[ksk-rollover] will there be another keyrollover?

[Michael Richardson]

Paul Wouters <paul at nohats.ca> wrote:
    >> I mean, if the signed zone is loaded from disk, and rarely actually
    >> transfered over the network, then maybe having huge-sized signatures
    >> (which some NIST candidates feature) isn't so much a problem.

    > You are talking post quantum algorithms ? The ones that aren’t chosen
    > yet by NIST, aren’t specified in RFCs and aren’t implemented in any
    > software and aren’t deployed anywhere in resolvers ?

Yes... has anyone done an *experiment* here?
I am not suggesting we do it tomorrow, but rather that we know what might be
involved.  As I said: what if the root zone, being signed,  no longer needed
to do queries, because every recursive had a copy.

    > I think maybe the root should first roll to like algo 13 or something
    > similar where there is operational experience.

That's also worth considering, and I said last time that doing it more often
means more operational practice.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF at sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide




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