[CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion

Schaefer, Brett Brett.Schaefer at heritage.org
Thu Nov 12 23:09:44 UTC 2015


Would be useful to see the suggested changes laid out again, we've had a hundred emails in the past two days.


________________________________
Brett Schaefer
Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
202-608-6097
heritage.org<http://heritage.org/>

__________

On Nov 12, 2015, at 6:00 PM, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig at redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweig at redbranchconsulting.com>> wrote:

I should also add that much as I agree with the amendments that Mark and Finn have proposed which =might= be useful, the GAC has not accepted them.  So a final question for Pedro and Olga rather than Roelof – do you accept the amendmendatory suggestions made by Mark C and Finn?

Paul

Paul Rosenzweig
paul.rosenzweig at redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq at redbranchconsulting.com>
O: +1 (202) 547-0660
M: +1 (202) 329-9650
VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739
Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066
Link to my PGP Key<http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19&Itemid=9>


From: Roelof Meijer [mailto:Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl]
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 2:42 PM
To: accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion

Dear all,

After improving the proposal with the remarks made by some GAC members (especially Mark and Finn), I fail to understand why most commenters on this proposal, instead of starting from what they do like and what the CCWG could work with, start with what they do not like and cannot live with. I do know that it is a very effective way not to converge and not make any progress. Which seems to be exactly what is happening.

On a much higher level, I find it almost unbelievable that some think that, in an global environment where our economies and societies become rapidly very dependent on the internet (and with that, on the DNS), we can prevent governments from getting the fair share of influence that has to come with the tasks societies give them. Yes, some governments want more and one has to be alert, but that is also true for the private sector.

I think Pedro’s proposal, with the amendments suggested, in the basis is a way out of the mess that stress test 18 has become, that will actually work.

Quite a few argue that "This would be a significant expansion of the current role and influence of the GAC”. That  might be the case, but, with the powers we foresee, the influence of ALL stakeholders would significantly expand. That’s the whole idea behind enhancing ICANN’s accountability (to the community).

Moreover, as Avri remarked earlier, "what is most important is that the board can reject GAC/AC's advice  and that it learns how to do so when that is appropriate". Through the new powers, the (rest of the) community can make sure it can and does so when appropriate.
So, I have no serious problem with aligning the threshold for rejection of consensus GAC advice with the SO’s and set it at 2/3rds.
And as we know, it is not something new either; as the ATRT’s recognized this (and did so with the present accountability structure and without narrowing it’s applicability down to consensus advice, as far as I know).

In line with how this is for the other constituencies, I find it no more than logic that the GAC determines what consensus GAC advice is and how it arrives at it.  The phrase "the advice provided is clear and reflects the consensus view of the committee” in the proposal helps there: there’s objectively not a lot of maneuvering space before an advice will evidently NOT be consensus advice and can be rejected on that ground. I would agree that a single objection in a large group (as e.g. the GAC), falls within that maneuvering space, if the relevant SO or AC would so decide.

Concluding: with the incorporation of the remarks mentioned, and in the absence of public statements of disagreement from GAC members, I urge us to put the proposed bylaw texts in our proposal and conclude the work on Stress Test 18.

Best,

Roelof Meijer

From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org>> on behalf of Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo at itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo at itamaraty.gov.br>>
Date: maandag 9 november 2015 11:28
To: "accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>
Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Stress Test 18: bylaw amendment suggestion

Dear CCWG colleagues,

As you are aware, in Dublin the GAC has provided a consensus input with regards to the bylaw amendments derived from ST18. The GAC input was the following:


"The discussions on Stress Test 18 have helped the GAC to have a better understanding of the different views on the issue. In assessing the different rationales presented so far related to Stress Test 18, the GAC considered:

·        The need that each and every Advisory Committee ensures that the advice provided is clear and reflects the consensus view of the Committee;

·        The need that each and every Advisory Committee should preserve its own autonomy in its definition of consensus;

·        The value the Board attributes to receiving consensus advice;

·        The recommendation of the BGRI WG, as reiterated by the ATRT2, to set the threshold

for the ICANN Board to reject GAC advice to a 2/3 majority voting, consistent with the threshold established for rejection of ccNSO and GNSO PDP recommendations.

In view of the above, having considered concerns expressed by various parties, the GAC agreed to further work on the issue of Stress Test 18, and to submit any further input to the CCWG taking into account the timelines of the CCWG. GAC Members will continue to work within the CCWG to finalise the proposal for enhancing ICANN accountability."

With the aim of addressing the input given by the GAC in its ICANN 54 communiqué and the original concerns expressed by the ST18 proponents, I present for your consideration the following alternative amendments (underlined) in ICANN bylaws.

ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES
Section 1. GENERAL
“The Board may create one or more Advisory Committees in addition to those set forth in this Article. Advisory Committee membership may consist of Directors only, Directors and non-directors, or non-directors only, and may also include non-voting or alternate members. Advisory Committees shall have no legal authority to act for ICANN, but shall report their findings and recommendations to the Board.
Where the ICANN Board is obliged to pay due deference to advice from Advisory Committees and where that advice, if not followed, requires finding mutually agreed solutions for implementation of that advice, the Advisory Committee will make every effort to ensure that the advice provided is clear and reflects the consensus view of the committee. In this context, each Advisory Committee has the right to determine its particular definition of consensus.”

ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEES
Section 2. SPECIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES
Item 1.j
“The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and adoption of policies. In the event that the ICANN Board determines to take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons why it decided not to follow that advice. Any GAC Advice approved by a GAC consensus may only be rejected by a vote of more than two-thirds (2/3) of the Board. The Governmental Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.”

Kind regards,

Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva
Divisão da Sociedade da Informação
Ministério das Relações Exteriores
T: +55 61 2030-6609

_______________________________________________
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community


More information about the Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list