

# GWG Questionnaire Response Review

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ICANN 77

*Candidate Principles and Further Feedback on Current Principles*

# Candidate Principles

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
# Candidate Response Summary

Given name	Surname	Affiliation		2.90	2.91	3.89	3.90
Jim	Reid	IAB	Member	5	5	5	3
Ken	Renard	RSO: US Army DEVCOM ARL	Member	4	5	4	5
Geoff	Huston	IAB	Member	4	3	3	4
Hiro	Hotta	RSO: WIDE Project	Member	5	5	5	5
Karl	Reuss	RSO: UMD	Member	5	4	5	3
Jeff	Osborn	RSO: ISC	Member	2	5	4	4
Hans Petter	Holen	RSO: RIPE NCC	Member	5	5	4	2
Luis Diego	Espinoza	ccNSO	Member	5	5	5	5
John	Augenstein	RSO: DISA	Member	5	5	5	5
Wes	Hardaker	RSO: USC ISI	Member	4	3	4	5
Kurt	Pritz	gTLD RySG	Member	4	4	4	4
Ashwin	Rangan	RSO: ICANN	Member	5	5	5	1
Brad	Verd	RSO: Verisign	Member	3	4	4	4
Peter	Koch	ccNSO	Member	1	5	4	5
Christian	Kaufmann	ICANN Board	Liason	5	5	5	1
Edmon	Chung	ICANN Board	Liason	5	5	5	1
Kim	Davies	IANA	Liason	5	5	5	1
Duane	Wessels	RZM	Liason	5	5	5	5

## 2.90 | RSO designations are not for sale by the RSS GS

*The RSS is a public good intended to be supplied free of charge at the point of consumption by downstream clients. RSO designations can only be granted through the proper RSS GS processes. The RSS GS can only make changes to designations in a fair, impartial, open, and transparent manner.*

### 2.90 | RSO designations are not for sale by the RSS GS




Rating	Name/Org	What amendments or additional external conditions might INCREASE your support for this candidate principle?
1	Peter Koch - ccNSO	The headline and the text diverge; headline is a 'no auctions' like clause, text precludes financial contribution by "downstream", i.e., resolvers - incompatible issues
2	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	We need to clearly state that TSO designations are not for sale and are not to be used as a source of financial support to the RSS GS, other than a very bare costs of assessing applications. It needs more, like "The processes of reviewing an Application for RSO designation must not be allowed to act as a significant source of finance as this would create improper incentives to the RSS GS. Fees must only cover bare cost of reviewing applications.
3	Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign	2.89   . RSS is a Public Good The RSS is a public good intended to be supplied free of charge at the point of consumption by downstream clients.  2.90   RSO designations are not for sale by the RSS GS The RSS GS can only make changes to designations in a fair, impartial, open, and transparent manner. The RSS GS may not appropriate existing or future RSOs with the intention of monetary benefit or attainment of influence.
4	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	First sentence seems unnecessary. Lost from the title to the text is the idea that no money will be paid to influence the decision process of an RSO designation. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>While fees paid by an applicant to fund an assessment process are not ruled out, those fees should have a goal of "cost recovery" only.</li> </ul>
	Geoff Huston - IAB	The heading "not for sale" and the body of the text do not appear to be aligned. Either the heading should say all RSS GS actions in the designation of an RSO should be follow RSS GS procedures (which strikes me as a truism), or the body of the text should be altered to refer to the intended inability for the RSS GS to raise general funds through a process of levying fees in the RSO application process. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>I _think_ this principle means that that an applicant cannot purchase an RSO designation from the RSS GS, which I agree with. However there are costs that are going to be met by the RSS GS in assessing candidate RSOs and it seems to be somewhat unfair to have the RSS GS meet all the costs of such an assessment, and it should be possible for the RSS GS to recover some (or even all of such costs) from the RSO applicant. What this principle says to me any fees associated with assessment of candidate RSOs should not be set such that they raise surplus funds for the general operation of the RSS GS.</li> </ul>
	Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI	This statement fails to account for the increasing trend in partnerships within the collective RSOs where an identifier is actually implemented by multiple entities. The statement above points really to assigning identifiers within the root zone, but should not prohibit partnerships from being formed to implement the service associated with any identifier.
5	Jim Reid - IAB	Who has to agree that the RSS GS (and only the RSS GS) gets to make these decisions? How/where is that agreement established?

## 2.91 | Changes in control of RSO operations are subject to review by the RSS GS

The RSS GS shall retain the ability to consider each entity proposed to take over RSO operations and assess whether continued designation or revocation is the appropriate path after a change in control.

2.91 | Changes in control of RSO operations are subject to review by the RSS GS




Rating	Name/Org	What amendments or additional external conditions might INCREASE your support for this candidate principle?
1		None
2		None
3	Geoff Huston - IAB	<p>I don't know what wording to suggest.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What constitutes a "change in control" of "RSO operations" is too vague in my opinion. Is this referring to the entity that operates an RSO, or just the subsection of the entity that has the responsibility of RSO operations. Is a "change of control" a change in shareholding? Or a change in the composition of the entity's board? What if an entity re-structures and assigns a new group within the entity to operate the RSO? What if the entity reaches an agreement with a third party to operate some of all of the RSO infrastructure for the RSO entity? What if that contracted third party has executed similar agreements with two or more RSO's?</li> <li>It strikes me that the headline of the policy has a fine intent to prevent an implicit change of RSO entity through a change in the controlling interests for the entity, but it strikes me that this is just too vague to assist in defining the next level of detail.</li> </ul>
	Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI	This statement fails to account for the increasing trend in partnerships within the collective RSOs where an identifier is actually implemented by multiple entities. The statement above points really to assigning identifiers within the root zone, but should not prohibit partnerships from being formed to implement the service associated with any identifier.
4	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	<p>Partnerships formed by an RSO for the operation of their service are not subject to review.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RSOs should be able to partner and outsource parts of their operation as long as they continue to meet the expectations and requirements of being an RSO.</li> </ul>
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	I am for this but believe it would require some sort of contractual obligation on the part of the RSOs that might be difficult to put in place. As a parallel, what happens when a large company happens to acquire a another company that happens to owns a gTLD registry or gTLD registrar?
5	Jim Reid - IAB	Same as my 2.90 comment: Who has to agree that the RSS GS (and only the RSS GS) gets to make these decisions? How/where is that agreement established?
	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	<p>...and assess whether continued "change of control" or revocation...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>should this invoke a similar "due diligence" (reference 3.89) of the new organization before approval of the transfer?</li> </ul>
	Duane Wessels - RZM	Proposed new text: In any situation whereby control of an RSO's operations or assets would transfer to a different entity, the RSS GS retain the ability the consider the new entity as an RSO and assess whether continued designation or revocation is the appropriate path forward after a change in control.

## 3.89 | Proposed RSS GS funders are subject to due diligence

The RSS GS will conduct due diligence over new persons or entities seeking to commit to ongoing funding for the RSS GS.

3.89 | Proposed RSS GS funders are subject to due diligence




Rating	Name/Org	What amendments or additional external conditions might INCREASE your support for this candidate principle?
1		None
2		None
3	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	perhaps such funders should have regular due diligence checks <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A initial gate condition without any form of follow-up strikes me as a weakness here. Circumstances and control change over time, and this principle would strike me as more effective is the diligence process is undertaken on a regular basis.</li> <li>Of course it does raise the possible issue of the RSS GS attempting to perform a due diligence on ICANN, which raises the question of the consequence of the diligence process finding ICANN an unsuitable funder.</li> </ul>
4	Geoff Huston - IAB	We don't want "bad" or "immoral" sources of funding, and that will be difficult to assess. Given that a voluntary contributor has no influence ("seat at the table") per 3.90, is this requirement "softened"?
5		None

### 3.90 | Representation of committed stakeholder community funders in the RSS GS in respect of funding policy

Any system that includes regular funding obligations by a community of RSS stakeholders to the RSS GS must also include a mechanism to represent that community in RSS GS funding policy.

3.90 | Representation of committed stakeholder community funders in the RSS GS in respect of funding policy



Rating	Name/Org	What amendments or additional external conditions might INCREASE your support for this candidate principle?
1	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christian Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	This principle creates a specific financial incentive and opportunities for entities to enter the RSS as stakeholders. Alternatively, this principle should focus on upholding the definition of stakeholders to the RSS GS and confirming that they have a voice in governance. The RSS GS should be flexible enough to allow for conversations on whether there are emerging new stakeholders that should have a voice in some/all of the RSS GS and to afford those new stakeholders the right to participate in the areas of RSS GS work that are related to their interests. This principle would be more of a general governance principle under separation and balance of powers, as opposed to financial principle, as new stakeholders could come forward on a variety of topics, though financial considerations could be one of the areas of interest.
2	Hans Petter Holen - RSO: RIPE NCC	the principle must be reworded so it is clear it is not intended to apply to those who are voluntary donors. IE "buying seat around the table.
3	Jim Reid - IAB	The wording is fuzzy. I think the (unstated) intention is reasonable but it's not written down clearly enough. For example, what does "community of RSS stakeholders" actually mean?
	Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD	Unsure what "represent that community in RSS GS funding policy" would entail. Entities forced to contribute should have some high level say in how funds are allocated, but should not have a full seat at the table or be involved on all levels of fund dispersal.
4	Geoff Huston - IAB	I have no suggestions here <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The caveat that this applies only to entities who are obliged to provide funding for the RSS GS seems appropriate in theory, although I am personally unaware of which bodies outside of ICANN that would be so obliged.</li> </ul>
5	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army DEVCOM ARL	+1 that this does not apply to voluntary funders
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE Project	I cannot understand the difference between 'people' and 'persons' used in the first paragraph of "Interpretation Notes",

# Basket 1 Discussion

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Separation and Balance of Powers



# Basket 1 Feedback Summary

	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.90	1.100	1.100.	1.101	1.110	1.210
Jim Reid - IAB														
Ken Renard - RSO: US Army DEVCOM ARL														
Geoff Huston - IAB														
Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE Project														
Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD														
Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC														
Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign														
Suzanne Woolf - SSAC														
Luis Diego Espinoza - ccNSO														
Hans Petter Holen - RSO: RIPE NCC														
John Augenstein - RSO: DISA														
Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI														
Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG														
Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN														
Peter Koch - ccNSO														
Christian Kaufmann - ICANN Board														
Edmon Chung - ICANN Board														
Kim Davies - IANA														
Duane Wessels - RZM														

## 1.10 | Financial self-determination

*The entity that collects funds for RSS support is not necessarily the entity that defines the rules for disbursement of those same funds. It is critical to avoid capture or the perception of capture as a result of loss of control over financial decisions.*



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### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI	transparency in decision making processes will be critical to assure lack of capture (eg, 1.70)
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Geoff Huston - IAB	In an entity of the size of a national government this makes sense from many perspectives. When we consider a far smaller entity such as the RSS GS, then is it feasible to envisage such a segmented organisation such that it is divided along the lines advocated here. I think not.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	I think this principle is misplaced in this category and at this prominent place. The self-determination in the heading is not reflected in the expanded text.
	Duane Wessels - RZM	I'd like to discuss how this does or does not conflict with 3.80   Decision-making concerning funding policy, specifically funds raised or disbursed by the RSS GS, should rest within the RSS GS itself. This should not be controlled by an outside entity.

## 1.20 | An RSO has no authority to publish an altered or alternative root zone

*An RSO must only publish from its designated root server identities IANA root-related data exactly as received from IANA through the Root Zone Maintainer.*

1.20 | An RSO has no authority to publish an altered or alternative root zone



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### Interpretation Notes

- Maintaining “outdated” or “expired” zone data might violate this principle after sufficient time has elapsed.
- Whether or not this principle is violated may depend upon the intention of the RSO in maintaining such an outdated data set.
- On some occasions, for example, root servers have continued to serve outdated data to maintain service when root zone updates have been interrupted.
- Also consider the ZONEMD process which allows RSOs to ignore updates when authenticity is unproven.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christian Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	First bullet point: change "Maintaining" to "Publishing" Third bullet point: change "maintain" to "publish"
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 1.30 | Prescriptive authority is distinct from executive authority

*The act of developing policy (prescriptive authority) should be distinct and separate from the acts of implementing and enforcing policy (executive authority).*

1.30 | Prescriptive authority is distinct from executive authority



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### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
👍 I am generally supportive of this principle	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	The acts are different but it is foreseeable that some of the same people will be involved.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	One could even distinguish further between implementation and enforcement
👎 I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 1.40 | RSS policy arises through collaboration between RSOs and non-RSO stakeholders

To maintain and continue to build trust in the RSS:

1. Stakeholders outside of the RSS must have a strong voice in RSS governance
2. RSOs must continue to have a strong voice in RSS governance

1.40 | RSS policy arises through collaboration between RSO and non-RSO stakeholders



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### Interpretation Notes

- See RSSAC058 Section 1.2, The Role of RSOs in DNS Root Service Governance and Operation.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
👍 I am generally supportive of this principle	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	Strong is a poor choice of words. If a modifier is required, I'd go with effective.
👎 I would like more discussion about this principle.	Geoff Huston - IAB	I am unclear on what assumptions are being used here to define whether a stakeholder is "inside" or "outside" the RSS, and with that lack of definitional clarity the principle seems very indistinct to me.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	I am not sure that in the expanded text "outside the RSS" is equal to "non-RSO stakeholders"

## 1.50 | Policy development: No single controlling person or entity

*The process of developing RSS policy must not fall under the control of a single actor, whether through sole control by an entity, or by multiple persons or entities acting under a common system of control.*

1.50 | Policy development: No single controlling person or entity



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### Interpretation Notes

- 1.50 can be distinguished from 1.90.
- 1.50 is an effort to avoid “capture” of the policy development institution.
- 1.90 is an effort to avoid someone who participates in the governance structure from “hijacking” an agenda that otherwise enjoys strong support.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle		None
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 1.60 | Accountability

*Maintaining and building trust in the RSS GS requires that adherence to these principles should be subject to some form of confirmation and review.*

1.60 | Accountability



### Interpretation Notes

- Who performs the confirmation and review?

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	We must define processes for questioning and evaluating adherence to principles
	Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI	There are many examples of this within the ICANN ecosystem that may be worth using as a model
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	There could be periodic (every few years) reviews of existing policies to check adherence to the principles. Cautionary tale: ICANN reviews are not effective and are costly w.r.t. time and resources.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	"should be subject .." -> "will be subject ..."
I would like more discussion about this principle.	John Augenstein - RSO: DISA	G-Root agrees in accountability, but agrees with the "who performs the confirmation and review". G-Root also agrees with Chairs previous assessment that this determination can't be done here in this document and is a future item.

## 1.70 | Transparency

*Maintaining and building trust in the RSS GS requires that exercise of enumerated powers should be open and transparent.*

### 1.70 | Transparency



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### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle		None
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None



## 1.80 | Flexibility

*To accommodate changes driven by technical necessity, it must remain possible to change the RSS GS itself and these principles.*

### 1.80 | Flexibility



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2

### Interpretation Notes

- The precise mechanism of changing the RSS GS (i.e., amending the governance documents) is to be determined.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
👍 I am generally supportive of this principle	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	Amending governance documents: should we have periodic reviews or just as-needed change processes?
	Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI	There is a notion missing in this about whether change happens internally vs externally to the system. I'd argue I think we mean that we should ensure change *within* the system is possible. A possible alternate statement might be needed that external changes are not allowed (ie, a future governance model must only come from within the system, not imposed by another entity (which may be the rest of ICANN itself)). This will bring back the question of within-ICANN vs outside-ICANN model types.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	it remains unclear who would exercise this change control, neither for the GS nor for the principles
👎 I would like more discussion about this principle.	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	It seems that principles would withstand the test of technical evolution.

## 1.90 | No unilateral veto

*No decision-making threshold within the RSS GS shall require unanimity. Unanimity requirements are generally a hindrance to good governance and promote the ability for any single voice or entity to stall or block progress. Decision-making thresholds based on majority, super- or supra-majority thresholds remain available.*

1.90 | No unilateral veto



18

### Interpretation Notes

- 1.90 can be distinguished from 1.50.
- 1.50 is an effort to avoid “capture” of the policy development institution.
- 1.90 is an effort to avoid someone who participates in the governance structure from “hijacking” an agenda that otherwise enjoys strong support.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle		None
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 1.100 | Divergent viewpoints are welcome

*Divergent viewpoints will be encouraged during policy development.*

1.100 | Divergent viewpoints are welcome



### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
👍 I am generally supportive of this principle	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	Everyone should be heard but not to the point of being disruptive.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	in conjunction with 1.100.4
👎 I would like more discussion about this principle.	Luis Diego Espinoza - ccNSO	Why we need this as a principle, divergent viewpoints are inherit on any discussion and can't be avoid.

## 1.100.4 | Divergent viewpoints will be published

All viewpoints on proposed or approved policies will be published.

1.100.4 | Divergent viewpoints will be published



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1

### Interpretation Notes

- This principle does not interfere with the normal process of creating or publishing minutes and recordings.
- With respect to formal statements of policy, the onus should be on the person with a divergent view to produce a statement of their view for publication if they wish it to be included.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI	I think this should require the agreement by the statement maker that it should be published. Otherwise it could be used against someone who said something in a hallway as "now I can force you to publish that publicly". We really mean anyone that wants to create an alternate viewpoint publication must be allowed to.
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Jim Reid - IAB	Depends on what is meant by "all" and which viewpoints should be accommodated.

# 1.101 | Obstructive dissent is unacceptable

*Dissenting opinions that unnecessarily delay or obstruct the policy development process will not be accepted.*

1.101 | Obstructive dissent is unacceptable



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## Interpretation Notes


- There must be a predictable method of declaring that debate has concluded and the time has arrived to make a decision.
- Who will qualify a dissenting opinion as obstructive?

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Jim Reid - IAB	Adopting a reasonable definition of consensus should make 1.101 unnecessary.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	Who will qualify a dissenting opinion as obstructive? It could be the chair of the group or an independent observer in place for that position. In either case, effective policy development teams require some level of training to make this level of governance work.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	anti filibuster clause is acceptable, "unnecessarily delay" is vague and might be unnecessary itself
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	This is missing the point. Either we drop it or change to something like, "The RSS GS must have predictable rules for ending debate and making decisions."

## 1.110 | Direct participation of RSOs in RSS GS

*Effectuation of governance decisions by the RSS GS must involve direct participation of RSOs.*

### 1.110 | Direct participation of RSOs in RSS GS



### Interpretation Notes


- Governance decisions must take place in a context where each RSO has the right to participate directly in the decision.
- This principle does not serve as a mandate for RSOs to participate in such decisions, provided that this may influence the ability to achieve a quorum, etc.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
👍 I am generally supportive of this principle		None
👎 I would like more discussion about this principle.	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	This misses the issue of both developing and carrying out policy. I prefer something like this: "RSS GS procedures for both developing and carrying out policy must involve direct participation of RSO's."

## 1.210 | Survivability

*The design of the RSS GS must make it capable of defending itself against attacks that would otherwise destabilize it.*

### 1.210 | Survivability



### Interpretation Notes

- In building the RSS GS and the RSS, risks should be identified, and mitigation measures implemented to support both the RSS GS and the RSS against legal process attacks by bad faith actors.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle		None
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

# Basket 2 Discussion

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Designation and Removal of RSOs



# Basket 2 Feedback Summary

	2.10	2.11	2.20	2.29	2.30	2.31	2.40	2.41	2.60	2.70	2.80	2.100	2.210
Jim Reid - IAB													
Ken Renard - RSO: US Army DEVCOM ARL													
Geoff Huston - IAB													
Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE Project													
Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD													
Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC													
Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign													
Suzanne Woolf - SSAC													
Luis Diego Espinoza - ccNSO													
Hans Petter Holen - RSO: RIPE NCC													
John Augenstein - RSO: DISA													
Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI													
Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG													
Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN													
Peter Koch - ccNSO													
Christian Kaufmann - ICANN Board													
Edmon Chung - ICANN Board													
Kim Davies - IANA													
Duane Wessels - RZM													

## 2.10 | Maintain and enhance trust in the RSS

*The decision-making framework used to establish the number and identities of RSOs must preserve and enhance trust in the RSS.*

### 2.10 | Maintain and enhance trust in the RSS



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#### Interpretation Notes

- The “equation” that defines how many RSOs is an implementation artifact that supports the engineering reality.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army DEVCOM ARL	"Architectural changes should result from technical evolution and demonstrated technical need" -- a change in the number of RSOs is an architectural change
	Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE Project	KPI/KGI of trust may better be defined in multiple aspects and stakeholders.
	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	What is the "Consideration for implementation" note trying to get at?
	Suzanne Woolf - SSAC	The framework should be transparent (as noted in 2.40) and flexible; it should be hard to change but not impossible; conditions will change over time.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	"The “equation” that defines how many RSOs is an implementation artifact that supports the engineering reality." - Nonetheless, conservatism is important. We should not be changing the number of RSOs based on a calculation. Changes that do not avoid a degradation of service would diminish trust.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	the equation might be a single or a set of inequalities
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 2.11 | Maintain and enhance trust in RSS performance

*The decision-making framework used to establish the number and identities of RSOs must preserve and demonstrate competence, consistency, commitment, and care for the RSS.*



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### Interpretation Notes

- The “equation” that defines how many RSOs is an implementation artifact that supports the engineering reality.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army DEVCOM ARL	"Architectural changes should result from technical evolution and demonstrated technical need" -- a change in the number of RSOs is an architectural change
	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Again, the "consideration for implementation" note is hard to grasp.
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 2.20 | Move cautiously

*Changes to the composition and identity of the RSOs must be undertaken with caution. Extreme or rapid change to identities or numbers of RSOs creates unnecessary operational risk and is to be avoided.*

2.20 | Move cautiously



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### Interpretation Notes

- See, for example, RSSAC058 Success Criteria A.7.3, designation or removal will require, at minimum, approval by a supermajority of RSOs.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Suzanne Woolf - SSAC	I'm uncomfortable with "a supermajority of RSOs" to decide on designation and removal; (even given the "at least" qualifier) this implementation consideration needs careful thought. I support the idea that the RSOs provide critical input to such decisions, but as stated, the suggested implementation principle looks like an effort to institutionalize the power of incumbents. There have been occasions in the past when various shortcomings (either poor service or other issues) arose and it's not at all clear to me how this principle would have been applied, or what the outcome would have been.
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 2.29 | Balance of service coverage

The RSS GS must ensure balance of service coverage for the RSS.

## 2.29 | Balance of service coverage



### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	How "balance of service coverage" is determined will need to be carefully defined. It will likely be subject to non-technically-motivated agendas.
	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	We might want to delete this. What exactly does "balance" mean? Geographic? Technological? Geopolitical?
	Suzanne Woolf - SSAC	I think "balance of service coverage" is shorthand for a principle we all feel we understand, but it needs to be spelled out in slightly more detail to be intelligible to others.
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Jim Reid - IAB	Depends on what "balance of service coverage" means
	Geoff Huston - IAB	I find it challenging to understand what "balance of service coverage" means in specific terms.
	Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI	Reading with fresh eyes: I think as written this is vague as to what we mean here. As someone that advocates for generally shorter text when possible, this is too short.

## 2.30 | RSS service mission is global and universal in scope

*The RSS is a service that is provided to the world without regard to the identity, affiliation, or location of the user.*

2.30 | RSS service mission is global and universal in scope



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### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle		None
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Geoff Huston - IAB	What is meant here by "the user"? Is it the recursive resolvers that (generally) pose queries to the root servers? Or the end users who pass queries into the DNS that may or may not entail queries being passed to one or more instances of root servers. I think_ the principle refers to the latter but a strict interpretation of "user" as being an entity that directly uses the service would infer the former.

## 2.31 | RSO service mission is global and universal in scope

*Each RSO holds a position of global trust, and each RSO must maintain a service that is globally available.*

2.31 | RSO service mission is global and universal in scope



### Interpretation Notes

- RSOs must provide a global service.
- The RSS GS must ensure that the aggregate of all RSOs deliver on a globally architected solution.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Jim Reid - IAB	What enforcement powers would the GS have to ensure this?
	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	"Globally available" can have a simple definition. Make sure this does not devolve into "perfectly optimized for every corner of the earth".
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	could be: "each RSO must maintain a service so that, in aggregate the RSS is globally available."
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Geoff Huston - IAB	I have no clear idea what "globally available" actually means in this context. It strikes me that the substantive intent of this principle is the final consideration, that refers to the aggregate service outcome. If that's the case then why not make this principle 2.31 directly and avoid the muddy wording of "globally available" and "global service" that refers to each RSO.

## 2.40 | Criteria objectivity and transparency

*Decisions about designation and removal of RSOs must be based on criteria that are both objective and transparent.*



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### Interpretation Notes

- Designation and removal are two different processes that require different standards.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Suzanne Woolf - SSAC	See above on flexibility as a critical attribute of these processes as well.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	"Designation and removal are two different processes that require different standards." - We seem to agree that these should be separated but we continue to group them.
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None



## 2.41 | Impartiality of decision-making

*Decisions about designation and removal of RSOs must be made in a manner that is impartial.*



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
### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Jim Reid - IAB	They also have to be fair. For some definition of fair.
	Suzanne Woolf - SSAC	Again, clarity and specificity of terms is critical: impartial towards what or whom? As discussed in the GWG, I support this principle, but it's going to have to be clear to others as well.
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 2.60 | Technical necessity

Any additional RSO designation must be based solely on objective technical necessity.

2.60 | Technical necessity



### Interpretation Notes

- This principle does not alter the need to preserve and promote RSO organizational diversity as discussed in RSSAC058 Success Criteria A.2.1.2.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
👍 I am generally supportive of this principle	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	I know the principle is "off limits", but what did we mean by "additional" here? Is it anything beyond the current count of 13? Or any new RSO regardless of the count at time of designation?
	Suzanne Woolf - SSAC	This is an extremely high bar, as it should be. Efforts will be made to weaken it, so it's probably worth some effort to "future-proof".
👎 I would like more discussion about this principle.	Geoff Huston - IAB	see 2.70

## 2.70 | Due diligence on candidate RSOs

*The RSS GS must conduct appropriate due diligence to assess the technological and non-technological characteristics of a candidate RSOs and to assure the RSS stakeholders that the candidate RSO complies with adopted designation criteria.*

2.70 | Due diligence on candidate RSOs



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### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Jim Reid - IAB	Might need fine-tuning to avoid perceptions of a clique deciding who gets to be in their club.
	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	Reference RSSAC024
	Suzanne Woolf - SSAC	It's *way* down in the weeds but there will need to be considerations of how to do this: RFPs? Some kind of application process? With what non-technological evaluation if we also keep the principle that the sole determinant for adding one is technical necessity.
	Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI	Would be tempted to say "and the principles of the RSS governance" -- aka, these principles. If you don't agree to them then ....
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	Small typo: "a candidate RSOs"
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Geoff Huston - IAB	In the first instance this strikes me as being contradictory to 2.60. If the designation is based solely on objective technical necessity (2.60) that why is there an explicit requirement here for an assessment of non-technological characteristics of a candidate RSOs. I think_ the intent of these principles is that the decision to increase the number of RSOs (or even to maintain the number of RSOPs following a removal of designation) is a technical decision based on technical necessity, but the decision as to which entity to designate is a decision that includes both technical and non-technical characteristics of the candidate RSO(s). This distinction is worth confirming so I have flagged "more discussion" here.

## 2.80 | Differentiate treatment of designation and removal of RSOs

*Decisions on designation of an RSO are different from decisions on removal of an RSO and should be subject to different frameworks.*

## 2.80 | Differentiate treatment of designation and removal of RSOs



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### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
👍 I am generally supportive of this principle	Suzanne Woolf - SSAC	This is important to clarify and support the idea that removal (or voluntary resignation) of one RSO does not necessarily imply a need or intention to add one.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	Maybe make this 2.41 and that would address the separation issue there.
👎 I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 2.100 | Funds received from RSO designation are dedicated to the RSS

*If the RSS GS receives funds in the process of assessing and granting a new RSO designation, such funds must be placed at the disposal of the RSS GS and used to benefit the RSS.*

2.100 | Funds received from RSO designation are dedicated to the RSS



### Interpretation Notes

- This is not a mandate to charge, or accept money from, applicants.
- This is merely guidance on what to do if there is going to be such a charge.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Suzanne Woolf – SSAC	I'd almost like to see this rephrased slightly, as "The RSS GS is not to be used to provide or accept funding except for the benefit of the RSS." This is slightly more general than designation activities.
	Wes Hardaker – RSO: USC ISI	I'll note that this doesn't mean we think money should change hands, but could be viewed as a safeguard in case something like that happens even if we never expect (or want) it to
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Jim Reid – IAB	Someone providing funds for this purpose will expect some say in how that money gets spent. Without that, no funding. That funding should be broadly revenue-neutral. ie the RSS GS can't raise more than it needs and spend any surplus on whatever it wants.
	Geoff Huston – IAB	The finance considerations pointed to a principle that the assessment of new RSO designations was not to be treated by the RSS GS as a source of general funding for the RSS GS, yet this principle appears to state the opposite. Which is it?

## 2.210 | Voluntary resignation

*Each RSO should have a path available that enables it to voluntarily resign its designation as an RSO in a controlled manner.*



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### Interpretation Notes

- Avoid situations where too many RSOs can resign too quickly.
- The onus is on the RSS GS to manage the resignation process.
- Candidate RSOs must have a plan for this in much the same way that they are expected to have incident response plans and related management in place.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Jim Reid –IAB	Each RSO should develop a resignation plan, and update that periodically,. It should be made available -- perhaps in confidence -- to the RSS GS
	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	The RSO resignation process should be orderly and preserve the stability of the RSS (e.g. advance notice of resignation should be sufficient). The RSS GS may establish guidelines for a resignation process.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	But there should be a plan (or maybe a framework) in the (admittedly rare) event of a mass migration.
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

# Basket 3 Discussion

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Finances

# Basket 3 Feedback Summary

	3.10	3.20	3.30	3.40	3.50	3.60	3.61	3.69	3.70	3.80	3.100	3.101	3.110	3.510
Jim Reid - IAB														
Ken Renard - RSO: US Army DEVCOM ARL														
Geoff Huston - IAB														
Hiro Hotta - RSO: WIDE Project														
Karl Reuss - RSO: UMD														
Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC														
Brad Verd - RSO: Verisign														
Suzanne Woolf - SSAC														
Luis Diego Espinoza - ccNSO														
Hans Petter Holen - RSO: RIPE NCC														
John Augenstein - RSO: DISA														
Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI														
Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG														
Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN														
Peter Koch - ccNSO														
Christian Kaufmann - ICANN Board														
Edmon Chung - ICANN Board														
Kim Davies - IANA														
Duane Wessels - RZM														



## 3.10 | Financial stability: governance

*Operating a trusted and stable RSS GS requires sufficient recurring, predictable, appropriate, and transparent sources of finance.*



### Interpretation Notes

- A reserve should be available to ensure stable operation of the RSS GS if the primary source of funding goes away.
- Support over time does not preclude other measures to make funding useful to the RSS and RSS GS. .

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Jim Reid - IAB	This needs more clarity, for instance how long those reserves would be expected to last. I think this principle needs to state RSOs are ordinarily expected to be self-funding: SPOf avoidance and all that.
	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	What happens if funding (and therefore, the RSS GS) stops? Should we consider or plan for this? Would things fall back to, well, "exactly how they are now"?
	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	I'm not sure I get the second implementation consideration.
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Geoff Huston - IAB	I have no qualms with the first sentence here. However the text of the considerations raises some as yet unresolved issues for me. The reference to a reserve fund appears to assume an independent existence for the RSS GS, such that is it not beholden in a financial sense to any other body, including ICANN. There is still the distinct possibility that the RSS GS could be structured as a subsidiary of ICANN, in a manner that the activities for the RSS GS are financially underwritten by ICANN, and in such a case there is no need (or purpose) for an independent fund to be operated by the RSS GS,
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	For implementation: if ICANN is funding the RSS GS, that funding would be included in the ICANN annual budget. A reserve fund for the RSS GS would not be created, but ICANN itself has a substantial reserve fund. Nonetheless, I believe this would be a predictable source of funding

## 3.20 | Financial stability: operations

*Operating a trusted and stable RSS requires sufficient recurring, predictable, appropriate, and transparent sources of finance for RSOs.*



### Interpretation Notes


- The transparency element should not be read to impose obligations to reveal confidential customer lists, etc.
- It is sufficient for RSOs to describe the nature of funding sources.
- More than the minimum number of RSOs must be fully funded for operation for more than a few years into the future.
- A reserve should be available to ensure stable operation of the RSOs receiving funding if the primary source of funding goes away.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Jim Reid - IAB	Clarity is needed on how long those reserves would be expected to last. And if an RSO's primary function goes away, surely the RSO goes away too and gets replaced?
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christian Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	Add a bullet point to consideration for implementation: "The RSS GS should not be viewed as a perpetual guaranteed funding source for RSOs."
	Duane Wessels - RZM	Acknowledge that this doesn't mean only external funding and can refer to internal/self funding.
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Geoff Huston - IAB	In general, this seems sensible, with the exception of the final consideration. As written this seems to indicate that the RSS GS is obligated to maintain a reserve to underwrite the RSO organisation if it has some form of business or financial failure. This seems to be stretch for the RSS GS to provide such support to each of the RSO organisations.
	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	I only disagree because where did item 3 come from? What does this imply: "- More than the minimum number of RSOs must be fully funded for operation for more than a few years into the future? "
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	I am not sure about the reserve. What is the reserve source of funding for RSOs operated by large corporations or governments? I don't think we can require these entities to identify those reserves.

### 3.30 | RSS governance is a not-for-profit activity

*The focus of the RSS GS must be the sole purpose of assuring the proper functioning of the RSS. Therefore, the RSS GS should be run in the public interest, and any revenue in excess of costs should not accrue to the private benefit of individual stakeholders or entities.*

### 3.30 | RSS governance is a not-for-profit activity



#### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Geoff Huston - IAB	The consideration that such funds "should not accrue to the private benefit of individual stakeholders or entities" appears to me to be in direct contradiction to the previous consideration that "a reserve should be available to ensure stable operation of the RSOs receiving funding if the primary source of funding goes away." which strikes me as a measure that acts as a benefit to the RSO, which are one of the stakeholders here.
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 3.40 | Operating an RSO is a not-for-profit activity

*Each RSO is expected to operate its root service in support of the RSS without the purpose or intention of making a profit from said service.*



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### Interpretation Notes

- This principle applies only to the business process of operating a root server.
- The principle does not restrict the RSO from profit-making activity outside the scope of operating a root server.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
👍 I am generally supportive of this principle		None
👎 I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 3.50 | No data commercialization

*An RSO should not monetize data collected while operating its root service.*



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### Interpretation Notes

- This principle does not distract from the need for each RSO to disclose operational data (as appropriate) to the RSS GS in support of security, stability, and resilience goals.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	Research efforts using collected data should not be prohibited.
	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Not opposed to clarifying the language.
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	"should not" leaves an unclear window of opportunity for monetization
	Duane Wessels - RZM	not an implementation consideration, but I think "should not" is too weak here.
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Jim Reid - IAB	There are other potential misuses of root zone traffic data besides making money: pervasive monitoring, privacy violation, etc. 3.50 should say something about that too.
	Geoff Huston - IAB	"monetize data" is unclear for me. For example, in investigating the risks involved in the 2018 KSK roll it was found to be very useful to assemble a large dataset of queries being passed to the root service. It is likely that the RSOs incurred incremental costs in assembling this data for analysis. Is recouping these costs of assembling this data an instance of "monetizing data"? While the general principle is clear and supportable, there are fringe areas that are not as clear here.

### 3.60 | Financial accountability: RSS GS

*The RSS GS must be accountable to the funding sources for funds provided to it.*



#### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
👍 I am generally supportive of this principle		None
👎 I would like more discussion about this principle.	Hans Petter Holen - RSO: RIPE NCC	I am still concerned with "Money buys control" effect of this principle

## 3.61 | Financial accountability: RSOs

*For the purpose of demonstrating accountability to the funders of the RSS GS, each RSO must be accountable to the RSS GS for funds provided to it by the RSS GS.*



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### Interpretation Notes

- In order to demonstrate accountability to the RSS GS and the RSS GS to funders, the reporting from the RSS GS and the reporting that the RSS GS will require from RSOs receiving funds need to be defined.
- The intention is that the RSS GS itself becomes the entity with primary responsibility to assure accountability to those who provide funds for operations.
- In turn, RSOs are accountable to the RSS GS with respect to such funds that are received from the RSS GS.
- The RSS GS itself will be a forum used to drive accountability.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Jim Reid - IAB	How will the RSS GS drive accountability? What enforcement powers will it have?
	Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI	There is a question of detail level that needs to eventually be addressed for implementation
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	If, say, the funding source is ICANN, we should check to see if ICANN can delegate their fiduciary duty to ensure accountability. ICANN has not done this in the past.
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 3.69 | Financial transparency: RSS GS

*The RSS GS must be transparent regarding all use of finances. This is a crucial element of building and maintaining trust with the broader community of RSS stakeholders.*



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### Interpretation Notes

- Funding requests will be vetted by the RSS GS prior to the request being addressed.
- Vetting will include a test for reasonableness.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Jim Reid - IAB	IMO "fit and proper person" is more appropriate wording than "reasonableness".
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	For the implementation: I think there will be a discussion of reasonableness vs need. Alternatively, the definition of reasonableness must be honed.
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None



## 3.70 | Financial transparency: RSOs

*Each RSO must be transparent regarding finances received from the RSS GS. This is a crucial element of building and maintaining trust with the broader community of RSS stakeholders.*



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### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle		None
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Geoff Huston - IAB	Being "transparent" is a very vague term. Being "financial accountability" already referred to, what additional measures or constraints are envisaged here? What makes this principle different from 3.61?

## 3.80 | Financial self-determination

*Decision-making concerning funding policy, specifically funds raised or disbursed by the RSS GS, should rest within the RSS GS itself. This should not be controlled by an outside entity.*

3.80 | Financial self-determination



### Interpretation Notes

- This principle does not apply to funds raised directly by RSOs outside the scope of RSS GS involvement.

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Jim Reid - IAB	RSOs getting other sources of funds should declare them (in confidence?) to the RSS GS.
	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	There are items not here that still need discussion, Principles 3.89 & 3.90.
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	For funds rec'd from ICANN, this will have to be cleared with ICANN. I imagine that other funders might require some degree of oversight also.
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christian Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	A proposed revised principle could be: "Development of funding policy regarding the use of funds raised or disbursed by the RSS GS, should rest within the RSS GS, subject to appropriate policy recommendation approval processes."
	Duane Wessels - RZM	This seems opposite of 1.10 The entity that collects funds for RSS support is not necessarily the entity that defines the rules for disbursement of those same funds.

## 3.100 | Funding commitment: RSS GS

*There must be a system of ongoing commitment to provide financial support for the RSS GS.*



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### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Geoff Huston - IAB	It seems to me that this is a restatement of 3.10. I am at a loss to understand why this is added here as a distinct principle.
	Duane Wessels - RZM	This seems redundant to 3.10
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 3.101 | Funding commitment: RSS operations

*There must be a system of ongoing commitment to provide financial support for RSS operations.*

3.101 | Funding commitment: RSS operations



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
### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
👍 I am generally supportive of this principle	Geoff Huston - IAB	Again, this seems to me to be already covered by 3.10 and 3.100.
	Duane Wessels - RZM	this seems redundant to 3.20
👎 I would like more discussion about this principle.	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	This is dependent upon the reasons for funding (e.g., need vs some other criteria, amount required, and sourcing). Maybe: "There must be a system of ongoing commitment to provide financial support for RSS operations, subject to allocation and amount criteria that are developed during implementation."
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	we should make clear(er) whether the status quo fulfills this principle

### 3.110 | RSOs remain free to seek external sources of funding

*RSOs remain free to raise funds to support RSO activity as they see fit.*

3.110 | RSOs remain free to seek external sources of funding



#### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Wes Hardaker - RSO: USC ISI	(as they see fit aside from not selling data and meeting other principles)
I would like more discussion about this principle.		None

## 3.510 | Uniform funding

3.510 | Uniform funding

*Funding should be available to the RSS. Each RSO can request funding support, and those requests will be assessed on a fair, impartial, and objective basis.*



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### Interpretation Notes

Rating	Name/Org	Feedback for additional discussion
I am generally supportive of this principle	Jim Reid - IAB	3.510 needs a clearer title. Uniform funding implies money will be split equally between RSOs. Which is unlikely. We could also say something about how the processes for requesting and assessing RSS GS funding apply equally to all RSOs.
	Ken Renard - RSO: US Army	RSOs are not required to request or accept funding. Funding amounts to each RSO may vary.
	Jeff Osborn - RSO: ISC	Equal distribution is not required by this.
	Kurt Pritz - gTLD RySG	Maybe instead of "Uniform Funding," we call it "Equitable Allocation" or "Uniform Consideration"
	Peter Koch - ccNSO	I'd rather see this depend upon 3.101 in a way that reads "if there is funding available, the each RSO ...." ; implementation needs to take into account budget cycles and competition for resources
	Ashwin Rangan - RSO: ICANN Christian Kaufmann - ICANN Board Edmon Chung - ICANN Board Kim Davies - IANA	Proposed edit to principle: "Funding [from the RSS GS] should be available to the RSS. Each RSO can request funding support, and those requests will be assessed on a fair, impartial, and objective basis."  Proposed consideration for implementation: "The RSS GS should not be viewed as a perpetual guaranteed funding source for RSOs."
I would like more discussion about this principle.	Geoff Huston - IAB	It strikes me that this principle is still overly general and leaves a large number of unresolved questions relating to its implementation. What is "fair" here? If, as an hypothetical example, there was a program for the RSS to assist the RSO's to deploy support for queries over the Foo transport protocol and one RSO has 400 anycast server instances and another has 2, then does one RSO get 200 times the support than the other? As a principle it all sounds good, until you start to think about it in practical terms. I think it is a little too abstract as stated.