[CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

[Seun Ojedeji]

On 27 Jul 2015 5:31 pm, "Edward Morris" <egmorris1 at toast.net> wrote:
>
> Hi everyone,
>
> My initial post didn't say anything about the quality or content of our
proposal. I was merely trying to correct some inaccurate language that was
being used. Sometimes, as here, when you reflect reality in what you write
you stimulate thoughts and discussion that otherwise would not have taken
place.
>
> These issues are complex. As the selector of Board seat 15 ALAC does have
a role to play in some of our community powers. I'm not sure I agree that
role does extend or should extend beyond powers related to the selection
and removal of their Board member. Powers over the budget and the strategic
plan, for example, do seem to me to be in the remit of groups such as the
GNSO which are charged with being a "policy development body"  yet are
perhaps beyond ALAC's limited remit to "consider and provide advice".
Double dipping, both by ALAC as a whole (advise and develop?) and by
individuals, as mentioned by Robin and James, is also a concern.
>
SO:
With due respect Edward, I am surprised by a section of your mail above. I
find it very interesting that you did not see ALAC role as conflicting (or
double dipping as you say) in its service as one of the chartering
organisation for both WG, serve in developing the proposals, supported the
need for community powers. Now that we have a direction on powers, you (we)
are trying to weight more to a side of the community than the other.
Let me state my personal views on this subject:

- What we will have post transition will only rely on existing structure
and not existing status of the structures as it concerns policy

- The accountability we are discussing here is NOT about the names
community alone.

- Post transition ICANN in my view could be more vulnerable to capture
because there is now a way to challenge board actions/inactions(through the
single member setup)

- We expect to reduce such possibility by ensuring no section of the
community can exercise the power independently.

- Balance and diversity should be paramount requirement in exercising the
community powers.

- Avoiding balance across the communities in exercising the community
powers defeats the essence of some membership

>
That said, I'm willing to listen to arguments to the contrary but that
process is going to take time that we just don't have right now.
>
SO:
I hope you (GNSO) can stay off this track of imbalance early enough before
it's too late.

> I'd suggest that we label our current model as being a transitionary
mechanism (that's often happened in ICANN when new groups have been
formed) and set up a member based (to guard against packing of the group by
interested parties) WS2 group to consider all of these rather complex
issues. The group should have a hard deadline to produce recommendations.
>
SO:
There has to be clear requirement that whatever is agreed in WS1 would be
implemented and not subject to change by WS2 post transition. I expect that
NTIA would want to read such assurance as well.

Regards

This would also give those parts of our community who are uncertain about
how they want to participate in the powers going forward more time to
consider their options. I think this would be a positive way forward on
several levels.
>
> One other note: in recent weeks the issues highlighted in this
conversation have dominated the accountability discussion within the
stakeholder group, the NCSG, that I represent on the GNSO Council. I
have to vote on Council in a way that I believe reflects the
interests, values and opinions of my Members. Opposition to this voting
model is so strong amongst those who elect me that if I were to have to
vote today  on an accountability package that includes this voting model I
would with a very sad heart be forced to vote "no". I certainly have no
desire to do that. Let's give all of this some more thought so we can all
proceed with the transition together.
>
> Kind Regards,
>
> Ed Morris
>
>
>
> ________________________________
> From: "Robin Gross" <robin at ipjustice.org>
> Sent: Monday, July 27, 2015 4:05 PM
> To: wp1 at icann.org, "accountability-cross-community at icann.org Community" <
accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in
community mechanism
>
> The problem with our proposal is that it doesn't take into account the
different roles of the various stakeholders at ICANN.  It also leads to
double-representation of certain users who participate in both the GNSO and
the ALAC.  These are not insignificant concerns, but major holes in the
proposal that will need to be dealt with in the interests of organizational
accountability.
>
> Perhaps we need to move this issue to WS2, where we can have a meaningful
discussion of the appropriate roles of stakeholders in this new model,
relative weights, and participation rights.
>
> Thanks,
> Robin
>
>
> On Jul 27, 2015, at 7:49 AM, Alan Greenberg wrote:
>
>>
>> If you are saying that 5 votes is insufficient to represent the views of
those charged with supporting the 3 billion Internet users, we will gladly
accept more votes.  ;-)
>>
>> Alan
>>
>> At 26/07/2015 11:25 PM, Arun Sukumar wrote:
>>>
>>> Agree with Robin and Ed on the issue of equal representation to ALAC.
If at-large is designed to represent internet users, are we really
suggesting that 5 votes will do justice to the diversity of views in this
wide constituency? ALAC, in my personal opinion, should remain an advisory
entity.
>>>
>>> Sent from my iPad
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 Jul 2015, at 07:53, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca >
wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public
Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission.
>>>>
>>>> Alan
>>>>
>>>> At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for bringing this up, Edward.  I am having a hard time
accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on
these issues.  GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal
certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I
cannot accept it.
>>>>>
>>>>> GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I
understand the GAC may be prepared to accept.  But giving ALAC such an
elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in
my view.  If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be
compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>> Robin
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi everybody,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In reviewing document 5A2 I’ve come across what I believe is an
inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be
honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the
NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council.  I’m referring to this
paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -----
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal
basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development
and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to
represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains
voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would
receive an equal number of votes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -----
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The description of ALAC is simply not true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which
states:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -----
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational
home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall
be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as
they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes
policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the
many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The
ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms,
also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ALAC was structurally designed to “consider and provide advice” on
the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of
individual Internet users”. It was NOT  “structurally designed to represent
Internet users within ICANN”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Two inaccuracies:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet
users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not “structurally
designed” to be the “home” of any of them, it’s structural remit being
limited to individual Internet users;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to represent anyone. It was
“structurally designed” to “consider and provide advice” to ICANN on behalf
of individual Internet users.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1
of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to
represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the
interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial
Internet users of generic Top-Level domains.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is
accurate to state that the NCSG was “structurally designed” to represent
both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of
generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it’s designated
community cannot be attributed to ALAC.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional
design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO,  in terms of
representation at ICANN. ALAC’s function is to “consider and provide
advice”. The NCSG’s function is to “represent”. They are different.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we
are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the
community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility
problems for our entire effort.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal
basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development
and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to
consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within
ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community
mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from
the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The
previous language was not.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to
question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might
be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I’m just trying
to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks for considering,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ed
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>>> From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan at internetnz.net.nz >
>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM
>>>>>> To: wp1 at icann.org, accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>>>>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community
mechanism
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi everyone
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting
weights. I am sorry that I haven’t got tracked changes to show you - it’s
not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff
draft that hadn’t actually been finished).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe
Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> best
>>>>>> Jordan
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Jordan Carter
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chief Executive
>>>>>> InternetNZ
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
>>>>>> jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>>>>>> Skype: jordancarter
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its
potential.
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> WP1 mailing list
>>>>> WP1 at icann.org
>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1
>>>>
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>
>
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