[CCWG-ACCT] Section 5B - community powers - consolidated draft

Paul Szyndler paul.szyndler at auda.org.au
Thu Jul 30 07:29:51 UTC 2015

Hello all,

Below are a few comments I have just sent to Jordan about the most recent 
Community Powers draft.

I am happy to help undertake the drafting changes as I feel these are 
important points to address before the next round of public commentary.



Hi Jordan,

Thanks for the time and effort that you have contributed to refining this 

I have a handful of comments / questions that we may wish to address before 
we reach the public comment phase.

Many of these are about improving clarity and minimising the risk of 

*         Getting language right about “petitioning” is important because it 
is the first step toward community “action”. So this (page 2) is confusing: 
“To trigger community consideration for the use of a community power, an SO 
or AC has to agree by a resolution of its governing body that the power 
should be used. A simple majority is sufficient to support a petition for 
any power so it can proceed to the discussion stage”. What “simple majority” 
are we referring to? Of the ccNSO Council? ccNSO membership? Of SOs and ACs? 
I assume you are referring to a “simple majority” of the governing 
body…..but we should be extremely precise. Also, are we intending to mandate 
how each SO/AC will execute its own processes for reaching agreement / 
consensus, or can each develop their own methodologies? Once again, clarity 
is vital.

*         Under 5B.1 (Reconsider budget or strategy/operating plans) is 
there a need for overtly negative language regarding ICANN putting budgets 
and plans to the community “without sufficient detail to facilitate 
thoughtful consideration”? I would propose highlighting the subsequent 
paragraph (04) about greater transparency and community involvement as a 
preferred introductory statement. Similarly, Para 18 on changes to ICANN 
Standard Bylaws is, once again, negative in tone. Can we craft these in a 
more diplomatic tone? Further, the examples in Para 18 of the ccNSO’s PDP 
and GNSO Stakeholder Groups are problematic for reasons that I believe Chris 
has discussed with you recently.

*         Para 15 on budget / plan veto: “A 2/3 level of support in the 
mechanism would be required in the mechanism to reject the ICANN or IANA 
budget or an operating/strategic plan the first time: a 3/4 level of support 
is required for a second rejection.” Aside from drafting errors, we need to 
be clearer as to who “2/3” or “3/4” refers to.

*         Para 29 on removing Directors: “It is expected that this power 
would only be exercised is cases of serious difficulty with a particular 
director”. I don’t wish to head further down the rabbit hole of detail, but 
in drafting this document, we are talking about nuclear options for the 
community. Would you expect that terms such as “serious difficulty” will be 
more fully defined?

Catch you on the upcoming calls,


From: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org 
[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of 
Jordan Carter
Sent: Thursday, 30 July 2015 9:51 AM
To: wp1 at icann.org; Accountability Cross Community 
<accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Section 5B - community powers - consolidated draft

Hi all

Attached are the community powers papers combined into one document, and 
benefiting from the latest legal review and updates following our last call. 
This is for discussion in our next CCWG call/s.

I draw your attention in particular to two points:

** in the "removing individual ICANN directors" paper (section 5B.3) there 
was no limit on the number of times people could seek the removal of a 
director: if a vote failed, a new petition could happen immediately. I have 
suggested there should be a standdown period of six months - if a vote to 
remove an individual director fails, a new petition could not be lodged. It 
doesn't seem fair to allow the community to simply wear down an elected 
director by attrition like this.

** in "recall of the ICANN Board" paper (section 5B.4), there was a 
weirdness in the petitioning. We agreed that two SOs or ACs must petition to 
trigger this, at least one of which needed to be an SO, but the paper had a 
legacy oddness that 2/3 of the SOs and ACs would have to sign on to the 
petition. This was the same threshold as the actual decision. So I have 
deleted it.

The changes to the Budget paper also clarify the separateness of decisions 
re IANA budget and ICANN budget.

Redline and clean versions attached. Please treat the clean version as the 
authoritative one. The redline includes all changes other than formatting 
and minor word changes that don't change substance, as far as I know.




Jordan Carter

Chief Executive

+64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
Email:  <mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz> jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Skype: jordancarter

A better world through a better Internet

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