[CCWG-ACCT] Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for CCWG ACCT Session #14 24 February
Alan Greenberg
alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
Sun Mar 1 17:28:54 UTC 2015
Thanks Avri,
Certainly for an AC/SO, there is an obligation to document how the
selection is made (or who it is made by) and if there were a recall
allowed, then that procedure must be documented as well. I don't know
to what extent we should or could prescribe those rules for them, but
I don't think it would be unreasonable to say that the decision to
recall should be made by the same group (current incumbents) that do
the selection, and that it should require a supermajority instead of
just a majority.
I am less sure I agree on the NomCom recall. I would prefer a
mechanism that required the overall community to act instead of the
NomCom. The NomCom is a surrogate for the community at least partly
because of the desire for confidentiality in its candidate list,
confidential references and deliberations. When you are only taking
about a binary decision to recall or not recall a particular person,
I see no reason why the secrecy of the NomCom is needed, and indeed,
I think that it would be a negative with regard to transparency of
how/why the decision is taken.
Alan
At 01/03/2015 11:42 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
>Hi,
>
>I support your position Alan.
>
>But in order for it to work, it must be as laborious to remove as it
>is to elect. There needs to be something that is similar to the
>process it takes to put someone on the Board. For example, if
>Nomcom placed someone on te Board, [a] Nomcom* should remove
>them. Like wise, if a process like the one that At-Large has to put
>them on, then a similar process needs to be created to take them off.
>
>It is more difficult to figure out what to do in terms of the GNSO,
>but as soon as we document our systems for (s)electing Board
>members, we should consider a system for removal. &c.
>
>My general refrain on this is it should be possible, but it should
>be hard to do.
>
>avri
>
>* for an example please see
><https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7437/>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7437/
>
> IAB, IESG, and IAOC Selection, Confirmation, and Recall Process:
> Operation of the Nominating and Recall Committees
>
>On 28-Feb-15 21:06, Alan Greenberg wrote:
>>Bruce, I have several problems with your rationale. First,
>>decisison of the ICANN Board which hinge on how a particular (or
>>even two) Board Members vote are few and far between, so the
>>concept of an AC/SO turfing their Board member(s) because they did
>>n't get something is rather hypothetical. Moreover, at least in the
>>case, of travel budget requests, I didn't think that the Board
>>voted on items at that level (perhaps if they did some of our
>>requests would be looked at more kindly!).
>>
>>But on a higher level, do you really think that this kind of action
>>would happen? I cannot imagine the GNSO doing something of that
>>sort when you were Chair, nor in any time since. Nor do I think
>>that ANY of the groups that appoint Board members would.
>>
>>If a Board member selected by an AC or SO is really and
>>consistently acting in a way that the AC/SO does not appropriate,
>>they certainly would not have selected them if they could have
>>foreseen it, so why should they not be able to rectify the
>>situation. Some political jurisdiction allow that with their duly
>>elected appointees, so why not here.
>>
>>Although I see the attraction in having a formal set of standards
>>to identify the more egregious sins, I believe that in reality, in
>>the very few cases where either the Board itself or an AC/SO would
>>be likely to recall, the reasons may well be outside of that class of problem.
>>
>>Alan
>>
>>
>>
>>At 28/02/2015 08:01 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
>>>Hello Roelof,
>>>
>>>
>>> >> - Recall Board members if not acting in global public
>>> interest rather than if not acting in segmented interest of a
>>> community. Consider community capture (especially a segment of community).
>>>
>>>My comment on the call was about a concern that allowing segments
>>>of the community to recall "their" Board member may move away from
>>>the objective of ensuring that Board members primarily focus on
>>>the global public interest in their decision making.
>>>
>>>I noted that under law the directors of ICANN owe a fiduciary
>>>(<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary)
>>>duty to the organization, but I also noted that the organization
>>>was established to act in the global public interest. When new
>>>Board members join the Board we make clear that they have a
>>>fiduciary duty under law and must understand the organization's
>>>financials etc, but we also make clear that they need to act on
>>>behalf of the community as a whole, not just the part of the
>>>community that appointed the director/s.
>>>
>>>The Board currently does have the power to remove a director with
>>>a 3/4 majority vote. In practice the Board sets clear
>>>expectations for the conduct of directors through its code of
>>>conduct:
>>><https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/code-of-conduct-2012-05-15-en
>>>. Also Board members must annually certify that they have read
>>>this code, and acknowledge in writing that they understand
>>>it. The code notes that "Board Members should not be, or
>>>appear to be, subject to influences, interests or relationships
>>>that conflict with the interests of ICANN or ICANN's ability to
>>>operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole."
>>>
>>> Under the enforcement of the code of conduct - it notes that
>>> "Serious breaches of this Code may be cause for dismissal of the
>>> Board Member committing the infraction in accordance with ICANN's
>>> Bylaws and applicable law."
>>>
>>>
>>>I don't have a problem in principle with a segment of the ICANN
>>>community that appoints a director having the ability to recall
>>>that director, but would prefer that they use the same standard
>>>-ie the Board Directors' Code of Conduct. I also don't have
>>>a problem with the Board having the same restriction in the bylaws.
>>>
>>>I think we need to avoid situations where one part of the
>>>community withdraws a Board member because a Board decision was
>>>not particularly favourable to their part of the community - even
>>>though the decision is in the global public interest. e.g. If
>>>one group didn't get their budget request for travel approved, or
>>>one group didn't like an increase in registry or registrar fees in
>>>a particular year. This has the risk of making the board behave
>>>in a political manner rather than focussing on the global public
>>>interest. The Board meets with each stakeholder group at ICANN
>>>and that is the forum where each stakeholder group can put their
>>>case for a particular decision. Generally Board members
>>>appointed by a particular part of a community listen to all the
>>>parts of the community and make a decision in the interests of the
>>>community as a whole, and don't play an active role on the Board
>>>pushing the agenda of their part of the community. Board members
>>>from a particular par
>>> t of the community do however help explain to other Board
>>> members the nuances of the concerns from their part of the
>>> community where that is not clear.
>>>
>>>Regards,
>>>Bruce Tonkin
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
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>>
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