[ksk-rollover] followup of DNSSEC Workshop at ICANN64
S Moonesamy
sm+icann at elandsys.com
Mon Mar 18 15:59:43 UTC 2019
Hi Michael,
At 07:59 AM 18-03-2019, Michael Richardson wrote:
>I am not addressing the absolute risk of exfiltration attacks,
>but rather asking if having more keys in the HSM causes a relative
>change to the risk of exfiltration attacks.
The simple answer is no.
>More keys generated might mean that the HSM is unlocked more often,
>but I don't think this would be the case. My understanding is that the HSMs
>need to be acccessed on a regular basis by the Security Officers anyway in
>order to sign new ZSKs.
The HSMs on the West Coast (U.S.) are activated twice a year during
scheduled KSK Ceremonies by using three out of the seven "OP"
cards. Physical access to the HSMs (hardware device) is under the
control of the Root Zone Manager.
A KSK Ceremony takes more time (not more Ceremonies) if there are
more "keys" to generate. The same number of KSK Ceremonies were held
for the "keys" required for the roll-over process. I have requested
authorization to attend events which might entail access to a
security card and the Root Zone Manager agreed to those
requests. Such events are usually scheduled within a day of a KSK Ceremony.
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
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