[NCAP-Discuss] why enhanced controlled interruption - not legal

[rubensk at nic.br]

> On 25 Feb 2022, at 16:14, Danny McPherson <danny at tcb.net> wrote:
> 
> On 2022-02-25 13:22, Rubens Kuhl via NCAP-Discuss wrote:
>> Matt,
>> Those ways can be summarized in the famous Sledgehammer catch phrase:
>> "Trust me, I know what I am doing".
>> When you say other operators, my organization happens to run one such
>> honeypot network of SMTP listeners. But we don't keep sending e-mail
>> to people so they hit our honeypots back, the only ones that get there
>> are those looking for open relays.
>> You might consult with the author of the Verisign comment that called
>> such mechanism controlled exfiltration, because I agree with him or
>> her.
>> Rubens
> 
> I suppose the author of those comments would also say that ignoring the plausibility of said exfiltration _until someone has made money off the domain sale (i.e., TLD delegated, traffic analyzed, domain registered, registrant does whatever they want, etc..) might well be convenient, but I'm not sure it's what responsible or good looks like.

That's why there is a buffer time of controlled interruption to foster people to move their systems away from the collision situation, so by the time someone might actually do that by an active delegation, this could be fixed already.

> I'm not going to redebate these things again here, we can agree to disagree...

In this case, Danny 2015, Jeff S 2015, Jeff S 2022 and Rubens 2022 all agree, only Danny 2022 disagree. I can agree to disagree with Danny 2022, but getting agreement from Danny 2015 seems hard.


Rubens




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