

GWG Questionnaire Response

Review at ICANN 76

Overview

- **37 Principals Reviewed:**

- I. Separation of Powers (12)
- II. Designation and Removal (14)
- III. Finances (11)

- **Summary of Responses:**

- 19-20 responses per basket
- 15-16 Members, 4 Liaisons

- **Overall Assessment**

- Primarily strong alignment on principals that require some tweaks
- Handful of items that require deep dive

- **Next Steps:**

- Update principals based on response feedback

I	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.90	1.100	1.110	1.210
>=4	14	20	19	17	20	16	19	19	16	18	12	14
3	1	0	1	3	0	4	0	1	0	2	1	5
<=2	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	7	1
Total	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20

II	2.10	2.11	2.20	2.30	2.31	2.40	2.41	2.50	2.60	2.70	2.80	2.90	2.100	2.210
>=4	19	18	19	19	15	18	19	14	16	18	19	17	16	18
3	0	1	0	0	3	1	0	3	3	0	0	2	1	1
<=2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	2	0
Total	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19

III	3.10	3.20	3.30	3.40	3.50	3.60	3.70	3.80	3.90	3.100	3.110
>=4	18	12	18	17	18	15	13	15	10	16	17
3	1	6	0	2	1	4	4	4	4	3	1
<=2	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	5	0	1
Total	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19



Basket 1


Basket 1 Responses

Given Name	Surname	Organization	Type	1.10 Financial self-determination The entity that collects money	1.20 An RSO has no authority to publish an altered or alternative	1.30 Prescriptive authority is distinct from executive authority	1.40 RSS policy arises through collaboration between RSOs and non-RSO stakeholders To maintain and continue to build trust	1.50 There is no single controlling person in policy-making No single	1.60 Fidelity to principles Maintaining and building trust in the RSS GS	1.70 Transparency Maintaining and building trust in the RSS GS	1.80 Flexibility The RSS GS must include the ability/freedom	1.90 No unilateral veto No single stakeholder can take the RSS GS	1.100 Dissent is welcome Those with dissenting voices are	1.110 Direct participation of RSOs in RSS GS Exercise of governance	1.210 Survivability The RSS GS and the RSS must be sufficiently
Luis	Espinoza	ccNSO	Member	1	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	3	5
Peter	Koch	ccNSO	Member	3	5	4	3	5	3	4	3	5	5	2	4
Kurt	Pritz	gTLD RySG	Member	4	5	4	4	4	5	5	5	4	3	5	2
Hanyu	Yang	gTLD RySG	Member	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	3
Geoff	Huston	IAB	Member	4	5	3	3	5	4	5	5	5	4	1	5
Jim	Reid	IAB	Member	5	5	5	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	1	5
Ken	Renard	RSO: ARL	Member	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	5	4	5	5
John	Augenstein	RSO: DISA	Member	4	5	4	3	5	3	4	5	5	5	4	5
Ashwin	Rangan	RSO: ICANN	Member	1	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	1	5	1	3
Jeff	Osborn	RSO: ISC	Member	5	4	4	4	5	3	5	4	5	4	4	4
Wes	Hardaker	RSO: ISI	Member	4	5	4	5	5	4	5	5	4	5	5	5
Lars-Johan	Liman	RSO: Netnod	Member	4	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Karl	Reuss	RSO: UMD	Member	4	5	5	4	5	5	5	4	5	5	4	4
Brad	Verd	RSO: Verisign	Member	5	5	5	4	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	4
Hiro	Hotta	RSO: WIDE Project	Member	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4
Suzanne	Woolf	SSAC	Member	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	3	4	4
Kim	Davies	IANA	Liason	1	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	1	5	1	3
Edmon	Chung	ICANN Board	Liason	1	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	1	5	1	3
Christan	Kaufmann	ICANN Board	Liason	1	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	1	5	1	3
Duane	Wessels	RZM	Liason	4	5	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	5	5	4

1.10 | Financial self-determination

The entity that collects money for RSS support is not necessarily the entity that decides how to spend that same money. It is critical to avoid accidental capture as a result of loss of control over financial decisions.

1.10 | Financial self-determination




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christian Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	<p>“The entity that collects money for RSS support, while being fiduciarily responsible for the maintenance and distribution of those funds, is expected to follow the policies/procedures developed to guide the distribution of those funds. This will avoid accidental capture by the collecting entity.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As worded, the principle suggests that it is improper for an entity holding funds to make decisions on how those funds are used, but that is the key to fiduciary responsibility. There are proper ways to contain that self determination, which is subject those decisions to other checks/required processes, etc. Adherence to those checks is how to prevent accidental capture of financial decisions.
	Luis Espinoza - ccNSO	Who collects the money should establish the way of how to spend the money, could be delegated to other entity but under their rules.
2		None
3	Peter Koch - ccNSO	The emphasis on finance is confusing
4	Geoff Huston - IAB	I'm not sure that this is feasible or realistic. All money comes with an agenda, and trying to create a distance between raising monies and spending them risks compromising the ability top raise money in the first place.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	<p>Rephrase the principle to say "the individual RSOs should have critical influence over how the money is spent for their respective parts of the service". (For motivation, see comment.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The stated principle may not say what's intended to say. It depends on _who_ collects the money and which the alternatives are for who decides on the spending. E.g., if the RSOs collect the money, the principle above could be interpreted to say "it's not necessarily the RSOs who decide how to spend the money they have collected", which, IMHO, would not fly. I think the important principle should be that the RSOs should have a strong influence over how the money is spent in their individual cases, regardless of who collects it. So the principle should (possibly) just say "the individual RSOs should have critical influence over how the money is spent for their respective parts of the service".
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	s/b The entity that "sets funding goals and develops funding sources for the RSS support in not necessarily..." "Collecting money" seems too entitled or presumptuous to me. Also, add: "Given that, we expect there to be communication between the groups so that funding needs and revenue targets can be set, and that there be some early warning in cases where revenue targets cannot be met."
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	The collecting entity should be chartered to operate on the principles of non-capture
	Duane Wessels - RZM	<p>I wonder if "spend" is the correct word to use here. The model I have in mind is some entity collects money and distributes it to RSOs, who in turn spend the money to provide services. Is this principle speaking to the first part (distributing -- i.e. which RSOs can receive funding), the second part (spending -- how the RSOs can spend their funds), or both?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maybe "accidental" doesn't belong in the principle

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


Rating	Name/Org	Statements
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	I feel pretty strongly already. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> This seems wise when thinking thru any of the parties it could involve.
	Jim Reid - IAB	No overlap between the people/organisations collecting the dosh and those spending it.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	The taxpayers or members funding it should not be a part of approval of any budget for that money or dictating that their funds go somewhere specific.
	Suzanne Woolf - RSO: ISI	There always have to be mechanisms for making sure distributed power doesn't turn into deadlock, capture is an important risk but so is paralysis. This is an implementation detail though.
	Hanyu Yang - gTLD RySG	Maybe it can set an accidental mechanism for the root server to classify the risk together with the financial support. Indeed, the new org can help to organize the business model for more collaboration and innovation business model for profit to survive.
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	[adding the following is proposed] In case the collector and the decider are different entities, “who is the decider and what the spending policy is” should be known to the original money providers before they provide money.

1.20 | An RSO has no authority to publish an altered or alternative root zone

An RSO must only publish from its designated root server identities IANA root-related data exactly as received from the IANA through the root zone maintainer..

1.20 | An RSO has no authority to publish an altered or alt RZ




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3		None
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Clarifying that the IANA supplied zone file is sacrosanct, but alternative DNS files may come to exist in formats that are complimentary to the IANA zone file. It's hard to second guess what the future holds. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Altering the root zone file maliciously remains a very bad thing.
5	Ken Renard - RSO: ARL	Any rule resulting from this principle should contain a caveat with respect to invalid zone contents (e.g. failed ZoneMD, bad DNSSEC signatures in zone). Is this up to the RSO? Or should the GS have a policy that will make the RSS more consistent or deterministic? This would not be CHANGING the zone, but deciding not to publish that version.
	Jim Reid - IAB	Publish processes & tools to allow public verification that each RSO is doing this.
	Wes Hardaker - RSO: ISI	the only exception i can think of is that there was wide support that ICANN had gone off the rails with a recent decision. And I mean *wide* support.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. This is one of the fundamental properties of the root server system. The RSS is in place to serve exactly this, and the unwritten agreement between the individual RSOs and the Internet community is that the RSO is there to provide reliable integrity for Internet's identifier system as implemented in the DNS. The RSS should thus honour this principle and this agreement by not serving any other data from these service identifiers.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	I never thought there was a risk of an alternate root designation but I guess it is good to say this.
	Luis Espinoza - ccNSO	Publish an unaltered root zone is the core business, other ways are violating the reason to exist as root zone operator
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	if you serve an alternate root you need to bifurcate operations so there is not inextricable co-mingling. If you receive funds, any infrastructure procured from those funds should not be used for any alternate root
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	[comment on wording] "root server identities" --> "root server identifiers" following the RSSAC lexicon ?

1.30 | Prescriptive authority is distinct from executive authority

The act of making policy (prescriptive authority) should be distinct and separate from the acts of implementing and enforcing policy (executive authority). .

1.30 | Prescriptive authority is distinct from exec. authority




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Geoff Huston - IAB	For small-sized undertakings this is not necessarily achievable. Separation of functions and authorities is a luxury achievable with size.
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	It seems that the prescriptive part might need to draw from a wider field of inputs than the executive. An overly inclusive executive can be unwieldy.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	Headline and text not aligned; since 100% separation is often not to be achieved in multi-tier governance structures, question is how to limit institutional CoI
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	I had to pause and think about the meaning of prescriptive and executive authority. Why not make it simple and clearer: "RSS governance will include separate functions for policy creation and policy oversight or enforcement."
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	There is a missing component here, as within the ICANN multistakeholder model there is the act of development of policy, the act of acceptance of that policy, and then the act of implementation/enforcement. If there is the potential for "making policy" to have both the "development" and "acceptance" components, then the candidate principle should reflect that. The use of terms such as "prescriptive" and "executive" are not as important as the definition of roles that are anticipated in the process.
	Suzanne Woolf - RSO: ISI	Sometimes it's hard to separate these functions, and it may be more important to be transparent about them while resisting capture.
5	Jim Reid - IAB	No overlap in people/organisations serving in these two roles
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. This principle is basically Montesquieu's principle of separation of powers. This has been tested and proven to withstand the teeth of history. It remains an important pillar on which democratic, sensible, and long-lasting structures stand. We should acknowledge this and adopt it.
	Luis Espinoza - ccNSO	As in many governments, one can't be both judge and part of it.

1.40 | RSS policy arises through collaboration between RSOs and non-RSO stakeholders

To maintain and continue to build trust in the RSS, non-RSO stakeholders must have a strong voice in RSS governance, and RSOs (as stakeholders) must continue to have a strong voice in RSS governance.

1.40 | RSS policy arises through collaboration bw RSOs/non-




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Peter Koch - ccNSO	Headline does not match content
	Geoff Huston - IAB	I am not necessarily on board with this proposition. The role of the RSOs as undistinguished commodity providers of engines that answer queries of the root zone is a legitimate view. Its not necessarily the only view, but it is legitimate. as a functionary that the policy role of RSOs is not an priori proposition that necessarily should exist in all scenarios for future governance.
	John Augenstein - RSO: DISA	G-Root believes RSO as stakeholders should have a strong voice and non-RSO stakeholders should have a "voice" but not strong.

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1.40 | RSS policy arises through collaboration between RSOs and non-RSO stakeholders

To maintain and continue to build trust in the RSS, non-RSO stakeholders must have a strong voice in RSS governance, and RSOs (as stakeholders) must continue to have a strong voice in RSS governance.

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


Rating	Name/Org	Statements
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	This will be easier to support with an actual proposed model. A credible multistakeholder model requires strong non-RSO stakeholders.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	I suggest to rephrase the principle to: To maintain and continue to build trust in the RSS, RSS policy must be formed and developed through a balanced collaboration between non-RSO stakeholders and RSOs (as stakeholders) where neither is allowed to dominate. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I fully support the underlying thought, but I have a slight itch for how it's phrased and for the notes. (I actually like the heading (rubric) better! :)) I look for the word "balance" (between all involved parties) in some way shape or form. I'm not sure how to phrase this, and it might even be automatically implied by the text as it stands, but it's very important to me that neither party has a dominant position in the relationship.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	"Non-RSO stakeholders will participate in the RSS policy development process." "Strong" in an unnecessary and vague term, we want to avoid debate about whether the non-RSO precipitation model is "strong enough" when we develop the model. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I think we should make it clear that this principle does not mean that every icann stakeholder group will be invited to participate, but only those germane to the decisions to be taken. (But that is tricky to do!)
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	The principle would be strengthened by reference to the multistakeholder nature of the anticipated governance model, as only recognizing a division between RSO and non-RSO does not fully embrace or acknowledge the multitude of voices that could be present in the non-RSO grouping. The ICANN community includes models for multistakeholder policy development that could be leveraged to show how a multitude of stakeholder voices are heard and contribute to the legitimacy of the system. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> It could be helpful to clarify that this means that neither RSOs or the group of voices that comprise the non-RSO camp are able to unilaterally decide RSS governance issues. The header could be refined to state "RSS policy requires principle-based collaboration between RSOs and non-RSO stakeholders".
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	RSO's need to have a "strong voice", if that means 50% weighting then yes, a strong voice. Bicameral model is important here. (i.e.: Contracted party vs non-contracted party house.) Each group should have the same amount of votes. RSO's and non-RSO should have equal power. *RSO's should be required to act as a stakeholder
	Suzanne Woolf - RSO: ISI	I haven't been completely comfortable with the explicit identification of stakeholders in RSSAC37 and the GWG. This principle would be stronger if there were explicit criteria on who gets a "strong voice".
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	[comment on wording] Assuming this principle is just regarding "policy making", the principle statement had better contain a phrase such as "in RSS policy making process" in the statement itself.
5	Jim Reid - IAB	Consensus decisions on RSS policy must not be RSO-only or non-RSO-only.
	Luis Espinoza - ccNSO	The root server users they are as important stake holders as the operators.

1.50 | There is no single controlling person in policy-making

No single person (whether a natural person or an entity) should be in a position to set or block RSS policy.

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


Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3		None
4	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	Include something about veto power: "No single entity or person shall control or have veto power in the policy development process."
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	It's already strong support. This one seems obvious.
	Jim Reid - IAB	No single entity OR GROUP should be in a position to set or block...
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support, but maybe we can fold 1.50, 1.90, and 1.210 together (see those)? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I fully support a democratic approach to the Internet as a world-wide system. I believe that the only way in which the Internet – as a whole and in parts – can maintain trust from the international community is by working through democracy. The principal design should therefore not contain "popes, kings, and emperors" that can have such controlling powers. The challenge lies in upholding the democracy, which is, by intrinsic design, susceptible to capture by non-democratic forces if they reach majority. (This is a general conundrum.)
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	The general principle makes sense - though this appears to be addressed to the multistakeholder policy development phase and could be made more specific to that. For reference, across the different policy development processes within ICANN, none of these processes include the ability for a single person/entity to set or block policy.
	Luis Espinoza - ccNSO	we need to avoid the monopoly
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	Pocket veto power needs to be avoided.

1.60 | Fidelity to principles

Maintaining and building trust in the RSS GS requires that compliance with these principles should be subject to some form of audit/confirmation/review.

1.60 | Fidelity to principles




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	This will be easier to judge with some flesh on the bones. Is there an ultimate authority? Who and why? This is a little hard to defend in a purely hypothetical setting.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	in its current wording, this isn't a principle (read: axiom)
	John Augenstein - RSO: DISA	G-Root believes that further definitions are needed for audit and confirmation. What would this entail?
	Duane Wessels - RZM	The words "compliance" and "audit" here really caused me to stop and think about the principles overall. e.g. whether the principles are just "guiding" or something that requires full compliance with possible consequences for non-compliance. Since some of the principles apply to RSOs my initial interpretation was that RSOs would be audited for compliance. But perhaps it means the GS would be the audit target. That should be clarified.
4	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	With regard to the RSS GS we agree, We do not want to conflate the RSS GS with the RSO's. In regards to the RSO's, I feel there should be two bars, one where an organization agrees to and signs up to an SLA or SLE and with that comes a level of compliance that can be in an audit/confirmation/review. The other bar is where they accept funding and there are more expectations on top of the non-funded bar.
5	Ken Renard - RSO: ARL	Hoping that an audit accurately represents the principles
	Jim Reid - IAB	Compliance audits must be public, carried out by a competent independent third party and take place at regular intervals, say once every 1-2 years.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support, but note that the requirement is mutual. All parts of the system should be subject to review, and different parts should probably be reviewed by different entities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> This is basic. If you want to play with "the others", you have to follow the rules that you have all agreed on together. For yourself, you can only decide on whether you want to play with the others if you know whether they are following the rules or not. You can only do so if you can see what they do. As a consequence of mutuality "the others" must therefore be allowed to assess whether <u>you</u> follow the rules. That can only be done if you allow "inspection", and you will only be accepted into the game if you pass inspection. This is, of course, all mutual.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	"Maintaining and building trust in the RSS GS requires that compliance with these principles should be subject to some form of accountability mechanism (e.g., audit, confirmation, review).
	Luis Espinoza - ccNSO	As this is a public service, transparency through auditing is a basement.
	Suzanne Woolf - RSO: ISI	Metrics for this aren't impossible but are likely to be difficult.

1.70 | Transparency

Maintaining and building trust in the RSS GS requires that exercise of enumerated powers should be open and transparent.

1.70 | Transparency




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1	Jim Reid - IAB	I don't know what is meant by "enumerated powers" or what these exclude.
2		None
3		None
4		No comments
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	We will only engender trust if we are transparent. This is vital.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transparency is the only way to allow all parties of the community (down to the individual Internet user) to assess how the agreement is fulfilled. There are certain details of the system that would suffer from public exposure (technical security measures come to mind), but design, principles, and general execution of activities must be transparent for democracy to work.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	Governing structure should have a periodic accountability/transparency review
	Hanyu Yang - gTLD RySG	ICANN has its own accountability and transparency mechanism, the RSS GS should follow the criteria to increase the openness and transparency.

1.80 | Flexibility

The RSS GS must include the ability/freedom to accommodate changes to the governance structure itself.

1.80 | Flexibility




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Peter Koch - ccNSO	this leaves unclear whether the change is approved internal or external to the GS
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Good in theory. The devil will be in the details. There is a balance required between fickle and inflexible.
	Ken Renard - RSO: ARL	As long as changes adhere to the governing principles.
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	The RSS GS should have the ability to do so against a set of enduring principles that maintain the public service mission of the RSS.
5	Jim Reid - IAB	Clarity on who gets to decide these changes and how those changes can be requested.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support (but see comment). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Only structures that adapt to evolution withstand. We want this to be long-lasting, and the only constant thing is change. Therefore the system must be able to adapt, but a few really basic principles (like some of the ones we're trying to define here) should probably be made <i>_very_</i> hard to change. (Compare with: there are laws that are reasonably easy to change, and there is a constitution that is, by design, very hard to change. This is good.) OTOH, you want to get these basic principles <i>_right_</i> before you cast them in stone.
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	This principle would be strengthened by referencing that changes to the governance system itself are based upon/tested against principles. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ICANN supports the development of an additional, related principle that the RSS GS should be periodically reviewed to ensure that it is fit-for-purpose and for currency.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	I can't emphasize this enough. Nothing is written in stone and should always be re-evaluated over time and if necessary changed to meet the evolution of things.
	Suzanne Woolf - RSO: ISI	It shouldn't be easy to change the structure, but there should be a process.

1.90 | No unilateral veto

No single stakeholder can take the RSS GS hostage. While decision-making thresholds may be based on majority or supermajority requirements, unanimity requirements are generally a hindrance to a well-functioning RSS GS.

1.90 | No unilateral veto




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	<p>ICANN supports the concept that no person or entity shall have a unilateral veto or ability to uphold decision making. However, further attention is needed to how this principle is drafted.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The first sentence of this principle appears nearly identical to 1.50, and ICANN encourages the removal of duplicative principles. In addition, between the title, the first sentence, and the second sentence, there are a few different concepts laid out in the principle that would benefit from being clarified or separated. One potential solution would be to rephrase a bit, such as “no decision-making threshold within the RSS GS shall require unanimity. Decision-making thresholds based on majority, super- or supra-majority thresholds remain available. Unanimity requirements are generally a hindrance to good governance and promote the ability for any single voice or entity to stall or block progress.”
2		None
3		None
4	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	<p>I would fold this principle into 1.50 above or at least make it 1.51 or 1.60.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> If we accept 1.50 the way it is re-written above, I would eliminate the first sentence (and in any case eliminate the word hostage) and make this recommendation: "Decisions and policy creation processes will seek consensus but not depend on unanimity. Voting mechanisms may be used in certain circumstances." (I don't really like that second sentence but am trying to keep with the spirit of the principle the way it is written.)
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	It's good already. We need to avoid the abuse of unanimous consensus as bullying.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	How is this different from 1.50?
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	<p>Full support, but this is basically a re-statement of principle 1.50. Maybe we can fold 1.50, 1.90, and 1.210 together (see those)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> This is a good and important observation on democracy.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	Pocket veto power needs to be avoided. Unanimity with all decisions will be difficult and one outlier can't derail progress if all the rest agree.

1.100 | Dissent is welcome

Those with dissenting voices are encouraged to voice their dissent on the record and elsewhere.

1.100 | Dissent is welcome




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	<p>I agree with the spirit of the principle but not the wording.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Disparate viewpoints will be encouraged during the policy-making process. Dissenting views from proposed or approved policies will be published. However, dissenting views or opinions that do not garner consensus support, will not be allowed to derail or unnecessarily delay the policy development process" I include that last clause because GNSO policies are delayed for years while participants make arguments that do not gain traction. Finally, I think we should drop "and elsewhere" as it encourages participants to debate RSS policy in fora outside the RSS GS.
	Suzanne Woolf - RSO: ISI	Dissent should always be taken seriously, and there's almost never a reason (certain financial and personnel decisions, not much else) to have a confidentiality requirement for anything the RSS GS will be dealing with. Not sure it's helpful to encourage people to take their differences of opinion outside of the structure for resolving them though.
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	<p>Documenting how dissent can be voiced and presented publically will be important.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stifling the views of the minority is rarely useful in the long run.
	Geoff Huston - IAB	Disruptive dissent is toxic to any common effort. I suspect that the principle assumes that any such dissent is constructive rather than simply disruptive.
5	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	<p>Full support, but ... (see comment)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> This is a double-edged sword of democracy. Strong voices of dissent based on malice and/or ignorance can influence large groups of malicious and/or ignorant people and make them overthrow good decisions. This is part of democracy. We have to live with it and be mentally prepared to deal with it.
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	Part of a healthy multistakeholder process includes the ability to voice dissent, but also includes documenting that the dissent was considered prior to final outcomes being reached.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	if there is a dissenting opinion it is encouraged that it be shared and heard.

1.110 | Direct participation of RSOs in RSS GS

Exercise of governance authority by the RSS GS should involve direct participation of RSOs rather than requiring RSOs to rely upon representation of their interests.

1.110 | Direct participation of RSOs in RSS GS




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1	Jim Reid - IAB	RSOs must not be compelled to take part in RSS GS.
	Geoff Huston - IAB	This freezes the current structure, membership and mode of operation of the RSOs. It runs the strong risk of losing relevance in an evolving environment and without the ability to be flexible in response then the governance body may become paralyzed.
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	This is not a requirement for ICANN as the operator of the IMRS. ICANN would be comfortable with a representational model of RSO interests within the resulting governance structure. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> While RSOs collectively have raised concerns about representation of interest, ICANN org notes that some level of representation has been a key to successful multistakeholder processes and urges the RSOs to consider alternative paths to assuring that all RSOs have a voice in governance. For example, those participating in the governance model on behalf of RSOs could be required to follow voting directions as given by those RSOs who elect to participate in internal policy development channels, including carrying forward of dissenting voices. Requiring direct representation also carries with it an obligation of participation, and raises questions of propriety of thresholds/ability to take action if any RSO (or grouping thereof) elect to not participate. There are likely tools that can be used to assure all RSO voices (that wish to participate) are considered in policy development, while still balancing that with some form of representation model that brings stability to the governance structure.
2		No comments.
3	Luis Espinoza - ccNSO	Could be complicate to enable direct participation to other stake holders like users of the system, then I'm not completely in favor or oppose to direct participation.

CONTINUED

1.110 | Direct participation of RSOs in RSS GS

Exercise of governance authority by the RSS GS should involve direct participation of RSOs rather than requiring RSOs to rely upon representation of their interests.

1.110 | Direct participation of RSOs in RSS GS




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	This will require additional trust in the organizations taking a stronger role. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> We have stated that the RSS needs to be trusted, the knife cuts both ways. Governance authority should not be handed to the untrustworthy.
	John Augenstein - RSO: DISA	G-Root wonders what the definition of "direct participation" is? Is both in-person and remote/online viewed as the same thing?
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	It is reasonable to think that there are several topics or processes that should be enumerated by the RSS GS which require all RSO's and probably unavoidable. However, I feel there is also a number of topics and processes that should be enumerated by the RSS GS that could and should be served by a representative model.
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	Agree, however, this should be re-examined if the number of RSOs grow in scale and representation becomes pragmatic. As of now, the number is reasonable
	Suzanne Woolf - RSO: ISI	I don't feel as strongly about this as some GWG members do; many groups find it more efficient to have "representation" in various processes rather than requiring everyone to participate in everything, with explicit processes for reporting and accountability. But I don't think it has to be harmful, unless the list of RSOs gets a lot longer.
5	Ken Renard - RSO: ARL	An RSO may still choose not to participate in some activities or abstain from certain votes.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diversity is one of the key properties of the RSS. The current RSOs are very diverse and share very little outside the root service. They are very different from each other in terms of legal and government structures, and may have different goals with their other activities which may be influenced by them taking part in the RSS. Recent history has proven that this fits ill with the concept of representation. Representation only works when the group represented is reasonably homogeneous.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	I think this is among the most important principles and should go near the top. (I think a general re-ordering should be done.) This principle should be combined with 1.40, where this principle might be 140 and 1.40 should become 1.41.
	Hanyu Yang - gTLD RySG	Not only the RSOs, but also the Non-RSOs also should have the direct participation.

1.210 | Survivability

The RSS GS and the RSS must be sufficiently robust to survive any legal process attack by a (non-state) bad faith actor.

1.210 | Survivability



Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	I am not sure what we are trying to avoid in this one or how we would accomplish it. I am FOR addressing the issue raised in some way. I think, in our discussion, we need to be more specific about the threat and the robustness envisioned.
3	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	This principle appears more of an aspirational statement than a principle. We cannot guarantee survivability, nor can we guarantee that the most robust of planning with lead to survivability. The concept, of course, is worthy of support. Suggest a modification that "In building the RSS GS and the RSS, risks must be identified, and mitigation measures implemented to support both the RSS GS and the RSS against legal process attacks by bad faith actors."
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	This will play out when this process fleshes things out. mmit is difficult to say much more in the abstract. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is likely that the end result of this process is challenged on legal and/or political grounds.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	"there is no 100% security" - in that sense, this is hardly achievable
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	You don't know what you don't know, so yes, we should plan for the worst, but there is always something that will be missed or not thought of at the time. Hence the governance structures need to have the ability to evolve as stated earlier.
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	Replace the word "any" with "to a reasonable extent". Avoiding any legal process attack is a high bar and will take too much time and effort to develop.
	Suzanne Woolf - RSO: ISI	This may not be a capability that the GS needs to have (or fund) on its own, if there were some way to spread it among multiple organizations or mechanisms. But it's probably hard to tell how much protection is "enough".
	Duane Wessels - RZM	As a principle it sounds nice but also seems maybe impossible to guarantee.
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	[change is proposed] Removal of "(non-state)" is proposed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> [reason] The GS and the RSS need trying to avoid any legal process attacks regardless of whether they come from the state. However, the existence of "(non-state)" may possibly lead readers to interpretation such as - Giving up to be robust enough against attacks by the state where GS-body is established. - No need to be robust enough against bad faith actor who is a state somewhere. If we want to touch on attacks by state(s), making it a NOTE is proposed.
5	Jim Reid - IAB	This has to apply to all possible bad-faith actors.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support, but maybe we can fold 1.50, 1.90, and 1.210 together (see those)? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> This actually ties into principles 1.50 and 1.90. They all focus on avoiding that a single entity gains undue influence over the system. If we try to merge them, we should avoid enumerating situations. Principles that rely on enumeration are not principles, they are lists of special cases ... ;-)

Basket 2


Basket 2 Responses

Given Name	Surname	Organization	Type	2.10 Maintain and enhance trust in the RSS The decision-making	2.11 Maintain and enhance trust in RSS performance The decision-	2.20 Move cautiously Changes to the composition/i density of RSOs must be	2.30 RSS service mission is global and universal in scope The RSS is a	2.31 RSO service mission is global and universal in scope Each RSO holds	2.40 Criteria objectivity and transparency Designation and removal decisions must	2.41 Impartiality of decision-making Designation and removal	2.50 Necessity Do not designate any additional RSO unless the	2.60 Technical necessity The predominant factor to be	2.70 Due diligence The RSS GS must conduct appropriate due diligence	2.80 Differentiate treatment of designation and removal Decisions on	2.90 RSO designation is not a concession to be sold The RSS is a public good, intended to be supplied free of charge	2.100 Funds received from designating new RSOs are dedicated to the RSS	2.210 Voluntary resignation Each RSO should have a path available
Luis	Espinoza	ccNSO	Member	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Peter	Koch	ccNSO	Member	5	5	4	5	3	5	4	3	4	4	4	4	3	5
Kurt	Pritz	gTLD RySG	Member	5	5	4	5	5	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	2	5
Hanyu	Yang	gTLD RySG	Member	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	5	5	5
Geoff	Huston	IAB	Member	5	5	5	5	2	5	5	2	5	4	5	3	5	5
Jim	Reid	IAB	Member	5	3	5	5	3	5	5	5	5	1	5	5	1	5
Ken	Renard	RSO: ARL	Member	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
John	Augenstein	RSO: DISA	Member	4	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5
Ashwin	Rangan	RSO: ICANN	Member	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4
Jeff	Osborn	RSO: ISC	Member	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	3	5	3
Wes	Hardaker	RSO: ISI	Member	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	5
Lars-Johan	Liman	RSO: Netnod	Member	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5
Karl	Reuss	RSO: UMD	Member	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	4	3	5	5	5	4	5
Brad	Verd	RSO: Verisign	Member	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	5
Hiro	Hotta	RSO: WIDE Project	Member	5	5	5	5	3	5	5	4	4	5	4	5	5	5
Suzanne	Woolf	SSAC	Member														
Kim	Davies	IANA	Liason	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4
Edmon	Chung	ICANN Board	Liason	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4
Christan	Kaufmann	ICANN Board	Liason	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4
Duane	Wessels	RZM	Liason	5	5	5	4	5	5	4	3	3	5	4	4	4	5

2.10 | Maintain and enhance trust in the RSS

The decision-making framework used to establish the number and identities of RSOs must maintain and enhance trust/confidence in the RSS and the legitimacy of the RSS GS.

2.10 | Maintain and enhance trust in the RSS




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3		None
4		No comments
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Already strongly supported. This is a key principle.
	Ken Renard - RSO: ARL	To what extent should we try to define "trust" and "legitimacy" in the principle?
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	It may be valuable to split this principle into two separate principles: One about trust and confidence in the RSS and another about legitimacy of the RSS GS.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. If you have decision-makers that don't believe in the system they are part of, only bad things can happen ...
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	While obvious to some, it is not obvious to all and it is not always obvious as time passes. It's important to document.
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	[comment on wording] "identifies" --> "identities"

2.11 | Maintain and enhance trust in RSS performance

The decision-making framework used to establish the number and identities of RSOs must preserve and demonstrate competence, consistency, commitment, and care for the RSS.

2.11 | Maintain and enhance trust in RSS performance




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Jim Reid - IAB	How does this differ from 2.10?
4		None
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Similar to 2.10
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. This is good. We need to be careful, though, that this statement isn't twisted into something that prevents the members of the framework from having dissenting opinions, and/or to question what's being done.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	While obvious to some, it is not obvious to all and it is not always obvious as time passes. It's important to document.

2.20 | Move cautiously

Changes to the composition/identity of RSOs must be undertaken with caution. Extreme or rapid change to identities or numbers of RSOs creates operational risk and is to be avoided.

2.20 | Move cautiously




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3		None
4	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	Second sentence s/b: "Change to the identities or numbers of RSOs creates risk to the competent operation of the RSS" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I.e., get rid of the modifiers as they make it arguable that change introduces risk.
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Already strong support
	Jim Reid - IAB	A standby RSO of last resort would be a good idea even it it's never needed.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. This is just intrinsically true.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	While obvious to some, it is not obvious to all and it is not always obvious as time passes. It's important to document.
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	[comment on wording] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "identity" --> "identities" "identities or numbers of RSOs" --> "number or identities of RSOs"

2.30 | RSS service mission is global and universal in scope

The RSS is a service that is provided to the world without regard to the identity or affiliation of the user. .

2.30 | RSS service mission is global and universal in scope




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3		None
4	Duane Wessels - RZM	include location of the user
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Already strong. The health of a global internet with a single namespace is a fundamental principle.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support but it is sometimes difficult to uphold.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	While obvious to some, it is not obvious to all and it is not always obvious as time passes. It's important to document.
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	[comment on wording] I prefer "global space" or "whole world" instead of "world" – just a matter of my taste.

2.31 | RSO service mission is global and universal in scope

Each RSO holds a position of global trust and must maintain a global service focus.

2.31 | RSO service mission is global and universal in scope




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2	Geoff Huston - IAB	I don't think that this is necessarily the case in the second part of "maintaining a global service focus". Its unclear as to the exact benefit of running multiple organisation who each use the same underlying technology of an anycast service cloud with multiple points of presence as being essential. In previous days. The issue here is balancing the possible approaches of greatly expanding the RSO base with many many more through lower barriers to entry and a far more cautious view that cements the status quo with major impediments to any form of deviation from the current norm,. This principle precludes the former option.
3	Jim Reid - IAB	RSOs need to demonstrate they're worthy of global trust. Today, some are better than others: publishing stats, accountability, outreach, education, etc.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	The wording of the first part is an assessment rather than a principle
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE Project	[change is proposed] The current candidate statement 2.31 may be misread as “the service focus must be global only”. Amendment proposal is “Each RSO holds a position of global trust and must maintain a global service focus while it may have additional focuses as an RSO” <ul style="list-style-type: none"> [reason] Each RSO may have multiple focuses in its self-defined mission. For example, WIDE Project currently considers its mission as an M-Root Operator : say – “Global service is properly maintained, while committing to raising the bottom of AP-regional root services.” WIDE Project decided to take this approach because WIDE Project knows more about AP-region than any other RSOs. This is one good aspect stemming from RSOs’ diversity.
4	Ken Renard - RSO: ARL	A potential new RSO that has a focus on “underserved” areas of the Internet might actually be useful. While not excluding anyone from their service (filtering), their *focus* could be on specific areas.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	If funding is provided to the RSO it is reasonable to expect that the RSS GS should define a “minimum” of geographic diversity needs: number of sites and continents/regions?
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	Having some RSOs regionally focused, yet still globally reachable, may be beneficial to the RSS.
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Same as 2.30
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. But that said, no RSO should be encouraged to collaborate to balance out each other's weaknesses.

2.40 | Criteria objectivity and transparency

2.40 | Criteria objectivity and transparency

Designation and removal decisions must be based on criteria that are both objective and transparent.




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	<p>I understand the convenience of referring to "designation and removal" in the same principle (even though we understand they are separate functions) because they share so many of the same principles, but, to bring that point home and to avoid confusion, I think we should separate them into Removal function principles and Designation function principles and then for each of those principles described here placed a sub headings under those two.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> For Designation, I am also concerned that publishing objective criteria, without more, will lead entities to publicly declare that they meet the criteria and petition icann to be awarded an RS Operation or somehow otherwise take away discretion of the RSS GS to act in the best interests of the RSS. Maybe: "In addition to addressing potential risks as described in Principle 2.20, Designation decisions must be based on criteria that are both objective and transparent."
4		None
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Already strong. The process is a non-starter without this.
	Jim Reid - IAB	Those making these decisions must not have a (perceived) conflict of interest.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. This is a public service, and all stakeholders have a right to understand what's going on so that they can take action to question decisions if the see fit. This goes back to balance of powers.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	Without this you will lose trust in the system

2.41 | Impartiality of decision-making

Designation and removal decisions must be made in a manner that is impartial.

2.41 | Impartiality of decision-making




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3		None
4	Wes Hardaker - RSO: ISI	I'm not sure 100% impartial is achievable because the whole world depends on the results of these decisions, thus all decision makers have some level of bias.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	not sure that the removal can be as impartial as the designation should b
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySGand in the best interests of stable, secure RSS. (?)
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Already strong. The process is a non-starter without this.
	Jim Reid - IAB	Those making these decisions must not have a (perceived) conflict of interest.
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	Every decision leading to designation or removal must be open, transparent, and based on objective criteria.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. This ties in closely with balance of powers principles, and connects with notions like "public service" and democracy.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	While obvious to some, it is not obvious to all and it is not always obvious as time passes. It's important to document.

2.50 | Necessity

Do not designate any additional RSO unless the designation is objectively necessary to demonstrably continue improvement of RSS stability, security, and resilience.

2.50 | Necessity




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		No comments.
2	Geoff Huston - IAB	If you want a principle that creates barriers to evolution and change then once more this is surely one to achieve that end. If you limit the extent, scope and purpose of any changes to narrowly pre-defined criteria then the system itself loses the ability to respond to changing technologies and changing circumstances, and that seems to me to be a liability.
3	Duane Wessels - RZM	Referencing back to RSSAC037 work, I think the model for "how many RSOs" is that a component of the RSS GS determines a range, and if the number of RSOs falls below the lower bound of that range, it triggers the process for a new designation. I propose "Do not designate any additional RSO unless the number of RSOs falls below a specified range or is objectively necessary to ..."
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	stress test this principle against a vacancy that occurs per resignation or removal
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	I know i lost this argument the first time around. Given a second chance, I try again. I think "demonstrable improvement" is a lower bar than "maintain the integrity (or smooth operation or something) of the RSS." In the former case an argument could be made that additional RSOs would provide some demonstrable benefit, albeit small, whereas the latter case would require some sort of failure that can only be cured through the Designation of additional RSOs. I think we might make it clear that no Designation moves forward without the recommendation of the RSS GS.
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	This may be difficult to achieve given pragmatic political realities.
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	Adding 'trust' to stability, security, and resilience.
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	.[change is proposed] The principle 2.50 itself is fine. However, I think 2.60 and 2.50 had better not divided into two, as division makes readers' understanding difficult. So, I propose combining 2.50 and 2.60 into one principle by adding one sentence - such as the following: Do not designate any additional RSO unless the designation is objectively necessary to demonstrably continue improvement of RSS stability, security, and resilience of the RSS. To decide the necessity, assessment of technical necessity (e.g., engineering efficiency, etc.) goes first and then whether additional RSO is needed to fill the technical necessity is investigated.

CONTINUED

2.50 | Necessity

Do not designate any additional RSO unless the designation is objectively necessary to demonstrably continue improvement of RSS stability, security, and resilience.

2.50 | Necessity




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
5	Jim Reid - IAB	Adding another RSO goes against the widely held misconception there can only be 13 RSOs. Opening the door to the possibility of a 14th will create too many layer-9+ problems and clear unwelcome precedents.
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	“Objectively necessary” needs a definition; presumably the RSS GS will determine this. Every decision leading to designation must be open, transparent, and based on objective criteria.
	John Augenstein - RSO: DISA	G-Root believes that a technical reason would be the only reason to apply this principle for enlarging the RSO pool.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. We need a system that is well-designed to provide the service requested. Proliferation risks leading to higher complexity and higher costs than necessary and is therefore not necessarily of good.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	While obvious to some, it is not obvious to all and it is not always obvious as time passes. It’s important to document.

2.60 | Technical necessity

The predominant factor to be considered when assessing necessity for new RSOs is technical necessity (e.g., engineering efficiency, etc.) to demonstrably continue to improve the stability, security, and resilience.

2.60 | Technical necessity




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Duane Wessels - RZM	Since this is similar to 2.50 I think the range threshold should be referenced here as well.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	I agree that the decision should be based on technical considerations but again stumble on the "continue to improve part." In addition, this might be the time to separate the "Need to Designate" decision from the "to whom" decision. Is it the same Designation function? A case can be made for separating those decisions between two entities.
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	Diversity among RSOs is a major strength of the RSS. Much of this diversity is non technical in nature, e.g. organizational mission, country of incorporation...
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	This too may be difficult to achieve given pragmatic political realities.
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	[change is proposed] 2.60 is proposed to be removed after combined with 2.50. --> See 2.50
5	Luis Espinoza - ccNSO	Is the core business of any RSO
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. We don't want to turn this public service into a playground for entities with political or financial agendas. Again this ties back into balance of powers.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	Defeats trust in the RSS GS if we are making decisions on political reasons

2.70 | Due diligence

The RSS GS must conduct appropriate due diligence to assess the technological and non-technological characteristics of a candidate RSO and to assure the RSS stakeholders that the candidate RSO complies with adopted designation criteria.


2.70 | Due diligence



Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1	Jim Reid - IAB	Someone independent of the RSS GS must make these assessments.
2		None
3		None
4	Geoff Huston - IAB	I'll repeat an earlier comment: if you limit the extent, scope and purpose of any changes to narrowly pre-defined criteria then the system itself loses the ability to respond to changing technologies and changing circumstances, and that seems to me to be a liability.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	We might add for clarity: "While the decision whether to Designate shall be based on technical criteria, the decision of whom to Designate will be based. on technical and non-technical criteria, and objective and subjective criteria."
	John Augenstein - RSO: DISA	G-Root wonders what the final definition of "due diligence" will be? Without the criteria in place this makes it more difficult to be confident in this answer.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	High support. May want to add a measure of transparency into this statement. The due diligence process needs to be transparent. That may seem "obvious", but I'm not sure it is.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	I agree with this principle, but I believe the characteristics need to be defined further at some point and documented for transparency
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	This should be obvious.
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	The RSS GS will have to define non-technological characteristics and designation criteria.

2.80 | Differentiate treatment of designation and removal

Decisions on designation are different from decisions on (involuntary) removal and should be subject to different frameworks.




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3		None
4	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	I agree that designation and removal decisions are different but "framework" is vague here and its not immediately obvious to me why different frameworks are needed. Also I don't understand why "(involuntary)" is included here.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	The problem here is that they are "different" but strongly interlinked by the vacancy they create
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	In re-ordering the Principles, this would go before all of the Designation and Removal principles and then bi-furcate the rest into a set of Removal principles and a set of Designation principles. I think the "should" should be "shall" or "must." I would add: "Decisions on designation require different skill-sets than decisions on (involuntary) removal and should be addressed by separate functions with different casting and subject to different frameworks / criteria." "In addition, decisions to Remove an RSO will not automatically trigger formal consideration to replace that RSO."
	Duane Wessels - RZM	I agree with this principle, but I believe the characteristics need to be defined further at some point and documented for transparency
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	[change is proposed] "(involuntary)" seems unnecessary, as decisions on designation are also different from voluntary removal and should be subject to different frameworks.
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Already strong. The reasons for adding differ from the reasons for removal. Treating the two situations as equal doesn't make sense.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. The two have slightly different paths and triggers, even though the overarching goal may be the same: to improve the system. (Removing a "bad" player may lead to an overall improvement of the system.)

2.90 | RSO designation is not a concession to be sold to be sold

The RSS is a public good, intended to be supplied free of charge at the point of consumption by downstream resolver operators. Attempting to sell off or auction RSO designations (either newly created by the RSS GS or existing and transferred by an incumbent RSO) creates perverse incentives for both the RSS GS and RSOs to act in a manner that causes their interests to diverge from the interests of service users.

2.90 | RSO designation is not a concession to be sold




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Separating new designations from existing ones would make this different. Selling a new designation is just wrong. There may be circumstances under which the sale of an entity that is a root server operator is normal and fitting.
	Geoff Huston - IAB	I'm not sure its as clear as this principle makes out. Already I understand that a couple of RSOs have outsourced part of their function to a cloud provider. Is this arrangement a form of concession? The principle assumes that an RSO is a single entity operating a single service. Its not necessarily the case.
4	Wes Hardaker - RSO: ISI	better restating -- having said that, I'm not sure how I would.
	Duane Wessels - RZM	The descriptive text is not as strong as the principle in the title. The descriptive text doesn't say an RSO can't be sold, only that it creates perverse incentives. Additionally I'm not sure this principle captures all the complexities that could arise from, e.g., corporate acquisition.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	These are two principles that might better be phrased separately
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	There are many scenarios. (1) Company A, an RSO Operator, is acquired by Company B. (2) Company A closes a business unit and transfers assets (including an RSO to an affiliate. (3) Company A goes out of business and Consultant who has been operating the RSO, agrees to continue in that role. So we might say: "RSO Designations may not be transferred for consideration. In the case of an unavoidable change of control of the entity operating the RSO, there will be a presumption that the RSO [WILL / WILL NOT] be transferred to the new controlling entity where that presumption can be overcome by the new controlling entity demonstrating that the change in control will sustain or improve RSO operability to the satisfaction of the GWG GS." <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some principles state rationale, such as this one (i.e., "attempting to sell off or auction RSO designations (either newly created by the RSS GS or existing and transferred by an incumbent RSO) creates perverse incentives" FOR consistency, I think we should leave rationale out of the principles but state it somewhere below.
5	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	This is instead a principle to guide RSO behavior after designation and to guide who participates in the RSS GS. The principles set out at 2.60 and 2.70 should be observed for decisions on designation.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. This ties back to the finance principles and not-for-profit etc.

2.100 | Funds received from designating new RSOs are dedicated to the RSS

If the RSS GS receives funds in the process of assessing and granting a new RSO designation (whether in the form of an application/transaction fee as consideration for the designation or otherwise), such funds must be placed at the disposal of the RSS GS and used to benefit the RSS.

2.100 | Funds received from designating new RSOs are




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1	Jim Reid - IAB	Funding for these assessments must be revenue-neutral. They cannot be used to enrich the RSS GS or RSOs.
2	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	This seems to say, "you can not profit from an RSO designation, but we can." I think this should never happen. If the RSS GS receives fees for application processing, they should be on a cost recovery basis. I do not see the benefit of trying to state this. It also seems like more of an implementation detail rather than a principle. If anything, say: "funds received as a result of an RSO Designation will be limited to cost recovery only."
3	Peter Koch - ccNSO	This might be better phrased towards the GS, as in: the GS MUST NOT accept funding ... that is, well, essentially "earmarked"
4	Wes Hardaker - RSO: ISI	this feels backward in some way I can't put my finger on. I think there are two principles here: 1 that says the RSS GS should be a non-profit and all funds should benefit the RSS. And 2: what happens if the RSS GS receives money as part of allocation. Those are two separate cases that need treatment individually.
	Duane Wessels - RZM	It feels like the word "leftover" or "unused" belongs in the text somewhere. If application fees are received one would assume that those fees more or less exactly cover the costs of the application/designation process.
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	Designation of an RSO should not be "pay to play". If funds are collected they should be used at the disposal of the RSS GS
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Already strong. If peddling root server letters becomes someone's road to riches, this process has failed.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support ... although I think I'd like this not to happen, because sounds like a step away from the not-for-profit principles that I support.

2.210 | Voluntary resignation

Each RSO should have a path available that enables it to voluntarily resign its designation as an RSO.

2.210 | Voluntary resignation



Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	We would feel more strongly if there are safeguards to prevent a wholesale quitting of performing RSO duties. There needs to be an orderly process.
4	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	Adding “, while maintaining the stability, security, and resilience of the RSS” at the end.
5	Jim Reid - IAB	Each RSO should publish its exit path(s) and likely trigger conditions. IMO the 5 questions below are key to the GWG's activities and governance issues more generally: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What power have you got? 2. Where did you get it from? 3. In whose interests do you exercise it? 4. To whom are you accountable? 5. And how can we get rid of you?
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. While I support stability and long-term commitments in this context, things must be allowed to evolve. Being an RSO should not be a "sentence for life". It must be possible for an RSO, whose fundamentals for providing the service have changed, to gracefully, and in collaborative and controlled fashion, step out of the business. Otherwise we risk seeing RSOs be run over the edge of the cliff, and that will lead to sudden changes that we don't want to see. Or to "unfriendly business takeovers" that are equally bad. Or to RSOs starting to perform badly just in order to be kicked out of the system. All of these are bad. Better to do it gracefully.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	I agree with this principle, but I believe the characteristics need to be defined further at some point and documented for transparency. Part of those characteristics should include the resigning entity has no say in the next designee. This removes perverse incentive.

Basket 3


Basket 3 Responses

Given Name	Surname	Organization	Type	3.10 Financial stability in governance A trusted and stable RSS GS requires recurring, predictable sources of	3.20 Financial stability in operations A trusted and stable RSS GS requires that RSOs have recurring, predictable	3.30 RSS governance is a not-for-profit activity The focus of the RSS GS must not be allowed to drift away from the sole	3.40 Operating an RSO is a not-for-profit activity The focus of each RSO individually, in the context of operating a root server network, must not be allowed to drift away from the sole purpose of assuring the proper functioning of the	3.50 No data commercialization An RSO should not have any incentive to monetize data collected while operating its root server	3.60 Financial accountability The RSS GS and RSOs must be accountable for funds provided to them.	3.70 Financial transparency Each RSO must be transparent regarding finances used in connection with root server	3.80 Financial self-determination Decision-making concerning funding policy (specifically funds raised or disbursed by the RSS GS) should rest within the RSS	3.90 Representation of committed funders in financial decisions In any funding model for support of the RSS there	3.100 Funding commitment For the RSS and RSS GS as a whole to function properly, there must be a system of	3.110 RSOs remain free to seek external sources of funding RSOs remain free to raise funds to support RSO activity as they
Luis	Espinoza	ccNSO	Member	3	3	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Peter	Koch	ccNSO	Member	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	5	3	4
Kurt	Pritz	gTLD RySG	Member	5	5	4	4	3	5	4	5	4	5	4
Hanyu	Yang	gTLD RySG	Member	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Geoff	Huston	IAB	Member	5	5	2	3	5	4	4	4	5	5	4
Jim	Reid	IAB	Member	5	1	5	5	5	3	5	5	3	3	2
Ken	Renard	RSO: ARL	Member	5	5	5	5	5	5	1	5	3	5	5
John	Augenstein	RSO: DISA	Member	4	5	4	5	4	3	2	4	2	3	3
Ashwin	Rangan	RSO: ICANN	Member	5	3	5	5	4	5	5	3	1	5	5
Jeff	Osborn	RSO: ISC	Member	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4
Wes	Hardaker	RSO: ISI	Member	5	3	4	5	4	4	3	4	4	5	4
Lars-Johan	Liman	RSO: Netnod	Member	4	4	5	3	5	4	4	5	3	5	5
Karl	Reuss	RSO: UMD	Member	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	3	5	5
Brad	Verd	RSO: Verisign	Member	5	5	5	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	5
Hiro	Hotta	RSO: WIDE Project	Member	5	5	5	5	5	4	3	5	4	5	5
Suzanne	Woolf	SSAC	Member											
Kim	Davies	IANA	Liason	5	3	5	5	5	5	5	3	1	5	5
Edmon	Chung	ICANN Board	Liason	5	3	5	5	5	5	5	3	1	5	5
Christan	Kaufmann	ICANN Board	Liason	5	3	5	5	5	5	5	3	1	5	5
Duane	Wessels	RZM	Liason	5	4	4	5	4	3	3	5	5	4	4

3.10 | Financial stability in governance

A trusted and stable RSS GS requires recurring, predictable sources of finance sufficient to operate.

3.10 | Financial stability in governance




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Luis Espinoza - ccNSO	Always can be a risk and the absolute warranty of sources of finance could be utopic, in that way of thinking if the finance stability of 1 RSO is threaten, the system provides enough tolerance to loose 1 operator because lack of finance support.
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Greater certainty in what the funders expect in return.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	The statement doesn't indicate that different parts of the system may have different sources of finance, which I believe to be an important property. The RSS consists of many moving parts. Not all of them have to be financed from the same (group of) source(s). Different parts can have different sources. "Diversity is good." :-)
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	Should be more clear that this is finance for the GS rather than the root operations (same principle would apply there, but separately); also I'm struggling with 'predictable sources'
5	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	"A trusted and stable RSS GS requires recurring, predictable sources of finance or in-kind support sufficient to operate."
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	The principle could be clarified to state, "A trusted and stable RSS GS requires recurring, predictable sources of finance for the RSS GS itself beyond the funding that the individual RSOs have for their own operations." This principle is not about RSO operational funding.

3.20 | Financial stability in operations

A trusted and stable RSS GS requires that RSOs have recurring, predictable sources of finance sufficient to maintain stable root server operations.

3.20 | Financial stability in operations




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1	Jim Reid - IAB	Financial stability of the RSS GS is orthogonal to the financial stability of RSOs (individually or collectively)
2		None
3	Wes Hardaker - RSO: ISI	I think this is an ideal, but the whole point of independence and diversity of RSO funding means that even if one collapses the RSS as a whole will still be functioning. Clearly, we should strive for an ideal where every RSO has adequate funding, but I'd argue many times in the past this hasn't been the case and yet the RSS has remained secure.
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christian Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	ICANN acknowledges that a goal for any RSO should include having recurring, predictable sources of funding. ICANN also acknowledges that the health of the RSS could be compromised if sufficient numbers of RSOs do not have stable funding. Further, ICANN notes that stability in the funding of any RSO can have an impact on whether it remains available to participate within the RSS GS. However, the RSS GS itself does not require that every RSO maintains stable funding, as a stable RSS GS can respond if an RSO's sources of income go away.
	Luis Espinoza - ccNSO	There's a low chance that all RSOs could suffer at the same time lack of source of finance and represent a risk for the root resolution
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Greater certainty in what the funders expect in return.
	Duane Wessels - RZM	"A trusted and stable RSS requires ...". <ul style="list-style-type: none"> This principle is not about the governance structure, but about RSS operations
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	The statement doesn't indicate that different parts of the system may have different sources of finance, which I believe to be an important property. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The RSS consists of many moving parts. Not all of them have to be financed from the same (group of) source(s). Different parts can have different sources. "Diversity is good." :-) Also, if the RSO don't have stable finances and therefore "come and go", the GSS may find itself constantly putting out fires, which is not, IMHO, a stable system.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	unclear what 'predictable sources' is meant to say in contrast to, say, 'predictable budget'
5	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	Add: "In many cases that source of funds might come from the RSO's controlling entity: in some cases the RSO might seek funding outside the controlling entity." <ul style="list-style-type: none"> We can state that
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	Thus far, there has not been stable funding, however the incumbents have offered the service as trusted and stable to date.

3.30 | RSS governance is a not-for-profit activity

The focus of the RSS GS must not be allowed to drift away from the sole purpose of assuring the proper functioning of the RSS. The RSS GS must operate on a not-for-profit basis.

3.30 | RSS governance is a not-for-profit activity




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2	Geoff Huston - IAB	This is two principles in one proposition. The first is easy. The second not so. "Not for profit" means different things in different countries. If it is meant by "not for profit" that the function should not be operated for the exclusive benefit of the operation's shareholders or owners then that is an easier proposition to agree with in preference to the somewhat indistinct term "not for profit"
3		None
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Not for profit has specific legal meaning that needs to be clearly stated.
	Wes Hardaker - RSO: ISI	these should be two principles
	Duane Wessels - RZM	I don't necessarily agree that the RSS GS has or should have a sole purpose. And if it did, "functioning of the RSS" sounds more operational than governmental.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	"The sole purpose of the RSS GS is to assure the proper functioning of the RSS. The RSS GS shall operate on a not-for profit basis."
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	Appears to be a corollary from being inside the ICANN sphere - except if it wasn't meant to be
5	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. We currently don't have a viable commercial business model for that part of the Internet. Hence, the GS needs to be not-for-profit.

3.40 | Operating an RSO is a not-for-profit activity

3.40 | Operating an RSO is a not-for-profit activity

The focus of each RSO individually, in the context of operating a root server network, must not be allowed to drift away from the sole purpose of assuring the proper functioning of the RSS. Operating a root server network must be done on a not-for-profit basis.




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Geoff Huston - IAB	In principle this sound perfectly reasonable to me. In practice it is not so clear. an RSO may do many things and separately accounting for the RSO function and maintaining clear lines of delineation may be wishful thinking.
	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Not sure this should be cast in stone, but maybe so for the current mode of operation. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The RSOs provide infrastructure, and when doing that, profit is always a sensitive issue. My general feeling is that maximising earnings in this context is probably a bad idea, but I don't want to prevent people from earning their living by providing good service for reasonable money. It's like privatising schools and hospitals. Not inherently bad, but comes with aggravated risks.
4	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	""The sole purpose of an RSO isto assure the proper functioning of the RSS. The RSO shall operate on a not-for profit basis (though its controlling entity might be a for-profit business that derives profits from operations other than that of the RSO.""
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	unsure what strings are attached to 'not-for-profit' vs., e.g., 'cost center'
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Not for profit has specific legal meaning that needs to be clearly stated.
	Duane Wessels - RZM	devil's advocate: should there be a corresponding principle that states whether or not operating an RSO can be a for-loss or subsidized activity?
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	This aligns with many principles, particularly about the activity of an RSO is for the public good.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	It can't be forgotten that the RSS is for the Public good

3.50 | No data commercialization

An RSO should not have any incentive to monetize data collected while operating its root server network. Each RSO should be prepared to disclose operational data (as appropriate) to the RSS GS in support of security, stability, and resilience goals.

3.50 | No data commercialization




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	The first sentence to this one is above my pay grade. I support the second sentence.
4	Wes Hardaker - RSO: ISI	This feels too widely worded. What's the goal? to document where all funds come from that support RSO operations? to ensure that any data collected isn't generating funds? ...
	Duane Wessels - RZM	unlike the title, the description of this principle does not forbid commercialization
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN	"An RSO should not monetize data collected while operating its root server network".
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	should vs must; also this might need to be extended to RSO's outsourcing partners
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Already strong. This is vital in a world where if you aren't paying for the product, you are the product.
	Jim Reid - IAB	Change should to must
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. The data does not belong to the RSO, it belongs to the users and the zone steward. The RSO should not be allowed to sell what's not theirs. (Awkward comparison: priests during confession).
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	[change is proposed] The second sentence is very important but has no relationship with Finances. So, it should be moved to a proper place somewhere in the whole document, a place other than Power Balance, Designation/removal, or Finance. For the time being, how about putting the second sentence as a NOTE of 3.50 as a memorandum.
	Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	"An RSO should not monetize data collected while operating its root server network".

3.60 | Financial accountability

The RSS GS and RSOs must be accountable for funds provided to them.

3.60 | Financial accountability




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Jim Reid - IAB	Depends on the funding source(s).
	Duane Wessels - RZM	"The devil is in the details." There is a spectrum of levels of accountability not captured by this principle.
	John Augenstein - RSO: DISA	G-Root wonders who will be the ones holding accountable? Will this lead to comparative issues amongst the RSOs?
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	Not sure what the value of this principle is without mentioning who the RSS GS and RSOs are accountable to; usually this follows from agreements with the funding source (then the 'principle' is just descriptive, or it would prevent the philanthropic billionaire to just 'throw in money')
4	Wes Hardaker - RSO: ISI	to some high level
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	"... accountable to the providers of the respective funds". If there are multiple sources of finance, I'm not sure that every source has the right to require full transparency into what the GS/RSO has done with money from the OTHER providers. Dragons within, though ... :-
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	[change is proposed] "... accountable for funds provided to them through the funding structure defined by GS"
5	Ken Renard - RSO: ARL	Assuming this refers funds provided to RSOs _from_ the RSS GS
	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	This is pretty obvious.
	Luis Espinoza - ccNSO	It's an accounting principle. Matching principle.

3.70 | Financial transparency

Each RSO must be transparent regarding finances used in connection with root server operations. This is a crucial element of building and maintaining trust with the broader community of RSS stakeholders.

3.70 | Financial transparency




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1	Ken Renard - RSO: ARL	<p>“Building and maintaining trust” should be based on the confidence that an RSO can continue to provide the technical service to expected standards. While future financial commitment to the service plays a role, it is an indirect, and possibly weak indicator of the quality of service to be expected. The way this has been discussed to date includes 2 types of financial transparency:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> How much funding is being spent to provide the service? Either broken into categories such as labor, equipment, services, etc. or just a lump sum of total expenditures. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> We’ve discussed how difficult this can be for an organization that does things other than root service (i.e. how do you split the power bill?) How do you translate funding into predicted performance? Is there a minimum or expected amount? Who decides or judges these? Will the benefits of this indirect performance measurement outweigh the negatives (inappropriate comparisons among RSOs, potential exposure of confidential information/costs in contracts with 3rd parties, costs associated with potentially complex accounting, etc). Does this lead to perverse incentives for spending or “financial creativity” to appear more trusted? If an RSO spends an extremely small amount on their operations, does that mean they are not providing an adequate performance now, or in the future? Similar for spending large amounts... what does that infer? Where does funding come from? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Do sources of funding infer some influence (e.g. funding from international crime syndicate) or the morality of the service (funding comes from illegal/immoral activities?). Who judges the influence or morality of the funding sources? <p>I think the value of financial transparency as discussed is questionable and the costs are non-trivial. I recommend removal of this principle.</p>
2	John Augenstein - RSO: DISA	<p>Financing transparency is a two-edged sword. It can be used to wield against RSOs with no cause or reason, and twisted to defend potential allegations or justifications.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> G-Root does not believe that trust should be built upon transparent financials. Providing the end-user service and experience reliably builds consumer confidence and trust. All RSOs operate in a unique and diverse fashion that allows for a shared building of trust.

CONTINUED

3.70 | Financial transparency

Each RSO must be transparent regarding finances used in connection with root server operations. This is a crucial element of building and maintaining trust with the broader community of RSS stakeholders.

3.70 | Financial transparency




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
3	Wes Hardaker - RSO: ISI	I think there are two issues here combined: 1. where funds come from externally, and 2. where funds come from internally. If internal funds are used to support an RSO, how is trust helped by disclosing internal specifics? should this principle be related to externally received funding?
	Duane Wessels - RZM	"The devil is in the details." There is a spectrum of levels of transparency not captured by this principle.
	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	Would there be benefit to find a range that was auditable. If funds are taken then I have a greater obligation of transparency against that commitment. Needs to be equitable. Is there enough funding to provided innovation? For R&D, thought process or just running the show? Encouraging thought diversity!
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	Basically, supportive. but.. How precise data we can collect and disclose for transparency cannot be committed at this point of time. If such uncertainty or up-to-each-RSO feature is embedded in the principle statement, it's better, although I myself don't have an idea how to improve the statement.
4	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	I am not sure the RSO needs to report its budget, internal sources of funding, or outside sources of funding it receives through grants developed by that RSO. So... "Each RSO must be transparent regarding funding received through the RSS GS and used in connection with root server operations." I think we can leave the rationale sentence at the end off. (Some of our principles have rationale and some do not. I think the principle should leave off the rationales, which can be summarised elsewhere in the document.)
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	"... transparent regarding SOURCES OF finances." "I'm not sure the RSOs have to put amounts in the papers, but they should list "we have received money from so-and-so".
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	We fully agree with the spirit of this principle, however from a pragmatic point of view this will be impossible to do when infrastructures/resources are shared with other parts of an RSOs organization.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	I read this as RSOs sharing figures
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Transparency is a key part of anything we do to engender trust.

3.80 | Financial self-determination

3.80 | Financial self-determination

Decision-making concerning funding policy (specifically funds raised or disbursed by the RSS GS) should rest within the RSS GS itself. This should not be controlled by an outside entity.

Note: This candidate principle does not apply to funds raised directly by RSOs outside the scope of RSS GS involvement.




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	The wording is not clear about whether this is about sources of funding getting to determine how they are used (the RSS GS being the only determiner of funding) but we recognize that this generally aligns with “1.10 Financial self-determination”.
4	Peter Koch - ccNSO	the text in brackets combined with. the note leaves some ambiguity regarding funds not raised by the RSS and neither the RSOs; if that's the empty set, the clause might be redundant
5	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	This is where the strings get attached.
	Jim Reid - IAB	There must be no (perceived) conflicts of interest in how funding is distributed by the RSS GS.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. The GSS should control its own money. If not, we risk control by single entities, and we don't want that. See separation of powers.
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	Funds should not come with strings attached.

3.90 | Representation of committed funders in financial decisions

In any funding model for support of the RSS, there must be a mechanism for stakeholders who are committed to provide funding to have a significant voice in funding discussions.

3.90 | Representation of committed funders in financial




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	ICANN opposes this as written as it creates any person or entity that happens to provide funding to an RSO as a stakeholder within the RSS GS. This opens the door to bad actors with deep pockets to approach RSOs with a predatory interest. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> This principle also conflicts with 3.80 in some ways, so we want to understand how they interact.
2	John Augenstein - RSO: DISA	G-Root believes RSO should operate with as much autonomous abilities as possible. Each RSO is distinct and different from another and this provides diversity and independence, while still all working to achieve the same group RSO and RSS goals. Non-stakeholder RSS entities should have a "voice".
3	Ken Renard - RSO: ARL	Does "significant" voice conflict with capture? With principle 1.10?
	Jim Reid - IAB	Depends on what is meant by "significant voice".
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Not sure this should be a principle. At least remove "significant". <ul style="list-style-type: none"> We don't want to construct a system where contributors contribute in order to "turn things in their direction". We want a system where contributors see a value in what's being provided and the structures around it. (Think "charity".)
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	Funding from entities should be principled-based and supportive of the RSS mission; guard rails should in place so that "voices" don't take things off the rails
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Does this conflict with 3.80? Discuss. All money has an agenda.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	I agree with the sentiment here, especially as a registry operator that funds icann. However, this seems to contradict 3.80, at least in one interpretation of it. Terrible case scenario that is pure hyperbole: If ICANN provides funding, At-Large members get a voice in which RSOs receive funding? I am not sure of the best way to avoid this interpretation, maybe: "The RSS GS will be configured to receive, consider, and take into account input on funding models from involved stakeholders and expect ICANN to do the same."
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE Project	To add clarity, how about changing "In any funding mode" to "In any funding model GS establishes" ?
5		No comments.

3.100 | Funding commitment

For the RSS and RSS GS as a whole to function properly, there must be a system of ongoing commitment to provide financial support for RSS operations and the RSS GS.

3.100 | Funding commitment




Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2		None
3	Jim Reid - IAB	Financial support for the RSS and RSS GS are orthogonal. Both should operate independently of the other.
	John Augenstein - RSO: DISA	G-Root believes that RSO should be fully funded without external conditions and should not rely upon external financing for continued operations. If RSS as a "voice" is followed than external funding is not as critical to function properly.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	we should not mic RSS operations and RSS GS here
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	A concrete model will be helpful.
	Duane Wessels - RZM	Do the past 30-odd years beg to differ? Or would the self-funding by RSOs be considered the ongoing commitment to provide financial support?
5	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	What is meant by "financial support for RSS operations"? What is meant by "financial support for the RSS GS"? We assume that this is only the operation of the RSS GS secretariat, meetings, and administration.
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. The "system" mentioned may consist of many small parts, each of which shows ongoing commitment. Diversity is good! :-)
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE	[comment] The content is fine. Only question will be – what’s the relationship/difference between 3.10 and 3.100? These two principles seem to basically say the same thing using different words.

3.110 | RSOs remain free to seek external sources of funding

RSOs remain free to raise funds to support RSO activity as they see fit.

3.110 | RSOs remain free to seek external sources of funding



Rating	Name/Org	Statements
1		None
2	Jim Reid - IAB	Depends on where/how these funds are raised and what strings are attached
3	John Augenstein - RSO: DISA	Ability for RSS and RSOs to at least be informed and have general knowledge and awareness of individual RSOs that are employing outside funding. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> G-Root believes this is a concern knowledge of external funders can be questionable and raise concerns of trust in both the RSS and RSO and the user community.
4	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	We remain diverse and independent.
	Wes Hardaker - RSO: ISI	yes, but it goes back to the above and "as long as they're not selling an enhanced service or data for profit" (or some such)
	Duane Wessels - RZM	...as long as such fund raising does not conflict with other principles (e.g. data monetization, etc)
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG subject to their status as a not-for-profit organisation not seeking to gain financial advantage by virtue of their operation of a Root Server.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	put in safeguards for funding diversity, capture, etc.
5	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christan Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	The title here does not match the given wording. "External" implies that there is some "internal" funding, which does not appear in any of the other principles. Also, this is linked to 3.70 (Financial transparency) and 3.90 (Representation of Funders).
	Lars-Johan Liman - RSO: Netnod	Full support. Diversity is good! :-)