[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] "access to whois" vs supporting a service (was Re: a suggestion for "purpose in detail")

[Gomes, Chuck]

What system are you referring to Allison? Are you saying that RDAP is not workable?



Chuck



From: gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org [mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of allison nixon
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2017 4:01 AM
To: Andrew Sullivan <ajs at anvilwalrusden.com>
Cc: RDS PDP WG <gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] "access to whois" vs supporting a service (was Re: a suggestion for "purpose in detail")



This suggested system is not workable because the daily use of whois does not conceptually fit within that framework. Several of us who work with whois on a daily basis have already described use cases that are made impossible by that system, so there's no need to go into the same details all over again.



On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs at anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs at anvilwalrusden.com>> wrote:

   Hi,

   On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 09:33:22AM -0700, John Horton wrote:

   > My biggest fear
   > is that in the monitoring that companies like mine do for banks, payment
   > providers, e-commerce companies, etc. that helps determine whether a
   > merchant is who they say they are, and whether they are engaged in other
   > bad activity (i.e., laundering money) will be unable to obtain access to
   > the Whois records we need in order to preserve the integrity of the
   > payments system, protect payment providers from risk, and derivatively
   > protect consumers.

   Modulo the inclusion of "Whois" in the above, that all seems
   reasonable.  What you are saying is that you need a mechanism by which
   you can create risk analyses with respect to some domain name.  But,

   > In other words, my fear is that we'll lose access to
   > Whois records, which we need for that purpose.

   this does not follow.

   Consider, for instance, that RDAP works via http(s), and that we have
   several kinds of authentication and authorization mechanisms related
   to https, and such things can be federated.  It is a short hop from
   that knowledge to understanding that someone(s) could operate a
   service that authenticates service providers like you, using tokens
   provided by the to-be-evaluated domain names.  A payment provider or
   whatever, when offering service to a customer, could obtain from that
   customer a token of consent allowing it to obtain the relevant data
   from the registries and registrars in question.  That token could then
   be provided to the authorization service, which would then
   authenticate your request to the RDAP servers and they could provide
   you the data you request.  This is by no means an impossible task --
   every time you apply for insurance online or log into a payment
   provider via Google or Facebook or Amazon, you're doing this.  This is
   a technique that is already deployed all over the Internet where real
   money is involved, so I fail to see how it could not be used in our
   case.  (In addition, you may not actually need the particulars of an
   individual -- it might be enough for you to be able to tell whether
   the domain and people behind it are related in some important ways to
   some other domain.  But we're getting ahead of ourselves in the use
   case description here.)

   This is also why separating the collection of data from questions
   about display and so on is necessary: we need to understand as a group
   the compelling use cases that the RDS data can support.  I agree that
   reputation-of-vendor systems are among those uses, and that we ought
   therefore to include support of such things in what we think we want
   the system to be able to support.

   Of course, all of this does represent some cost to you -- your
   existing service would need to change to reflect the new business
   logic and access rules and mechanisms and so on.  But I don't think
   this WG has so far accepted, "But that's how we do it now," as a
   legitimate purpose.

   Best regards,

   A


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