[CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority

Fri Dec 19 16:52:42 UTC 2014

Dear All,

May I start a new thread and suggest a complete restructuring/ break up of ICANN, with a new corporate, tax paying entity, established, accountable for all revenue generating activity, particularly from its management, facilitation and  its on going responsibility, accountability, reporting  of the whole gTLD  programme, processes, procedures. 

Are you aware that ICANN’s ( currently a 501 Californian not for profit - where no tax is payable) latest audited 2013 financial statements show a  “surplus” of $83M ( with a further $32.4 M development cost write back ) on $359M revenue received from 1930 applicants.  It has also in addition, subsequently  received  https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionresults with another 100+ contention sets  ( potentially )facing a last resort ICANN auction, where ICANN takes all the proceeds.

Perhaps this outside the CCWG -Accountability remit.

Best regards,

Phil Buckingham

From: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Roelof Meijer
Sent: 19 December 2014 15:26
To: Steve DelBianco; Accountability Cross Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority

Deal all,

Steve wrote:

"Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). „

The possibility of introducing such a structure is certainly not limited to organizations operating under California State (or US Federal for that matter) Law. 

If the members of such a structure would be the (elected) chairs of the SO’s and AC’s and of a few other (e.g. IETF, IAB and –dare I suggest it- the SG of the ITU) to make it truly/fully multi-stakeholder, it could greatly enhance ICANN’s accountability. As the structure itself would be very accountable.

I would think that (indeed on the condition of a supermajority) this structure then could be given the power to (escalation with increase in number):

1.	On the basis of „too much noise from the community”, tell ICANN to redo a particular process;
2.	If the above does not solve the situation, call for an independent review of the issue/process;
3.	If the situation meets certain criteria, send the board (or part thereof) away;
4.	If the situation meets even stricter criteria, transfer ICANN’s role and/or the IANA function to another organization (Chris Disspain’s „nuclear option”)

The nice thing about option 4 is that having it, will make it’s actual use unnecessary and will make options 1 to 3 a given. By rattling the sable, as the NTIA occasionally did, for sure..

Only a very rough sketch, lots of develish details to be worked out. But in my opinion worth reflecting on. Not because it, as Kavouss suggests, „[is limited] to merely existing practice and model”. As it is not. But because it builds onto what had been realized over the years and works pretty well most of the time. And because it might be part of a solution to both issues: the IANA stewardship transition and the enhancement of ICANN’s accountability.

And, now that I am having a go at it anyway, if the above would be implemented, another increase in ICANN’s accountability could be realized some time down the line. By replacing ICANN’s present board by one of which none of the members are elected from an SO or AC , but all members are selected on the basis of their personal skills and expertise.

Best regards,

Roelof A. Meijer

CEO

SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS
T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05  
roelof.meijer at sidn.nl |  <http://www.sidn.nl/> www.sidn.nl

From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org>
Date: woensdag 17 december 2014 17:20
To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority

This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community ‘Membership’ group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community.  It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accountability%20suggestions%20%5Bdraft%203%5D.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1418610739000&api=v2>  for work area 2: 

Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:

Appoint members of Affirmation review teams

Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel)

Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval

Approve annual proposed ICANN budget

Recall one or all ICANN Board members

One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/>  a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability>  in a Washington paper today.  Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:

California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). 

We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.

Steve DelBianco

Executive Director

NetChoice

http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/>  and http://blog.netchoice.org <http://blog.netchoice.org/> 

+1.202.420.7482

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