[gtld-tech] Draft RDAP Operational Profile for gTLD Registries and Registrars

[Francisco Arias]

I think there is perhaps a misunderstanding. The current profile proposal does support/allow for tiered access, as long as an agreement provision, waiver, or Consensus Policy supports/allows such thing (see section 1.4.11 of the proposal).


-- 
Francisco







On 1/8/16, 10:41 AM, "Andrew Newton" <andy at hxr.us> wrote:

>So I believe that is addressed in Andrew's proposal.
>
>What we don't want is for the PDP to make a recommendation only to
>have people say, "but the gTLD profile doesn't support tiered access."
>
>-andy
>
>On Thu, Jan 7, 2016 at 8:48 PM, Francisco Arias
><francisco.arias at icann.org> wrote:
>> Hi Andy,
>>
>> Defining what should or should not be shown is probably better suited for the new Policy Development Process on Next-Generation gTLD Registration Directory Service. There is a call for volunteers (and observers) at https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2016-01-04-en
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> --
>> Francisco
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1/7/16, 2:21 PM, "gtld-tech-bounces at icann.org on behalf of Andrew Newton" <gtld-tech-bounces at icann.org on behalf of andy at hxr.us> wrote:
>>
>>>First, is it right of me to assume that commenting here is sufficient
>>>to be considered providing feedback for this:
>>>https://www.icann.org/public-comments/rdap-profile-2015-12-03-en ?
>>>
>>>I agree with the general aim and direction of this proposal. Comments in-line:
>>>
>>>On Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at 5:57 PM, Andrew Sullivan <asullivan at dyn.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I understand the difficulty of specifying a profile where the possible
>>>> future policy options are not known, but I believe that RDAP was
>>>> designed with the goal of being able to deliver selectively any field
>>>> at all depending on the identity of the querying party.  Therefore, I
>>>> think the profile could specify at least three roles: public1,
>>>> authenticated-full, authenticated-test.
>>>>
>>>
>>>I would call these authorization profiles, not authentication profiles.
>>>
>>>>     RDAP services MUST provide a form of authentication service as
>>>>     described in RFC 7481.  RDAP services MAY use any of the federated
>>>>     authentication models described in RFC 7481, section 3.2.1.
>>>>
>>>>     RDAP services MUST provide differentiated access based on
>>>>     authorization, as described in RFC 7481, section 3.3.  RDAP
>>>>     services MUST provide a minimum of three different authorized
>>>>     levels of access, called public1, authenticated-full, and
>>>>     authenticated-test.  In the sections that follow, members
>>>>     appropriate to the public1 and authenticated-full roles are marked
>>>>     as appropriate to either or both.  Any member not explicitly
>>>>     marked is assumed to appropriate to the authenticated-full role
>>>>     only The authenticated-test role is for testing, and is used to
>>>>     demonstrate the ability to selectively disable response for some
>>>>     field at test time.
>>>>
>>>>     RDAP services MAY NOT implement additional differentiated
>>>>     responses based on authorization except as contemplated by ICANN
>>>>     policy or under agreement with ICANN under the RSEP process.
>>>>
>>>> Then, each member mentioned should be marked as "public1",
>>>> "authenticated-full", or both.  I think only the following fields are
>>>> part of the public1 list:
>>>>
>>>> for domain objects:
>>>>
>>>>     objectClassName
>>>>     ldhName
>>>>     unicodeName
>>>>     variants (all of it)
>>>>     nameservers
>>>>     publicIDs, but only when it's used for a registrar
>>>>     secureDNS
>>>>     status
>>>>
>>>> for nameserver objects:
>>>>
>>>>     objectClassName
>>>>     ldhName
>>>>     unicodeName
>>>>     ipAddresses
>>>>
>>>> Nothing else goes in public1.  I've called this public1 to make it
>>>> clear that it is but one possible interpretation of what "public
>>>> access" could be in the future; I'm not wedded to the name.
>>>
>>>I would include handle and any remarks the registrant intended for
>>>public consumption.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Now, the final bit is to make it clear that access that is
>>>> _un_authenticated will use the authenticated-full role until ICANN
>>>> policy changes.
>>>>
>>>> The point of all this is to have differentiated role functionality
>>>> sitting there and ready to go as soon as the ICANN policy changes, and
>>>> to include in the RDAP deployment policy now all the mechanisms
>>>> necessary to implement whatever policy the PDP comes up with.  By
>>>> doing it this way, the current policy can be respected while yet
>>>> laying the ground for the just-launched PDP to do something sane.
>>>>
>>>> I hope this is useful.  Apologies again for the long time to send it.
>>>> If you have further questions, obviously, please don't hesitate to
>>>> poke me.
>>>>
>>>
>>>I don't know if this is the right place, but it would be nice if
>>>something like draft-hollenbeck-weirds-rdap-openid could be
>>>implemented as well, say 6 months after it is published as an RFC.
>>>
>>>-andy
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