[CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model

Tue Oct 6 23:49:37 UTC 2015

Add to that it is not a nominating committe because no one gets to approve the choices. It is a selection committee. It is a completely unaccountable selection committee where only the legal staff reviews the choices.

avri

Sent from a T-Mobile 4G LTE Device

<div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: Kieren McCarthy <kieren at kierenmccarthy.com> </div><div>Date:10/06/2015  7:29 PM  (GMT-05:00) </div><div>To: Phil Corwin <psc at vlaw-dc.com> </div><div>Cc: CCWG Accountability <accountability-cross-community at icann.org> </div><div>Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model </div><div>
</div>Before everyone starts persuading themselves that the NomCom isn't all that
bad, please consider:

* The criteria for selection are secret

* The meetings are secret

* The NomCom views public disclosure of any candidates names, even by the
candidates themselves, as a bad thing

* A former chair-elect resigned because he was "sickened" by how it worked
(lobbying, abuse of travel support, insider culture, refusal to listen to
formal advice)

* It was set up to replace direct elections and is an active impediment to
discussions about how real elections might actually work

* It has been repeatedly criticized for poor working methods and failure to
communicate with candidates

* It is entirely self-contained. NomCom members often fail to turn up to
meetings but it is not reported back; NomCom members are not required to
explain their decisions.

* It gets the same number of people applying each year - 80-90 - and each
year says that is a great number with no explanation or analysis

* It measures its own success. And agrees each year that it has done a
terrific job

The fact that the NomCom exists at all is a sign that ICANN has not matured
to the point where it can do what thousands of other organizations achieve
every year: open elections with selections made by the whole community
rather than a secretive subset of community members who lobby extremely
hard to be selected.

Kieren

On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 3:18 PM, Phil Corwin <psc at vlaw-dc.com> wrote:

> Hello George.
>
> I have no quarrel with the fine and dedicated work of the NomCom.
>
> I do have a quarrel with the notion that the Board is significantly more
> representative and protective of the global Internet community and its
> interests than the members of the ICANN community, who contribute tens of
> millions of dollars' worth of unpaid labor on behalf of ICANN and its
> objectives each and every year.
>
> Best regards, Philip
>
> Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
> Virtualaw LLC
> 1155 F Street, NW
> Suite 1050
> Washington, DC 20004
> 202-559-8597/Direct
> 202-559-8750/Fax
> 202-255-6172/cell
>
> Twitter: @VlawDC
>
> "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: George Sadowsky [mailto:george.sadowsky at gmail.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 5:10 PM
> To: Kleinwachter Wolfgang
> Cc: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya; CCWG Accountability
> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
>
> Hi, Phil,
>
> I want to align myself 100% with Wolfgang's comments below.  I chaired the
> NomCom for three successive years, in 2005-2007, and my experience agrees
> with Wolfgang's completely.
>
> I cannot duplicate Wolfgang's extensive discussion of how it works and why
> it works, but I don't have to.  He has already made the case, and
> eloquently.
>
> Regards,
>
> George
>
>
> > On Oct 6, 2015, at 3:14 PM, Kleinwächter, Wolfgang <
> wolfgang.kleinwaechter at medienkomm.uni-halle.de> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> >
> > thanks for your understanding. Unfortunately we have been pulled into a
> "we vs. they" constellation which is grotesk.
> >
> > I served five years in the NomCom, one year as its chair. We had endless
> discussion how to send the best people for ICANN and the broader ICANN and
> Internet community to the Board. The people who made it to the board are -
> in my understanding - the best people you can get in a given year. They are
> not hand picked by an outside power which wants to manipulate the
> community. The NomCom itself is populated by representatives from the
> community. All SOs, ACs and the constituencies are represented with voting
> members in the NomCom. I trusted the community that they did send the right
> people to the NomCom. In my reports to the ICANN Public Forum - when I
> chaired the NomCom - I always presented the NomCom as the most democratic
> element in the whole ICANN ecosystem. The community itself selects its
> representatives (and should have also the right to spill them if they do
> not meet the expected standards, here I agree with the proposed
> enhancements). No CEO, no ICANN chair, no ICANN Board member can tell the
> NomCom whom to select. The same is true for the seven directors
> selected/elected by the SOs and ALAC. Do you know how many interviews and
> discussions take place before the 15 ALAC members vote in favor of one
> director which goes to the Board? Did you see the debate on the GNSO Seat?
> >
> > This are very democratic bottom up transparent, diversified and open
> processes. If you compare this with the population of other for profit or
> non-for profit boards in the world, this is unique. Do you know how FIFA
> selects its Executive Committee? Do you know how to become a member of the
> IOC ExCom? Do you know how Green Peace selects its Board? There are endless
> back-door meetings (in closeed circles) which produce bodies which are
> indeed - sometimes - not accountable to the broader public and it is
> difficult to remove them.
> >
> > The procedure how to get a seat in the ICANN Board is - as said above -
> one of the most impressive achievements we have in the ICANN family. And we
> should be proud to have such good mechanisms. Additionally the principle of
> rotation is an extra block against misuse and capture of the board
> function. The term is just three years for a director. If he did not
> deliver what was expected, the ACs, SOs and the NomCom has no duty to
> re-elect/select the candidate. The maximum is three terms (nine years). It
> was two terms (six years). The extension was made to have a right mix
> between continuation and presence of history knowledge and innovative
> newcomers. There is also the democratic element of geographical diversity.
> BTW, this is one point I miss in the CCWG discussion. How seriously CCWG
> members take arguments from participants from Africa, Latin America and
> Asia?
> >
> > I bring this facts not to undermine the proposed community power of
> spilling of the board. I was always behind this extra power for the
> community to enhance the inner democratic processes. In my eyes there is no
> need to create a new burocracy to achieve this aim. It can be done on the
> basis of the tested and workable model. Under the circumstances of the
> discussion we have today I have my doubt whether we can introduce the same
> high standard for representatives in a new legal entity in the short time
> we have (Sole Membership Model). We were fighting over many years to errect
> barriers aganist caputre in the board. And I am not ready to open now a
> backdoor for capture in a new entity which has not yet clear rules of
> procedure how voting and other important elements (including
> accountability) can be introduced in a way which does not undermine the
> functioning, stability, security and prosperity of ICANN. I am in favor of
> power sharing. But I am against power shifting.
> >
> > As you know I am leaving the board and I will repeat my arguments after
> Dublin as a member of the commmunity. I hope that we have more or less
> finished the discussion at the end of the Dublin Meeting. But there will be
> a lot of things that we have to do beyond Dublin.
> >
> > Wolfgang
> >
> >
> >
> > I agree this is slippery and dangerous territory, Wolfgang. And I have
> made clear that I do not agree with that POV.
> >
> >
> >
> > However, in its October 1st High Level Response to CCWG Counsel's 29
> > September 2015 Slides, Jones Day states: " proponents of the CCWG's
> > Proposal minimize or ignore the fact that the shift to the SMM would
> > place a significant amount of power in the hands of individuals and
> > stakeholders that hold no fiduciary obligations to ICANN or the global
> > stakeholder community. These individuals and stakeholders are free to
> > act in their personal interest and are not required to make decisions
> > based on what is best for ICANN, the ICANN community, and the global
> > public interest".  (Emphasis added)
> >
> >
> >
> > While the Board may credibly state that it has a fiduciary duty to ICANN
> and makes decisions beside upon what is best for ICANN (and I am not in any
> way implying that the CCWG and ICANN community make decisions based on
> anything but what they believe is best for ICANN and its community), it
> cannot claim to make decisions based on what is best for the ICANN
> community (since its first duty is to the Corporation, and it is quite
> evident from the current accountability discussion that its views are at
> significant variance from those of the community members comprising the
> CCWG) and it has no greater claim to representing the global public
> interest than the community from which it is drawn.
> >
> >
> >
> > Given that it is ICANN's outside Counsel that has raised this charge,
> which has since been echoed in Board member communications, perhaps your
> caution to "be careful" should be directed elsewhere.
> >
> >
> >
> > Finally, on the matter of the "global public interest", points #2 & 3 of
> the CCWG Charter states:
> >
> > 2.            If the Board believes it is not in the global public
> interest to implement a recommendation from the Cross Community Working
> Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governance (CCWG
> Recommendation), it must initiate a dialogue with the CCWG. A determination
> that it is not in the global public interest to implement a CCWG
> Recommendation requires a 2/3 majority of the Board.
> >
> > 3.            The Board must provide detailed rationale to accompany the
> initiation of dialogue. The Board shall agree with the CCWG the method
> (e.g., by teleconference, email or otherwise) by which the dialogue will
> occur. The discussions shall be held in good faith and in a timely and
> efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
> >
> >
> >
> > I have previously inquired on this list whether the Board's concerns
> regarding the Sole member or Designator models amounted to a formal belief
> that they threatened the global public interest, and I do not recall any
> statement that they did - much less a formal invoking of the dialogue
> process provide for in the Charter.
> >
> >
> >
> > If the Board believes that either or both of those models does so it
> would seem appropriate to provide the required detailed rationale and start
> the dialogue. If it does not, then it seems quite inappropriate and
> non-constructive for ICANN Counsel to raise a purported threat to the
> global public interest in their memoranda.
> >
> >
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Philip
> >
> >
> >
> > Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
> >
> > Virtualaw LLC
> >
> > 1155 F Street, NW
> >
> > Suite 1050
> >
> > Washington, DC 20004
> >
> > 202-559-8597/Direct
> >
> > 202-559-8750/Fax
> >
> > 202-255-6172/cell
> >
> >
> >
> > Twitter: @VlawDC
> >
> >
> >
> > "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang"
> > [mailto:wolfgang.kleinwaechter at medienkomm.uni-halle.de]
> > Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 1:25 PM
> > To: Phil Corwin; Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya
> > Cc: CCWG Accountability
> > Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
> >
> >
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> >
> >
> >
> > this is slippery territory. If you read Parminders comment that it is
> only the UN which is the legitimized representative of the global Internet
> community (via the elected governments of the UN member states). As said in
> previous comments: There are unintended side-effects of our discussion both
> for the microcosm of ICANN as well as for the macrocosm of the broader
> Internet world. Be careful!
> >
> >
> >
> > Wolfgang
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> >
> > Von:
> > accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org<mailto:accountability
> > -cross-community-bounces at icann.org> im Auftrag von Phil Corwin
> >
> > Gesendet: Di 06.10.2015 19:15
> >
> > An: Paul Rosenzweig; Guru Acharya
> >
> > Cc: CCWG Accountability
> >
> > Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
> >
> > I personally do not buy the argument that the ICANN community is
> insufficiently reflective of the global Internet Community, given the very
> low barriers to participation as well as the increasing levels of
> attendance at ICANN meetings and participation in ICANN activities, with
> greater numbers from the developing world as it comes online.
> >
> >
> >
> > However, if the community is not reflective of global Internet diversity
> then wouldn't the Board members who are drawn from it be equally
> non-representative? The logical outcome of this criticism is that the Board
> is equally disqualified from being the steward.
> >
> >
> >
> > Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
> >
> > Virtualaw LLC
> >
> > 1155 F Street, NW
> >
> > Suite 1050
> >
> > Washington, DC 20004
> >
> > 202-559-8597/Direct
> >
> > 202-559-8750/Fax
> >
> > 202-255-6172/cell
> >
> >
> >
> > Twitter: @VlawDC
> >
> >
> >
> > "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
> >
> >
> >
> > From:
> > accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org<mailto:accountability
> > -cross-community-bounces at icann.org>
> > [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of
> > Paul Rosenzweig
> >
> > Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 12:47 PM
> >
> > To: Guru Acharya
> >
> > Cc: CCWG Accountability
> >
> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Exactly.  The Board is demonstrably speaking with situational
> particularity..  Perhaps it is time we think about selecting different
> Board members in the next round of elections....
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > Sent from myMail app for Android
> >
> > Tuesday, 06 October 2015, 00:40AM -04:00 from Guru Acharya
> <gurcharya at gmail..com<mailto:gurcharya at gmail.com<mailto:
> gurcharya at gmail.com%3cmailto:gurcharya at gmail.com>>>:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > I strongly agree with Jordan.
> >
> >
> >
> > I personally find that attitude of the board to be very 'convenient'.
> >
> >
> >
> > According to them, ICANN is multistakeholder enough to become the
> steward of IANA, but the community is not multistakeholder enough to become
> a member of ICANN. Effectively, we are making ICANN the corporation the
> steward of IANA and not ICANN the community.
> >
> >
> >
> > I also find it an extremely convenient argument that 'while entering
> uncharted territories to make ICANN the steward is very safe; at the same
> entering uncharted territories to make ICANN a membership organisation is
> untested and very very unsafe'.
> >
> >
> >
> > In the CWG (Stewardship), the board consistently argued that
> >
> > 1) the CCWG will solve all accountability issues and therefore ICANN
> should be made the steward.
> >
> > 2) the ICANN structures are truly multistakeholder and therefore ICANN
> > should be made the steward
> >
> > 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN the steward is
> > very very safe
> >
> > 4) the NTIA may not accept the Contract Co model
> >
> >
> >
> > In complete contrast, in the CCWG (Accountability), the board is
> > arguing that
> >
> > 1) the CCWG should postpone major accountability measures to after the
> > transition
> >
> > 2) the ICANN structures are currently not multistakeholder enough to
> > become the members of ICANN
> >
> > 3) entering unchartered territories by making ICANN a membership
> organisation is very very unsafe.
> >
> > 4) the NTIA may not accept the membership model
> >
> >
> >
> > I do not find the promises for future change to be trustworthy. I am
> strongly against pushing something so important and basic to WS2.
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman at lrrlaw.com
> <//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman at lrrlaw.com<mailto:
> AAikman at lrrlaw.com%3c//
> e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman at lrrlaw.com>>> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > @ Jordan - well stated.   Postponing truly effective accountability
> measures developed using the Multistakeholder process  in favor of  "a
> review of structure" as suggested strikes me as another recipe for a
> years-long process the elements of which would take months to agree on in
> and of themselves - very ineffective.
> >
> >
> >
> > Anne
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > [https://af.mail.my.com/cgi-bin/readmsg?id=14441065090000080418;0;0;1&
> > mode=attachment&bs=16497&bl=3767&ct=image%2fgif&cn=image001.gif&cte=ba
> > se64]
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > AAikman at lrrlaw.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aAAikman at lrrl
> > aw.com<mailto:AAikman at lrrlaw.com%3c//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailt
> > o%3aAAikman at lrrlaw.com>> |
> > www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/<http://www.LRRLaw.com%3chttp:/ww
> > w.lrrlaw.com/>>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > From:
> > accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org<//e-aj.my.com/compose
> > /?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces at icann.o
> > rg<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org%3c//e-aj.my
> > .com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbou
> > nces at icann..org>>
> > [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org<//e-aj.my.com
> > /compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces
> > @icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org%3c
> > //e-aj..my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aaccountability%2dcross%2dcommu
> > nity%2dbounces at icann.org%3e>] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter
> >
> > Sent: Monday, October 05, 2015 7:44 PM
> >
> > To: Steve Crocker
> >
> > Cc: Accountability Cross Community
> >
> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Message from ICANN Board re Designator Model
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Steve, all
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > In finalising the CCWG's proposal, the ICANN board is a stakeholder - an
> important one.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > It has a later role as a decision-maker, according to criteria that have
> already been established by Board resolution.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > A careful multi-stakeholder process over almost a year has analysed the
> community's requirements and come up with a model that can do it - based
> around membership.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > The Board has abused its role as a decision-maker in this process. In
> effect, it has sought to replace the open, public, deliberative proposal
> development process with its own definition of what the community requires,
> and its own solution that can deliver its evaluation of those requirements.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > In doing so, it has profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the
> multi-stakeholder model of decision-making that ICANN and its Board claim
> to uphold.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Worse, as a matter of process, the Board has attempted to use its
> decisional role at the end of the Accountability to move the trajectory of

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