[CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion

[Paul Rosenzweig]

I should also add that much as I agree with the amendments that Mark and
Finn have proposed which =might= be useful, the GAC has not accepted them.
So a final question for Pedro and Olga rather than Roelof – do you accept
the amendmendatory suggestions made by Mark C and Finn?

 

Paul

 

Paul Rosenzweig

 <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq at redbranchconsulting.com>
paul.rosenzweig at redbranchconsulting.com 

O: +1 (202) 547-0660

M: +1 (202) 329-9650

VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739

Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066

 
<http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=19&Itemid=9> Link to my PGP Key

 

 

From: Roelof Meijer [mailto:Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl] 
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 2:42 PM
To: accountability-cross-community at icann.org
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion

 

Dear all,

 

After improving the proposal with the remarks made by some GAC members
(especially Mark and Finn), I fail to understand why most commenters on this
proposal, instead of starting from what they do like and what the CCWG could
work with, start with what they do not like and cannot live with. I do know
that it is a very effective way not to converge and not make any progress.
Which seems to be exactly what is happening.

 

On a much higher level, I find it almost unbelievable that some think that,
in an global environment where our economies and societies become rapidly
very dependent on the internet (and with that, on the DNS), we can prevent
governments from getting the fair share of influence that has to come with
the tasks societies give them. Yes, some governments want more and one has
to be alert, but that is also true for the private sector.

 

I think Pedro’s proposal, with the amendments suggested, in the basis is a
way out of the mess that stress test 18 has become, that will actually work.

 

Quite a few argue that "This would be a significant expansion of the current
role and influence of the GAC”. That  might be the case, but, with the
powers we foresee, the influence of ALL stakeholders would significantly
expand. That’s the whole idea behind enhancing ICANN’s accountability (to
the community). 

 

Moreover, as Avri remarked earlier, "what is most important is that the
board can reject GAC/AC's advice  and that it learns how to do so when that
is appropriate". Through the new powers, the (rest of the) community can
make sure it can and does so when appropriate.

So, I have no serious problem with aligning the threshold for rejection of
consensus GAC advice with the SO’s and set it at 2/3rds.

And as we know, it is not something new either; as the ATRT’s recognized
this (and did so with the present accountability structure and without
narrowing it’s applicability down to consensus advice, as far as I know).

 

In line with how this is for the other constituencies, I find it no more
than logic that the GAC determines what consensus GAC advice is and how it
arrives at it.  The phrase "the advice provided is clear and reflects the
consensus view of the committee” in the proposal helps there: there’s
objectively not a lot of maneuvering space before an advice will evidently
NOT be consensus advice and can be rejected on that ground. I would agree
that a single objection in a large group (as e.g. the GAC), falls within
that maneuvering space, if the relevant SO or AC would so decide.

 

Concluding: with the incorporation of the remarks mentioned, and in the
absence of public statements of disagreement from GAC members, I urge us to
put the proposed bylaw texts in our proposal and conclude the work on Stress
Test 18.

 

Best,

 

Roelof Meijer

 

From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> > on behalf of
Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo at itamaraty.gov.br
<mailto:pedro.ivo at itamaraty.gov.br> >
Date: maandag 9 november 2015 11:28
To: "accountability-cross-community at icann.org
<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org> "
<accountability-cross-community at icann.org
<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org> >
Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion

 

Dear CCWG colleagues, 

 

As you are aware, in Dublin the GAC has provided a consensus input with
regards to the bylaw amendments derived from ST18. The GAC input was the
following:

 

"The discussions on Stress Test 18 have helped the GAC to have a better
understanding of the different views on the issue. In assessing the
different rationales presented so far related to Stress Test 18, the GAC
considered: 

*        The need that each and every Advisory Committee ensures that the
advice provided is clear and reflects the consensus view of the Committee; 

*        The need that each and every Advisory Committee should preserve its
own autonomy in its definition of consensus; 

*        The value the Board attributes to receiving consensus advice; 

*        The recommendation of the BGRI WG, as reiterated by the ATRT2, to
set the threshold 

for the ICANN Board to reject GAC advice to a 2/3 majority voting,
consistent with the threshold established for rejection of ccNSO and GNSO
PDP recommendations.

In view of the above, having considered concerns expressed by various
parties, the GAC agreed to further work on the issue of Stress Test 18, and
to submit any further input to the CCWG taking into account the timelines of
the CCWG. GAC Members will continue to work within the CCWG to finalise the
proposal for enhancing ICANN accountability." 

 

With the aim of addressing the input given by the GAC in its ICANN 54
communiqué and the original concerns expressed by the ST18 proponents, I
present for your consideration the following alternative amendments
(underlined) in ICANN bylaws. 

  

ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Section 1. GENERAL

“The Board may create one or more Advisory Committees in addition to those
set forth in this Article. Advisory Committee membership may consist of
Directors only, Directors and non-directors, or non-directors only, and may
also include non-voting or alternate members. Advisory Committees shall have
no legal authority to act for ICANN, but shall report their findings and
recommendations to the Board.

Where the ICANN Board is obliged to pay due deference to advice from
Advisory Committees and where that advice, if not followed, requires finding
mutually agreed solutions for implementation of that advice, the Advisory
Committee will make every effort to ensure that the advice provided is clear
and reflects the consensus view of the committee. In this context, each
Advisory Committee has the right to determine its particular definition of
consensus.” 

 

ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Section 2. SPECIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Item 1.j

“The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters
shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and adoption of
policies. In the event that the ICANN Board determines to take an action
that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it
shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons why it decided not to
follow that advice. Any GAC Advice approved by a GAC consensus may only be
rejected by a vote of more than two-thirds (2/3) of the Board. The
Governmental Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will then try, in good
faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable
solution.”

 

Kind regards,

 

Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Divisão da Sociedade da Informação

Ministério das Relações Exteriores

T: +55 61 2030-6609

 

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