[CCWG-ACCT] A path to Dublin and beyond
Kavouss Arasteh
kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com
Mon Oct 5 07:28:06 UTC 2015
Dear All,
The ocomotive is taking its path to the right direction.
For me Certainly the transparency and disclosure of information is very
important
Once again let us further develop the consensus which is being emerged but
reconsider voting in replacing it by consensus as currently practices in
some SOs and ACs, and retain the advice of ACs instead of voting and
removal of the Individual Director by the entire community and then
include in the BYLAWS clearly the need to considere restructuring the
current ICANN restructuring in WS2.
Cheers
Kavouss
2015-10-05 6:39 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz>:
> Hi Avri, all
>
> I agree this is a significant limiting constraint on our choices. To me it
> remains to be seen what our lawyers think and what the ccwg thinks and if
> it's ok with those two checks, then what the cwg things as well.
>
> To my mind it is at least a plausible option, given where we are, but
> there are hurdles to get over....
>
> Cheers
> Jordan
>
>
> On Monday, 5 October 2015, Avri Doria <avri at acm.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> While people are deciding the SD model sufficient to meet our
>> requirements, I question whether the inability of that model with regard
>> to direct shared decisions on implementation of a separation process is
>> not a serious enough flaw to make the model unacceptable. In the CM
>> model, the community shares the power to decide on approval of a
>> separation recommendation, in the SD model, the community needs to rely
>> on indirect methods like Board approval, appeals, court proceedings and
>> replacing the Board.
>>
>> avri
>>
>>
>> On 04-Oct-15 18:21, Jonathan Zuck wrote:
>> > Great note Jordan and expansion of the Zuck proposal Steve. ;)
>> > Seriously though, we need to get people past being concerned about
>> > future reforms, be they structural or not. We don't need to represent
>> > Sole Designator as less than effective, merely sufficient to empower
>> > the community to make further reform in a dynamic and geographically
>> > expanding environment. That has always been our objective for WS1,
>> > pre-transition.
>> > Jonathan
>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> > From: Jordan Carter <mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz>
>> > Sent: 10/4/2015 6:02 PM
>> > Cc: Accountability Cross Community
>> > <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A path to Dublin and beyond
>> >
>> > Thanks Steve, this is quite a good prospectus and is similar to where
>> > my own thinking has been going.
>> >
>> > I have one concern and a suggestion to mitigate it.
>> >
>> > If I was a decision-maker on this proposal - either the ICANN Board,
>> > NTIA or indeed the Congress itself, or even an ICANN SO or AC - I
>> > would be very uncomfortable at anything which suggested "we will
>> > reevaluate the model after the transition, because we aren't sure this
>> > is a durable accountability settlement".
>> >
>> > The signal of uncertainty and of future work that this sends is
>> > problematic.
>> >
>> > If membership is the straw that breaks the camel's back, my preference
>> > would instead be the bones of a settlement like this:
>> >
>> > - the community powers are put into the bylaws (Steve's list below
>> > 1-5) - and for me, I am happy with modifying the Budget powers in a
>> > range of ways to be agreed to further reduce the already minimal
>> > disruption the CCWG's approach would create (the Board's proposal is
>> > helpful in doing this).
>> > - the IRP approach largely as the CCWG has set out (Steve's list below
>> 6)
>> > - a Designator foundation that renders the board removal powers
>> > completely enforceable
>> > - probably the Sole Designator model, operating by SO/AC consensus for
>> > NomCom director removal and the rest of the powers, and appointing SOs
>> > and ACs for their appointed Directors
>> >
>> >
>> > Taking this approach mitigates the "future governance change" concern
>> > which I think is a real one, and ensures that a key instrument of
>> > redress is enforceable.
>> >
>> > It is clearly not as powerful a set of tools as the membership model,
>> > which on an objective basis remains my preference.
>> >
>> > That said: I take the concerns about "changing the engine in flight"
>> > seriously. I think that the comments about the scale of the change
>> > created by membership are wrong and misleading, but some of the
>> > participants in this process hold them sincerely and seem unlikely to
>> > accept analysis that contradicts their entrenched views.
>> >
>> > So in terms of our *requirements*, which are meant to be guiding our
>> > work, I personally am prepared to step back to indirect enforceability
>> > of some of the powers by means of membership, back to designator. The
>> > additional enforceability of membership on the budget power, if it is
>> > going to prevent consensus, should not be something to die in a ditch
>> > over.
>> >
>> > We can get almost all the way there. CMSM and MEM would both be
>> > redundant and off the table. Multistakeholder consensus building at
>> > work....?
>> >
>> > A last thought: I have never placed much importance on the "other
>> > statutory powers" a membership would allow. I know others have.
>> > Certainly on transparency and disclosure, it's clear to me just by
>> > watching and participating in our CCWG process that there are hidden
>> > depths that need badly to be exposed to sunlight - and that's a piece
>> > of work that needs to be pushed along promptly next year. I know
>> > others have a different view though, eloquently expressed by Ed among
>> > others. So this needs more discussion.
>> >
>> >
>> > I don't present my thinking above as a definitive compromise, but I
>> > hope that it helps to demonstrate that like others, I have been
>> > listening to discussion, and recognise a need for me and all of us to
>> > get out of the competitive "my way or the highway" tone that has
>> > emerged in the past few weeks.
>> >
>> > So long as others show the same willingness to move, we should be able
>> > to get into a more collaborative work method, which is what the
>> > community deserves from all of us.
>> >
>> >
>> > all best,
>> > Jordan
>> >
>> > On 4 October 2015 at 09:33, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org
>> > <mailto:sdelbianco at netchoice.org>> wrote:
>> >
>> > Here are my own thoughts on a path to Dublin and beyond.
>> >
>> > I was thinking about Jonathan Zuck’s suggestion (link
>> > <
>> http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/005764.html
>> >)
>> > that a change to Membership model could be done in Work Stream 2 —
>> > if we create lasting leverage for community to enact a change
>> > despite board resistance.
>> >
>> > Then I read Bruce Tonkin's recent post (link
>> > <
>> http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-October/006098.html
>> >)
>> > describing why our present AC/SO participation falls short of
>> > representing the global M-S community, and suggesting this is why
>> > the board might not approve a move to Membership at this time.
>> >
>> > Their posts, along with responses on list, suggest a way we can
>> > deliver by Dublin on enforceable accountability enhancements,
>> > thereby giving us powers to impose reforms to the AC/SO model
>> > after the IANA transition.
>> >
>> > Consider this:
>> >
>> > Let’s use the leverage of the IANA transition to get bylaws
>> > changes give the current AC/SO community the powers we require,
>> > with adequate enforceability. Plus, we ensure those powers are
>> > enough to force a future change to ICANN governance structure
>> > and/or Membership, if the community comes to consensus around what
>> > that new ICANN governance structure look like.
>> >
>> > That would mean we focus CCWG on finishing details and bylaws
>> > language for these enforceable powers exercised by supermajority
>> > of ACs and SOs:
>> >
>> > 1. Power to block a proposed Operating Plan/Strat Plan/Budget
>> > 2. Power to approve changes to Fundamental Bylaws and Articles of
>> > Incorporation
>> > 3. Power to block changes to regular bylaws.
>> > 4. Power to appoint and remove individual board directors
>> > 5. Power to recall the entire board of directors
>> > 6. Mechanism for binding IRP where a panel decision is enforceable
>> > in any court recognizing international arbitration results — even
>> > if ICANN’s board refused to participate in the binding
>> > arbitration. (assuming CCWG lawyers verify this works without
>> > activating a Membership model)
>> >
>> > I think we are close enough to get consensus around the above
>> > powers before we leave Dublin. And based on what we’ve heard
>> > recently, the board will support the powers described above.
>> >
>> > But there’s one more we have to add before losing the leverage of
>> > this IANA transition:
>> >
>> > Let’s put into ICANN bylaws a method where the community can show
>> > consensus to undertake a review of ICANN's governance structure,
>> > either because the powers above aren’t working, or just because
>> > the community overwhelmingly wants to review governance. The
>> > goal of the Governance Review is to recommend a new governance
>> > model that might even include moving to Membership. To Bruce’s
>> > point, any proposal emerging from this Governance Review would
>> > include assurances that ACs and SOs are representative of global
>> > internet users and protected from capture.
>> >
>> > This same bylaw could describe a process for board acceptance of a
>> > consensus proposal emerging from the Governance Review: it would
>> > take 2/3 board majority to object to the proposal on the grounds
>> > that it is not in the global public interest, triggering a
>> > board-community consultation. After consultation, a new community
>> > proposal would take 3/4 board majority to object. If the board
>> > objected a second time, we would have the power to recall that
>> > entire board, or to pursue binding arbitration.
>> >
>> > Again, these are my personal thoughts about a way forward that is
>> > based on what others have said recently.
>> >
>> > —Steve DelBianco
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>> > Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>> > <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
>> >
>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > --
>> > Jordan Carter
>> >
>> > Chief Executive
>> > *InternetNZ*
>> >
>> > +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
>> > Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz>
>> > Skype: jordancarter
>> > Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz>
>> >
>> > /A better world through a better Internet /
>> >
>> >
>> >
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>>
>>
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>
>
> --
> Jordan Carter
> Chief Executive, InternetNZ
>
> +64-21-442-649 | jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>
> Sent on the run, apologies for brevity
>
>
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