[CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Fwd: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator

Thu Nov 12 19:32:10 UTC 2015

Chris,

I'm not saying that the community *should* in my opinion have that power.
I'm saying that under the current formulation, the community *will* have
that power.  Seun says he believes there is a limitation that prevents this
from happening.  If someone could point to where that limitation is stated
in our proposal I would be most grateful.

Greg

On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 8:50 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:

> Thanks Greg.
>
> For clarity then, you are saying that where a policy has been created by
> the GNSO through its legitimate PDP and that policy requires a bylaw
> change, the community should be able to block that bylaw change. Does that
> not undermine the whole policy development process and substantially change
> the role of the SOs within the ICANN structure?
>
> Although I was not in the ccNSO room at the time of the discussion, I
> believe that this issue was a serious concern for the ccTLDs. Perhaps my
> ccTLD colleagues on the CCWG would care too confirm the position?
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> Chris
>
>
>
> On 13 Nov 2015, at 00:17 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> I think the corollary to Chris's questions is whether the ccNSO (in
> Chris's example) should be able to push through these changes despite
> opposition from the rest of the community.
>
> I would say that we have answered this question "no" and Chris's questions
> "yes."  These have been fairly obvious implications of our work for quite
> some time.
>
> On the other hand, if there is substantial opposition to this lack of
> autonomy (in favor of more power to the community as a whole), now that
> it's so explicitly stated, now's the time to say so!
>
> Greg
>
> On Thursday, November 12, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>
>> All,
>>
>> Jon’s point is, in effect, the same as has been raised in the ccNSO (by
>> me and a number of others).
>>
>> Using the ccNSO as an example there are 2 questions:
>>
>> 1. If the ccNSO goes through an internal or external review process and
>> ends up approving changes to its operations that involve a change to the
>> relevant bylaw then should that change be ‘blockable' without the ccNSO
>> supporting such a block?
>>
>> 2. If the ccNSO has run a PDP and makes recommendations to the Board
>> which are accepted and in the event that the recommendations require a
>> bylaw change then should such change be ‘blockable’ without the ccNSO
>> supporting such a block?
>>
>> This applies to each SO (and for question 1 the ACs) including,
>> importantly, the ASO which delivers global policy instructions on behalf on
>> the NRO.
>>
>> It is not an answer to these questions to say ‘it is highly unlikely that
>> bylaw changes would be required because of a PDP or SO/AC review’. Unlikely
>> scenario or not, these are fundamental questions that need to be answered.
>>
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>>
>> Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
>>
>> .au Domain Administration Ltd
>>
>> T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
>>
>> E: ceo at auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au
>>
>> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
>>
>>
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>> On 12 Nov 2015, at 20:46 , Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org>
>> wrote:
>>
>> "consent of the governed"?  I do not think it means what you think it
>> means.
>>
>> A government serves with the consent of those it governs, measured by
>> majority of all citizens.  A government that campaigned on raising taxes on
>> the rich could prevail in an election WITHOUT requiring that the impacted
>> rich give their support.
>>
>> Even if it meant what Jon intends, “consent of the governed” for a budget
>> veto would require consent of those who pay registration fees, not just the
>> contract parties.   That would mean ALAC support would be required, too.
>>
>>
>> From:  <wp1-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of Robin Gross <
>> robin at ipjustice.org>
>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 10:24 PM
>> To: Accountability Cross Community <
>> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>> Cc: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel at godaddy.com>, "wp1 at icann.org" <
>> wp1 at icann.org>, Jon Nevett <jon at donuts.email>
>> Subject: Re: [WP1] [CCWG-ACCT] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>
>> Also agree with Jon on this key point, which has been raised before, but
>> not dealt with due to more "pressing" issues.
>>
>> Robin
>>
>> On Nov 11, 2015, at 2:34 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
>>
>> Agree with Jon, “consent of the governed” is an necessary component of
>> community decision making.
>>
>> Thanks—
>>
>> J.
>>
>>
>> From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of
>> Jon Nevett <jon at donuts.email>
>> Date: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 at 20:51
>> To: Accountability Cross Community <
>> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>> Cc: "<wp1 at icann.org>" <wp1 at icann.org>
>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>
>> Folks:
>>
>> I'd like to propose an amendment to the Community Decision-making
>> Process.
>>
>> In the case where an issue being considered most directly relates to a
>> specific Supporting Organization, we should require support of that SO in
>> order to utilize a community action. For example, if the community is
>> considering blocking a change to a standard Bylaw -- Article IX of the
>> ICANN Bylaws (CCNSO) -- we should ensure that the CCNSO supports using a
>> community action in order to move forward.
>>
>> In the case of blocking ICANN's budget, which includes the specific
>> amount gTLD registration fees, the GNSO must support using that community
>> process.
>>
>> In the case of an ASO related IRP issue, the ASO must support before the
>> community makes a decision binding.
>>
>> We should require the specific SO at issue plus at least 50% of the other
>> SOs and ACs participating in the decision in order for the community
>> decision process is invoked.
>>
>> To do otherwise, we risk tyranny of the majority being used against the
>> group most impacted by a decision.
>>
>> Of course, in the case where there is no SO that is predominantly at
>> issue, we should go with a certain requirement of support that we already
>> have been discussing.
>>
>> We also would need to figure out how to handle a dispute of which SO is
>> predominant.  Regardless of how we handle that issue, we should ensure that
>> the SO most impacted by use of community powers are in support.
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>> Jon
>>
>>
>> On Nov 10, 2015, at 9:44 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>> No misunderstanding. I was replying to Seun who raised the case of some
>> AC/SOs choosing not to participate in a particular issue.
>>
>> Alan
>>
>> At 10/11/2015 07:29 AM, Schaefer, Brett wrote:
>>
>> Alan,
>>
>> I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. Iâ€™m not talking about a
>> participating SO or AC choosing to abstain or make no decision. That is
>> anticipated in the model. Abstention, as far as I understand it, is not
>> considered either opposition or support for the purposes of exercising the
>> community powers – in other words iit does not count for the thresholds
>> either in support or against.
>>
>> Iâ€™m talking about situations like SSAC, where a AC decides not to
>> participate at all. Most seem to believe that RSSAC will likewise decide
>> not to participate.
>>
>> But the assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC, and GAC will. This is
>> why everyone is assuming that we will have 5 participating entities in the
>> community mechanism.
>>
>> But if GAC or one of the others decides otherwise or simple cannot reach
>> consensus on participating for some length of time, we would only have 4 or
>> even fewer participating entities. In the first situation, using those four
>> community powers would require community unanimity. In the second, the
>> community would not be able to exercise those powers at all.
>>
>> That is why I suggested getting confirmation of intent to participate –
>> acknowledging that this would not be an endorsement of the CCWG proposal –
>> from the ACss and SOs so that we can accurately project for the model.
>>
>> I also think that we need to explore thresholds for various levels of
>> participation for that reason.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Brett
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>> Brett Schaefer
>> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National
>> Security and Foreign Policy
>> The Heritage Foundation
>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
>> Washington, DC 20002
>> 202-608-6097
>> heritage.org
>>
>> *From:* Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca]
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:51 AM
>> *To:* Seun Ojedeji; Schaefer, Brett
>> *Cc:* <wp1 at icann.org>; Accountability Cross Community
>> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole
>> Designator
>>
>> There is a huge difference between an AC/SO that has explicitly said it
>> will not participate at all and one that decides to not state a position on
>> exercising a power in a particular instance. The latter IS participating by
>> neither supporting nor opposing the action. Without sufficient ACTIVE
>> support, the action dies.
>>
>> In the extreme, option 2 will allow one AC/SO to exercise a power on its
>> own, since 1 is greater than 75% of 1.
>>
>> Alan
>> --
>> Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos.
>> On November 10, 2015 1:54:23 AM GMT-03:00, Seun Ojedeji <
>> seun.ojedeji at gmail.com > wrote:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> I think lowering the threshold may still bring us to a deadlock since we
>> are not always certain whether all will participate at any point in time.
>> Allowing splitting votes is out of discussion as we have agreed to go by
>> consensus.
>>
>> Option 2 IMO seem to be a good thing to explore further and in order to
>> ensure that is not abused, an overall minimum total number of participating
>> SO/AC should be set. So if that minimum is not achieved then there is no
>> need to check those in support or against. I think a minimum number of 4
>> may be in order.
>> That will ensure that percentage is not used on say 3 participating SO/AC
>> or less.
>>
>> Regards
>> Sent from my Asus Zenfone2
>> Kindly excuse brevity and typos.
>> On 9 Nov 2015 22:57, "Schaefer, Brett" < Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org>
>> wrote:
>> Jordan,
>>
>> If the model that we are discussing is unworkable under a fairly
>> realistic eventuality that seems to be a critical problem.
>>
>> In my opinion, it requires consideration of: (1) lowering the thresholds
>> to three if there are only four participating entities; (2) shifting
>> minimum thresholds from 4 entities in support to, instead, at least 75
>> percent of the participating entities in support; or (3) allowing the
>> splitting of votes to surmount existing thresholds.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Brett
>>
>> *From:* Jordan Carter [ mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz]
>> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:46 PM
>> *To:* Schaefer, Brett
>> *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1 at icann.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>
>> hi Brett,
>>
>> Such matrices of decision are not being drafted. If you are able to
>> attend the call in around ~15 hours, I think it would be useful to talk
>> this through. As I've said before, if we are down to four SO/ACs
>> participating, to my mind that's too small an orbit to use the current
>> model.
>>
>> Jordan
>>
>> On 10 November 2015 at 08:34, Schaefer, Brett <
>> Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org> wrote:
>> Jordan,
>>
>> I appreciate the explanation provided in the memo.
>>
>> However, I note that the decision matrix remains unchanged in that it
>> requires support from 4 SOs/ACs to exercise powers 1, 2, 5, and 7. The
>> operating assumption is that GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, and ALAC will participate. I
>> believe that they will, but it would be good to get confirmation even with
>> the knowledge that such a statement should not be considered an endorsement
>> of the CCWG proposal.
>>
>> Also, as we discussed in the previous CCWG WP1 call, there is a possible
>> complication if RSSAC, as expected, decides not to participate and GAC
>> either (1) decides not to participate, (2) decides not to participate
>> immediately, but announces its desire to be allowed participate at some
>> future date, or (3) cannot reach a consensus position.
>>
>> In that case, unanimous support by the 4 SOs/ACs assumed above to
>> participate would be required in order to exercise powers 1,2, 5, and 7. I
>> donâ€™t think that unanimous support was supposed to be required for
>> exercise of the community powers.
>>
>> Until we have confirmation of which SOs and ACs (other than SSAC which
>> has explicitly stated its intention not to participate) will be
>> participating in the mechanism, we need to plan out possible scenarios. For
>> this reason, I think we need to provide decision matrices based on varying
>> levels of participation.  Is this being drafted?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Brett
>>
>> *From:* wp1-bounces at icann.org [ mailto:wp1-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf
>> Of *Jordan Carter
>> *Sent:* Sunday, November 08, 2015 5:51 PM
>> *To:* Accountability Cross Community; wp1 at icann.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [WP1] Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>>
>> ... and in PDF
>> J
>>
>> On 9 November 2015 at 11:50, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz >
>> wrote:
>> Dear all - for your reading pleasure and for the lists record.
>>
>> Jordan
>>
>>
>> *Brett* *Schaefer*
>>
>> * Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security
>> and Foreign Policy*
>> The Heritage Foundation
>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
>> Washington, DC 20002
>> 202-608-6097
>> heritage.org
>>
>> *Brett* *Schaefer*
>>
>> * Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
>> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security
>> and Foreign Policy*
>> The Heritage Foundation
>> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
>> Washington, DC 20002
>> 202-608-6097
>> heritage.org
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: *Gregory, Holly* <holly.gregory at sidley.com >
>> Date: 7 November 2015 at 13:48
>> Subject: Updated Memo on Request on Sole Designator
>> Dear Co-Chairs, Jordan and Staff,
>>
>> Attached please find a substantially reorganized and revised memo on how
>> the Sole Designator would be made operational, to replace the memo that was
>> sent to you last week.  The changes are largely in the nature of
>> clarifications and we have addressed the point requested below as well.  We
>> request that this memo be posted to replace the prior memo.
>>
>> Please let us know if you have any questions.
>>
>> Kind regards,
>> Holly and Rosemary
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Jordan Carter
>>
>> Chief Executive
>>
>> *InternetNZ *
>> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
>> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>> Skype: jordancarter
>> Web: www.internetnz.nz
>>
>>
>> *A better world through a better Internet *
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Jordan Carter
>>
>> Chief Executive
>>
>> *InternetNZ *
>> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
>> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>> Skype: jordancarter
>> Web: www.internetnz.nz
>>
>>
>> *A better world through a better Internet *
>>
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