[RSSAC Caucus] INPUT REQUESTED: Proposal for Future Root Zone KSK Rollovers

[Paul M]

While I concur with most of the proposed guidelines on the key rollover
interval(s), I have particular misgivings on the duration of Phase D

 (KSK standby state).  Why should this phase last for two years?  Publishing
a KSK but not deploying it for two years potentially invites an attacker to
exploit possible vulnerabilities with either the properties of the key or
key generation algorithm. The ROCA
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ROCA_vulnerability>vulnerability shows that
even 2048-bit RSA is susceptible to exploitation.


If phase D could be reduced a reasonably shorter duration (1-1.5 years)
this problem could be mitigated. However, if this duration is pretty short
and will inconvenience the dissemination of the KSK to OS and DNS software
vendors, then considerations should be proposed for using a longer KSK key
length of 3072-bit RSA.


Best Regards,


Paul Muchene
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