on this
> massive investment and who's going to pay that bill? It won't be me.
>
> The last point, and I will be very direct about this. Some of you on
> this list made a startling bald statement that you ignore your
> contractual OBLIGATIONS as they exist today regarding registrant
> accuracy because you "don't like them" in such a way that at least one
> investigation was already opened. For those of you who openly admitted
> that you ignore ICANN contractual requirements for a contract you
> signed, how can we (who will bear the personal risks) trust any
> assurances you will give that you simply won't give this data to
> criminals despite any policy we create here?
>
> --
> John Bambenek
>
> On Jun 7, 2017, at 15:20, Michael Peddemors <michael at linuxmagic.com
> <mailto:michael at linuxmagic.com>> wrote:
>
>> Hi Volker,
>>
>> Maybe we are getting to the root of your position, too much spam ;)
>> Maybe a better spam filter would be the solution? ;)
>>
>> But in all seriousness, what you are discussing are problems that
>> really should NOT be part of this discussion. Just because cars are
>> a target for theft, we should not prevent owners from parking on the
>> street.
>>
>> What you are discussing are criminal activities, for which other
>> resources are available to address that problem. But a gated
>> solution would inherently add to the problem. First of all, most
>> spam of that type are already addressed by good filters, and domains
>> involved in such activity usually end up on blacklists etc quite
>> quickly, but a gated approach would prevent some of the ability to
>> identify those actors, and report/stop them.
>>
>> Some of these tests are automated, eg right in software policies, and
>> need to have access to that data on the fly, and that type of
>> automated detection tool cannot work properly, or will be very
>> inhibited with any form of gated access.
>>
>> And to argue that in the case of unfettered access can be used by
>> both the bad players and the good, do remember that the 'bad actors'
>> have a commercial interest in gaining that data, and will be the
>> first people to automate work arounds.. (eg when SPF came out,
>> surprised how many spammers were early adopters)
>>
>> Every email operator should be able to have access to that data, eg
>> domain creation date, expiry date, and that data cannot be restricted
>> by bulk (have you seen the volume of senders?) and distributed
>> protection software should not require the end user to 'register' for
>> access to this data to have their protections work.
>>
>> Gated Access:
>>
>> * Inhibits the ability to create systems that protect privacy
>> * Adds a commercial burden (extra systems) to those with legitimate
>> requirements
>> * Requires an authentication mechanism which can create privacy concerns
>> * requires an authentication mechanism which may not be usable or
>> desired by all parties
>> * Raises the bar on who can develop protections and legitimate systems
>> * Provides protection for the very actors you are worried about.
>> * Adds unnecessary burdens/costs on ICANN and registrars as well
>> * Adds a point of failure
>> * Research and innovation will be inhibited
>>
>> IMHO, you had better have a STRONG reason to put a gate up..
>> Let's not mix the problems of certain criminal elements getting
>> access to this data, that is a separate issue, and we can't cut off
>> our nose to spite our face..
>>
>> I might suggest that rather than promoting 'gated' access, which
>> those elements would be the first to sign up for, is spend the same
>> amount of time working on getting internet providers to prevent that
>> activity from occurring in the first place, and doing anything you
>> can to help those who are trying to stop such activity, including
>> ensuring that they (the good guys) have unfettered access.
>>
>>
>>
>> On 17-06-07 01:54 AM, Volker Greimann wrote:
>>> It is remarkable how much of the spam that we see on a regular basis
>>> that is tied to the domain lifecycle. Fake renewal notices, SEO offers,
>>> the lot.
>>> Anything that would reduce this is a basis for restricting access
>>> somewhat. I do not really see any harm in such restrictions either.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Volker
>>>
>>> Am 07.06.2017 um 10:27 schrieb jonathan matkowsky:
>>>> There is no basis for restricting ungated access any more so than the
>>>> domain's existence or the string of characters registered.
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, 7 Jun 2017 at 11:22 Volker Greimann
>>>> <vgreimann at key-systems.net <mailto:vgreimann at key-systems.net>
>>>> <mailto:vgreimann at key-systems.net>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I have no objections against having this data available and
>>>> accessible.
>>>> The question is whether it should be as accessible as it is now or
>>>> whether there could be certain restrictions. A tiered access
>>>> system as
>>>> has been proposed would solve this beautifully.
>>>>
>>>> In this case, the dates would be on the second tier (the first tier
>>>> being full unhindered access), which would entail some form of
>>>> authentification and bulk access restrictions. Every single one
>>>> of the
>>>> uses Andrew desribes would remain possible and unproblematic,
>>>> but the
>>>> data would no longer be in as much danger of being abused as it is
>>>> today.
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Volker
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Am 06.06.2017 um 22:07 schrieb Michael Peddemors:
>>>> > +1 as well..
>>>> >
>>>> > .. but with so many +1's on having that data publicly
>>>> accessible, it
>>>> > would be interesting to take a straw poll, to a wider audience
>>>> on that
>>>> > simple question..
>>>> >
>>>> > It would be also nice to see what category the parties in each
>>>> camp
>>>> > lie? We know that everyone involved in making the internet a
>>>> safer and
>>>> > better place (security companies, law enforcement et al) want it
>>>> > available, and to define 'thin data' as wide as possible, and
>>>> I can
>>>> > understand that some consideration to privacy be considered so
>>>> that it
>>>> > doesn't go too wide, but not really certain I understand the
>>>> position
>>>> > of those that want it as 'thin' as possible, or non-existant,
>>>> and/or
>>>> > the parties behind that position and their numbers.
>>>> >
>>>> > And of course the ever present question for both camps, is the
>>>> opinion
>>>> > coming from a place where there are financial motivations (not
>>>> that
>>>> > necessarily there is anything wrong with that <sic>) that have
>>>> formed
>>>> > the basis of that opinion. (eg, if the money equation was removed,
>>>> > would you still have that opinion, or even be in the
>>>> conversation?)
>>>> >
>>>> > For all we know, the privacy camp are in very small numbers in
>>>> this
>>>> > conversation, and while they might hold legitimate positions,
>>>> maybe it
>>>> > isn't enough to affect the directions/positions of ICANN as a
>>>> group
>>>> > going forward.
>>>> >
>>>> > And IMHO, even if it was 50/50 split, if it came down to two
>>>> camps, eg
>>>> > 'the ones keeping us safe' and 'it affects/risks our
>>>> pocketbooks', I
>>>> > would err on policies that would aid the former..
>>>> >
>>>> > Don't want 'politics' to affect such important decisions..
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > On 17-06-06 11:22 AM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
>>>> >> Hi,
>>>> >>
>>>> >> On the call today there were arguments being made about why
>>>> certain
>>>> >> fields should not be publicly accessible. In effect, what we
>>>> are now
>>>> >> arguing about, in talking about what should be considered "thin
>>>> data",
>>>> >> is the definition of the set of data to which unauthenticated
>>>> access
>>>> >> should be permitted. (Let us please not get distracted by
>>>> what is
>>>> >> actually required by the RAA or anything like that just now,
>>>> since the
>>>> >> outcome of this policy discussion might change that.)
>>>> >>
>>>> >> There were several arguments put forth about whether the
>>>> created on,
>>>> >> updated on, and expiry dates should be included. Similarly,
>>>> people
>>>> >> discussed whether the domain status values should be included. I
>>>> >> believe they must be.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> The Internet is unlike many other technologies because of its
>>>> radical
>>>> >> decentralization. That is not some sort of political choice, but
>>>> >> instead a fundamental part of the design of the Internet: it's a
>>>> >> network of networks (of networks…) formed by voluntary
>>>> interoperation
>>>> >> among the participants. Participants in the Internet
>>>> interoperate
>>>> >> without setting up formal contractual arrangements between
>>>> all the
>>>> >> participating parties. This feature is part of what has made the
>>>> >> Internet so successful compared to other telecommunications
>>>> systems,
>>>> >> because the barrier to entry is really low. But that design
>>>> comes at
>>>> >> a cost.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> The cost is that there's not always a party to speak to, with
>>>> whom one
>>>> >> has a pre-existing relationship. If communications break down
>>>> between
>>>> >> two telephone customers, they know whom to call: the phone
>>>> company.
>>>> >> The phone company also has contractual (or sometimes treaty)
>>>> >> relationships to other phone companies.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> The Internet doesn't work that way. If you and I are
>>>> communicating
>>>> >> over the Internet, there is no guarantee of direct contractual
>>>> >> relationships all the way along the transit path: that's what
>>>> open
>>>> >> peering policies ensure. The way we make this work in fact is by
>>>> >> placing the responsibility for troubleshooting out at the
>>>> edges. And
>>>> >> because of that, when I need to troubleshoot my site I need
>>>> to have
>>>> >> tools with which to do that.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> In domain-based communications (such as email, IP telephony,
>>>> websites,
>>>> >> money transfer, and thousands of other applications), when I
>>>> encounter
>>>> >> a problem with the communication I need to answer whether the
>>>> problem
>>>> >> is in _my_ network operation, or in the other end. Important
>>>> data to
>>>> >> rule out "the other end" is in the thin RDS data.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Obviously, the nameserver and DNSSEC information in the RDS
>>>> will allow
>>>> >> me to tell whether what is in the global DNS is what ought to be
>>>> >> there. For instance, if the RDS has one value for the name
>>>> servers,
>>>> >> but the DNS returns something else, there is a problem.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Less obvious but just as important are the status values. If a
>>>> name
>>>> >> is on Hold or is pendingTransfer or something like that, it can
>>>> tell
>>>> >> me that something is up. A name that doesn't appear in the
>>>> DNS but
>>>> >> has a full complement of name servers in the RDS, for example,
>>>> might
>>>> >> be on hold; and I can't tell that without seeing the status
>>>> values.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> In the same way, the dates in the RDS allow a troubleshooter to
>>>> >> understand what might be wrong when things are broken. If a
>>>> name is
>>>> >> set to expire in a day and you're getting a parking page on the
>>>> >> website, you have a clue about what is going on. Most of the
>>>> examples
>>>> >> cited in
>>>> >>
>>>> https://whoapi.com/blog/1582/5-all-time-domain-expirations-in-internets-history/
>>>> >>
>>>> >> were trivial to understand for help desks that could see that a
>>>> name
>>>> >> that should have existed for some time was just hours old,
>>>> because the
>>>> >> created_on date was available. And if you start having
>>>> trouble and
>>>> >> see a domain was updated about the same time the trouble
>>>> started, you
>>>> >> have a pretty good clue that the problem is most likely at the
>>>> target
>>>> >> domain, and not in your own network.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> As for the question of why the global Internet infrastructure
>>>> needs to
>>>> >> help with this, the answer is that _that's what the
>>>> infrastructure is
>>>> >> for_. We have registrars and registries in order to
>>>> co-ordinate these
>>>> >> assignments and make those assignments available, in support
>>>> of the
>>>> >> distributed administration and operation of the Internet. If the
>>>> >> infrastructure isn't providing this kind of information in
>>>> order to
>>>> >> help administrators of various Internet administrators, then it
>>>> isn't
>>>> >> doing its job.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> The Internet is a distributed system. If you want to make
>>>> distributed
>>>> >> systems work, you have to allow the operators to have enough
>>>> >> information to do their jobs independently of one another. So,
>>>> >> regardless of where one lands on whether any of this data is
>>>> personal
>>>> >> data, it makes no difference. If you want the domain name
>>>> system to
>>>> >> continue to work reliably, you have to publish this data.
>>>> >> Centralization and locking the data up for just registrars simply
>>>> >> won't scale.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Best regards,
>>>> >>
>>>> >> A
>>>> >>
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
>>>>
>>>> Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
>>>>
>>>> Volker A. Greimann
>>>> - Rechtsabteilung -
>>>>
>>>> Key-Systems GmbH
>>>> Im Oberen Werk 1
>>>> 66386 St. Ingbert
>>>> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
>>>> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
>>>> Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net
>>>> <mailto:vgreimann at key-systems.net> <mailto:vgreimann at key-systems.net>
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to
>>>> contact us.
>>>>
>>>> Best regards,
>>>>
>>>> Volker A. Greimann
>>>> - legal department -
>>>>
>>>> Key-Systems GmbH
>>>> Im Oberen Werk 1
>>>> 66386 St. Ingbert
>>>> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
>>>> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
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>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>>
>>>> This e-mail and its attachments is intended only for the person to
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>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
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>>>> --
>>>> jonathan matkowsky, vp - ip & head of global brand threat mitigation
>>>
>>> --
>>> Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
>>>
>>> Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
>>>
>>> Volker A. Greimann
>>> - Rechtsabteilung -
>>>
>>> Key-Systems GmbH
>>> Im Oberen Werk 1
>>> 66386 St. Ingbert
>>> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
>>> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
>>> Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net <mailto:vgreimann at key-systems.net>
>>>
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>>>
>>> Geschäftsführer: Alexander Siffrin
>>> Handelsregister Nr.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
>>> Umsatzsteuer ID.: DE211006534
>>>
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>>>
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>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to
>>> contact us.
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>>
>>> Volker A. Greimann
>>> - legal department -
>>>
>>> Key-Systems GmbH
>>> Im Oberen Werk 1
>>> 66386 St. Ingbert
>>> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
>>> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
>>> Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net <mailto:vgreimann at key-systems.net>
>>>
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>>>
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>>> Registration No.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
>>> V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534
>>>
>>> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
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>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> "Catch the Magic of Linux..."
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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--
Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Volker A. Greimann
- Rechtsabteilung -
Key-Systems GmbH
Im Oberen Werk 1
66386 St. Ingbert
Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net
Web: www.key-systems.net / www.RRPproxy.net
www.domaindiscount24.com / www.BrandShelter.com
Folgen Sie uns bei Twitter oder werden Sie unser Fan bei Facebook:
www.facebook.com/KeySystems
www.twitter.com/key_systems
Geschäftsführer: Alexander Siffrin
Handelsregister Nr.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
Umsatzsteuer ID.: DE211006534
Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
www.keydrive.lu
Der Inhalt dieser Nachricht ist vertraulich und nur für den angegebenen Empfänger bestimmt. Jede Form der Kenntnisgabe, Veröffentlichung oder Weitergabe an Dritte durch den Empfänger ist unzulässig. Sollte diese Nachricht nicht für Sie bestimmt sein, so bitten wir Sie, sich mit uns per E-Mail oder telefonisch in Verbindung zu setzen.
--------------------------------------------
Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Best regards,
Volker A. Greimann
- legal department -
Key-Systems GmbH
Im Oberen Werk 1
66386 St. Ingbert
Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net
Web: www.key-systems.net / www.RRPproxy.net
www.domaindiscount24.com / www.BrandShelter.com
Follow us on Twitter or join our fan community on Facebook and stay updated:
www.facebook.com/KeySystems
www.twitter.com/key_systems
CEO: Alexander Siffrin
Registration No.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534
Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
www.keydrive.lu
This e-mail and its attachments is intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. Furthermore it is not permitted to publish any content of this email. You must not use, disclose, copy, print or rely on this e-mail. If an addressing or transmission error has misdirected this e-mail, kindly notify the author by replying to this e-mail or contacting us by telephone.
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