[NCAP-Discuss] Defining CI/CE

[Rubens Kuhl]

> Em 2 de ago. de 2023, à(s) 19:28, Jeff Schmidt via NCAP-Discuss <ncap-discuss at icann.org> escreveu:
> 
> This reminded me about SSL/certificate issues. Has been discussed before, but here it is again so folks can think about it before we meet.

If I understood correctly the idea of a minimal honeypot, no connection will ever be established… either due to it being RST or never answered.
So no certificates will ever be presented or requested from either side.

But it provides no visible notification, just like CI… it only gathers more data. If it answers anything, then it’s not a minimal honeypot, it’s a plain honeypot. Considering what you mentioned about most collisions causing M2M traffic, with no humans actually seeing the result, the minimal honeypot sounds like a better data privacy x data collection trade-off.



Rubens





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