[CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism
egmorris1 at toast.net
Mon Jul 27 16:05:32 UTC 2015
My initial post didn't say anything about the quality or content of our proposal. I was merely trying to correct some inaccurate language that was being used. Sometimes, as here, when you reflect reality in what you write you stimulate thoughts and discussion that otherwise would not have taken place.
These issues are complex. As the selector of Board seat 15 ALAC does have a role to play in some of our community powers. I'm not sure I agree that role does extend or should extend beyond powers related to the selection and removal of their Board member. Powers over the budget and the strategic plan, for example, do seem to me to be in the remit of groups such as the GNSO which are charged with being a "policy development body" yet are perhaps beyond ALAC's limited remit to "consider and provide advice". Double dipping, both by ALAC as a whole (advise and develop?) and by individuals, as mentioned by Robin and James, is also a concern. That said, I'm willing to listen to arguments to the contrary but that process is going to take time that we just don't have right now.
I'd suggest that we label our current model as being a transitionary mechanism (that's often happened in ICANN when new groups have been formed) and set up a member based (to guard against packing of the group by interested parties) WS2 group to consider all of these rather complex issues. The group should have a hard deadline to produce recommendations. This would also give those parts of our community who are uncertain about how they want to participate in the powers going forward more time to consider their options. I think this would be a positive way forward on several levels.
One other note: in recent weeks the issues highlighted in this conversation have dominated the accountability discussion within the stakeholder group, the NCSG, that I represent on the GNSO Council. I have to vote on Council in a way that I believe reflects the interests, values and opinions of my Members. Opposition to this voting model is so strong amongst those who elect me that if I were to have to vote today on an accountability package that includes this voting model I would with a very sad heart be forced to vote "no". I certainly have no desire to do that. Let's give all of this some more thought so we can all proceed with the transition together.
From: "Robin Gross" <robin at ipjustice.org>
Sent: Monday, July 27, 2015 4:05 PM
To: wp1 at icann.org, "accountability-cross-community at icann.org Community" <accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism
The problem with our proposal is that it doesn't take into account the different roles of the various stakeholders at ICANN. It also leads to double-representation of certain users who participate in both the GNSO and the ALAC. These are not insignificant concerns, but major holes in the proposal that will need to be dealt with in the interests of organizational accountability.
Perhaps we need to move this issue to WS2, where we can have a meaningful discussion of the appropriate roles of stakeholders in this new model, relative weights, and participation rights.
On Jul 27, 2015, at 7:49 AM, Alan Greenberg wrote:
If you are saying that 5 votes is insufficient to represent the views of those charged with supporting the 3 billion Internet users, we will gladly accept more votes. ;-)
At 26/07/2015 11:25 PM, Arun Sukumar wrote: Agree with Robin and Ed on the issue of equal representation to ALAC. If at-large is designed to represent internet users, are we really suggesting that 5 votes will do justice to the diversity of views in this wide constituency? ALAC, in my personal opinion, should remain an advisory entity.
Sent from my iPad
On 27 Jul 2015, at 07:53, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca > wrote:
Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission.
At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote: Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it.
GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes.
On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:
In reviewing document 5A2 I've come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I'm referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized:
The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.
The description of ALAC is simply not true.
I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states:
The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.
ALAC was structurally designed to "consider and provide advice" on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users". It was NOT "structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN".
1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not "structurally designed" to be the "home" of any of them, it's structural remit being limited to individual Internet users;
2. ALAC was not "structurally designed" to represent anyone. It was "structurally designed" to "consider and provide advice" to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users.
To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:
The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains.
The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was "structurally designed" to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it's designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC.
As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC's function is to "consider and provide advice". The NCSG's function is to "represent". They are different.
We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort.
I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:
The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.
I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not.
I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I'm just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.
Thanks for considering,
From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan at internetnz.net.nz >
Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM
To: wp1 at icann.org, accountability-cross-community at icann.org
Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism
Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven't got tracked changes to show you - it's not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn't actually been finished).
We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.
This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.
04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
jordan at internetnz.net.nz
To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential.
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
WP1 mailing list
WP1 at icann.org
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the Accountability-Cross-Community