[CCWG-ACCT] Summary words from engagement meeting

[Jordan Carter]

hi Paul

The topic of our group was narrow - it was to understand the differences in
enforceability between the SD and the SM models. We were not asked to, and
did not, investigate all of the other issues.

Jordan


On 17 October 2015 at 15:14, Paul Rosenzweig <
paul.rosenzweig at redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:

> Dear Jordan/Desiree/Others
>
>
>
> I regret, of course, not being in Dublin with you – especially since
> Mathieu and Lise are buying the first round this evening at the pub.
>
>
>
> Had I been there, and had I been able to join your enforcement meeting
> there is one question I would have asked relating to our efforts to
> distinguish the Member and Designator models, viz:  My understanding is
> that the Member of a corporation has certain statutory rights of inspection
> that would, if invoked, require the corporation to be more transparent.  In
> particular, the right of inspection, as I understand it, extends to a right
> to inspect financial records of the corporation and to demand public access
> to the minutes of Board meetings.  My further understanding is that these
> statutory rights are NOT available in the Designator model.
>
>
>
> Assuming my understanding is correct (and I am more than happy to be
> corrected), what was the reasoning behind the argument for giving up these
> inspection rights?  To my mind they would be essential components of
> transparency and part of the key to maintaining good community insight into
> the operations of the corporation.  And that, in turn, seems to me a strong
> argument for the Membership model.  I’m not sure I see what the
> counter-argument is.
>
>
>
> Regards
>
> Paul
>
>
>
> Paul Rosenzweig
>
> paul.rosenzweig at redbranchconsulting.com
> <paul.rosenzweigesq at redbranchconsulting.com>
>
> O: +1 (202) 547-0660
>
> M: +1 (202) 329-9650
>
> VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739
>
> Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066
>
> Link to my PGP Key
> <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19&Itemid=9>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Jordan Carter [mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz]
> *Sent:* Saturday, October 17, 2015 9:25 AM
> *To:* Desiree Miloshevic <dmiloshevic at afilias.info>
> *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community <
> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Summary words from engagement meeting
>
>
>
> Thanks Desiree - copying to list for the record and to share your thoughts.
>
> J
>
>
>
> On 17 October 2015 at 12:19, Desiree Miloshevic <dmiloshevic at afilias.info>
> wrote:
>
> Jordan
>
>
>
> Myself, like Malcolm has said, have come out of our Enforcement model
> breakout session thinking that in the end there is not a huge advantage of
> the Sole Membership model
>
> over the Single Designator Model.
>
>
>
> However, we should explore other opportunities. For example we have not
> discussed enough the indirect Enforcement - the spill of the board
>
> as that may end up being a faster and more efficient way than court
> proceedings, that would, in the end, keep deciding if something is
>
> a fiduciary duty or not regardless of potentially reserved membership
> statutory powers and regardless of what the board suggests.
>
>
>
> Desiree
>
> --
>
>
>
> On 17 Oct 2015, at 12:00, Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
>
>
>
> Here are my notes as outlined at the meeting, for the record:
>
>
>
> 1. We focused on IRP, because PTI would end up in an IRP.
>
>
>
> 2. IRP enforcement process is the same regardless of the model. If after
> arbitration award is granted, losing party objects, prevailing party must
> go to court for enforcement of arbitration award
>
>
>
> 3. In both models there is a legal person - the sole designator or member
> - that can be party to IRP if required.
>
>
>
> 4. In either model, fiduciary duties are important and have the effect of
> limiting the scope of what can be arbitrated in an IRP setting.
>
>
>
> 5.  In the member model the board is limited in asserting that its action
> was protected as a fiduciary business judgment as to community powers
> reserved to the sole member. (That is, the scope of issues properly subject
> to arbitration is therefore broader in member model.)
>
>
>
> 6. Preferences were split among those present between the two models.
>
>
>
> 7. My personal preference on this dimension angles slightly towards the
> member model, because it provides for stronger enforceability of the
> community powers through the IRP or generally - that is, as said, it does
> that by removing the possibility of ICANN arguing that enforcement of those
> powers conflicts with fiduciary duties and so cannot be arbitrated.
>
>
>
> --
>
> Jordan Carter
>
> Chief Executive
> *InternetNZ*
>
>
> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
> Skype: jordancarter
>
> Web: www.internetnz.nz
>
>
> *A better world through a better Internet *
>
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Jordan Carter
>
> Chief Executive
> *InternetNZ*
>
>
> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
> Skype: jordancarter
>
> Web: www.internetnz.nz
>
>
> *A better world through a better Internet *
>
>
>



-- 
Jordan Carter

Chief Executive
*InternetNZ*

+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz

*A better world through a better Internet *
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