[CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile
Greg Shatan
gregshatanipc at gmail.com
Wed Sep 9 04:49:45 UTC 2015
Having belatedly fought my way through this entire thread, I want to thank
Jordan, Avri, Phil and Malcolm for so ably, eloquently and comprehensively
expressing so many concerns and reactions that I share.
Greg
On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 12:01 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com>
wrote:
> And here is a final observation. To put it – like Greg – as a conflict as
>> “Board on Top” vs. “Community on Top” is misleading.
>
>
> Wolfgang,
>
> You have misstated, and thus significantly mischaracterized, my point.
> Though I am sure it was inadvertent, it nonetheless obscures the point I
> was making.
>
> I did not say there was a "conflict" between "Board on Top" and "Community
> on Top." What I said was:
>
> "Board on Top" survives, and "Member on Top" (as membership organizations
>> are constituted under US nonprofit law) is eliminated.
>
>
> These characterizations are rooted in the basic difference, under US
> non-profit corporations law, between a membership non-profit corporation
> and a non-profit corporation without members. This is a generic
> distinction -- not specific to ICANN. It is not a "conflict" -- but it is a
> fundamental difference between a "membership model" and a "non-membership
> model."
>
> In a membership corporation, the membership (whether a single member or
> many members) outranks the Board in certain limited but significant ways.
> In a non-membership corporation, the Board has ultimate authority. While
> somewhat simplified, it is neither "wrong" nor "misleading" to characterize
> the distinction between these two models as "Board on Top" and "Member on
> Top." Indeed, it's really quite accurate.
>
> One thing I was NOT saying was that there was a dichotomy between the
> Board and the Community. It's quite fascinating that you would have chosen
> to re-cast it in that fashion. While I'm a lawyer, I'm no psychiatrist
> (though my father was, and my wife, sister and brother-in-law are all
> psychologists), so I'll leave it to others to analyze that.
>
> Greg
>
> Greg
>
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 at 2:17 PM, Avri Doria <avri at acm.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> And I think it has more to do with establishing checks and balances that
>> take into account the loss of the NTIA backstop/oversight.
>>
>> avri
>>
>>
>> On 08-Sep-15 13:48, Jonathan Zuck wrote:
>> > Exactly
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On 9/8/15, 1:31 PM, "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> on behalf of James M. Bladel" <
>> accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org on behalf of
>> jbladel at godaddy.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >> Disagree, Nigel. It¹s not about the past, but rather an effort to
>> >> future-proof the organization against individuals & groups we haven¹t
>> >> event met yet.
>> >>
>> >> Thanks‹
>> >>
>> >> J.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 9/8/15, 11:59 , "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> on
>> >> behalf of Nigel Roberts" <
>> accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> >> on behalf of nigel at channelisles.net> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> Roelof
>> >>>
>> >>> You are a smart guy. You are open and ready to trust. These are
>> >>> admirable qualities.
>> >>>
>> >>> But ICANN, as a collective entity, to those of us who were there at
>> its
>> >>> beginnings needs to continually prove it is worthy of trust.
>> >>>
>> >>> Because back then, it wasn't.
>> >>>
>> >>> And some of us remember.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> On 08/09/15 17:53, Roelof Meijer wrote:
>> >>>> All,
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder.
>> >>>> What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a ³yes,
>> >>>> perfect, let¹s implement this straight away²?
>> >>>> But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven¹s sake, do we see
>> the
>> >>>> board as a unity of ill-doers?
>> >>>>
>> >>>> The board members that have participated in our work are individuals
>> >>>> that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I
>> >>>> entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago.
>> >>>> They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different
>> >>>> possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new
>> ideas.
>> >>>> And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the
>> benefit
>> >>>> of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a
>> bit
>> >>>> after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal
>> >>>> sacrifice and join ICANN's board.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> In my opinion, there¹s no collective single opinion in any wrong
>> >>>> direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect
>> and a
>> >>>> level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not
>> easily
>> >>>> find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no,
>> does
>> >>>> not mean that we cannot have different opinions.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> When Steve Crocker writes:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> /"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability
>> >>>> contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse
>> >>>> the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we
>> >>>> believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the
>> >>>> proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the
>> >>>> proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA
>> >>>> requirements.²/
>> >>>>
>> >>>> he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily
>> >>>> receive, as he commits the board. Let¹s await the promised details of
>> >>>> their ideas and keep engaged.
>> >>>> Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we
>> hope
>> >>>> to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt?
>> >>>> Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read
>> or
>> >>>> heard: as in ³while you say, Š. I seeŠ², ³when you say, Š you mean.."
>> >>>>
>> >>>> /"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation
>> issue, I
>> >>>> //see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the
>> >>>> //keystone of the CCWG proposal."/
>> >>>>
>> >>>> //
>> >>>>
>> >>>> /"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the
>> all
>> >>>> the //bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"/
>> >>>>
>> >>>> //
>> >>>>
>> >>>> /"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure
>> does
>> >>>> not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than
>> for
>> >>>> those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a
>> >>>> very natural human reaction."/
>> >>>>
>> >>>> //
>> >>>>
>> >>>> /"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the
>> >>>> priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the
>> >>>> board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and
>> >>>> out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" /
>> >>>>
>> >>>> //
>> >>>>
>> >>>> /"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you
>> have
>> >>>> not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."/
>> >>>>
>> >>>> //
>> >>>>
>> >>>> /"And I, for one, do not want the transition //badly enough that I
>> would
>> >>>> capitulate to the Board's effort to completely //distort the proposed
>> >>>> process."/
>> >>>>
>> >>>> //
>> >>>>
>> >>>> /"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is
>> >>>> precisely //why it must."/
>> >>>>
>> >>>> //
>> >>>>
>> >>>> /"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just
>> >>>> //operationalization is impressive."/
>> >>>>
>> >>>> //
>> >>>>
>> >>>> /"not surrender and let the Board have complete control //without any
>> >>>> possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"/
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Let¹s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselvesŠ
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Cheers,
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Roelof Meijer
>> >>>>
>> >>>> SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE
>> >>>> NETHERLANDS
>> >>>> T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55
>> 05
>> >>>> roelof.meijer at sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer at sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl
>> >>>> <http://www.sidn.nl/>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> >>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf
>> of
>> >>>> Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> >>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf
>> of
>> >>>> avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>> wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Hi,
>> >>>>
>> >>>> First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the
>> Board
>> >>>> and I
>> >>>> trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the
>> >>>> best
>> >>>> you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior
>> >>>> motive of
>> >>>> personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my
>> >>>> trust
>> >>>> of the Board members as being among those who do not believe
>> that a
>> >>>> Board member would ever take a position just because it would
>> help
>> >>>> him
>> >>>> get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board
>> >>>> member
>> >>>> would change her position due to a concern with being removed
>> from
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign
>> >>> >from the
>> >>>> Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> Internet.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective
>> from
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> Board that holds all the power, and from the community that
>> wishes
>> >>>> to
>> >>>> become empowered, at leas to a degree.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> While you say the the Single member is just a implementation
>> issue,
>> >>>> I
>> >>>> see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the
>> >>>> keystone of the CCWG proposal.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the
>> >>>> all the
>> >>>> bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I
>> >>>> think
>> >>>> this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> current impasse.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Some inset comments below.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Hi Avri,
>> >>>>
>> >>>> it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the
>> areas
>> >>>> where we work together we have consensus or rough
>> >>>> consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of
>> >>>> disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking
>> myself
>> >>>> whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?
>> >>>>
>> >>>> What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we
>> have
>> >>>> an agreement:
>> >>>> €Community empowerment (Agreeement)
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal.
>> Maybe
>> >>>> it is
>> >>>> a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to
>> a
>> >>>> lower
>> >>>> extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by
>> >>>> other,
>> >>>> you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on
>> >>>> some
>> >>>> fundamental issues the community requires decision making
>> >>>> empowerment.
>> >>>> The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in
>> >>>> any
>> >>>> straightforward definition of the term..
>> >>>>
>> >>>> €Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor
>> specifications)
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering
>> conjecture
>> >>>> on
>> >>>> the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do
>> you
>> >>>> fear us so?
>> >>>>
>> >>>> €Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a
>> >>>> direct
>> >>>> say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of
>> incorporation.
>> >>>> Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the
>> >>>> requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> €Operational Plan (Agreement)
>> >>>> €Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting
>> >>>> was
>> >>>> that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually
>> >>>> based on
>> >>>> fundamental disagreements.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> €Enforceability (Agreement)
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume
>> >>>> that
>> >>>> we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing
>> >>>> could
>> >>>> be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make
>> >>>> going to
>> >>>> court the end of a very long chain of other options that should
>> not
>> >>>> be
>> >>>> necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The
>> CCWG
>> >>>> plan
>> >>>> balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new
>> >>>> participant
>> >>>> in the checks and balances.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> €IRP (Agreement)
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called
>> >>>> agreement.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> €Ombudsman (Agreement)
>> >>>>
>> >>>> We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership
>> Model.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the
>> other
>> >>>> parts of the solution would work.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further
>> >>>> intensification of the dialogue within the community
>> including
>> >>>> CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from
>> >>>> different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal
>> >>>> advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make
>> the
>> >>>> decision.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here
>> was
>> >>>> that
>> >>>> ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community
>> >>>> been
>> >>>> making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG
>> >>>> process.
>> >>>> Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have
>> >>>> submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the
>> >>>> implementation phase.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a
>> >>>> complicated transition in the final stage there are some
>> >>>> remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles
>> to
>> >>>> go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is
>> >>>> good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its
>> >>>> members and to the input from the broader community. The
>> whole
>> >>>> process is a very encouraging example which shows how the
>> >>>> multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an
>> >>>> important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in
>> New
>> >>>> York.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I
>> >>>> would be
>> >>>> able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM
>> >>>> and
>> >>>> the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To
>> >>>> me,
>> >>>> this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a
>> >>>> century*
>> >>>> or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb
>> of
>> >>>> Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> (*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a
>> little
>> >>>> better)
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> The reason why I have problems with the sole membership
>> model is
>> >>>> simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the
>> >>>> checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board
>> (and
>> >>>> the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in
>> my
>> >>>> eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a
>> >>>> number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element
>> that
>> >>>> compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight.
>> An
>> >>>> organization that removes formal external oversight needs a
>> stronger
>> >>>> notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a
>> >>>> good
>> >>>> start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations
>> >>>> sometimes
>> >>>> get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that
>> >>>> made
>> >>>> the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended
>> by
>> >>>> ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2
>> >>>> recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the
>> >>>> rainbow. As
>> >>>> people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2
>> >>>> recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."
>> >>>>
>> >>>> You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested
>> >>>> is the
>> >>>> current model without any changes. And we have seen that this
>> is a
>> >>>> model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending
>> >>>> exuberance of
>> >>>> the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate
>> >>>> oversight
>> >>>> somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become
>> free
>> >>>> from
>> >>>> government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the
>> >>>> community,
>> >>>> one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need
>> the
>> >>>> SMCM
>> >>>> in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot
>> be a
>> >>>> transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a
>> >>>> transition
>> >>>> to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board
>> has
>> >>>> accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is
>> >>>> something
>> >>>> that the CWG proposal requires.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save
>> >>>> enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale
>> why
>> >>>> Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the
>> proposed
>> >>>> mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included
>> in
>> >>>> an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching
>> the
>> >>>> well designed balance between governments and the
>> >>>> non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And
>> there
>> >>>> are other detailed questions.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal
>> >>>> footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want
>> >>>> its
>> >>>> structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists
>> in
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major
>> >>>> opportunity
>> >>>> for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms
>> for
>> >>>> action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate
>> >>>> capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less
>> >>>> chance
>> >>>> there will be for capture and other shenanigans.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still
>> too
>> >>>> vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined
>> scope
>> >>>> and
>> >>>> functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the
>> >>>> modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an
>> >>>> implementation
>> >>>> detail.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> It is not yet ready for adoption.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> We disagree on this.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> It needs a lot of more work.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That
>> fact
>> >>>> of an
>> >>>> SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems
>> to
>> >>>> claim, but its implementation modalities may be.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which
>> was
>> >>>> presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus
>> and
>> >>>> minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole
>> Membership
>> >>>> Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus
>> >>>> than the other two. But in total, all the three models were
>> far
>> >>>> away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against
>> >>>> capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and
>> >>>> security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful
>> >>>> analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated
>> this
>> >>>> in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the
>> >>>> weaknesses
>> >>>> of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will
>> >>>> help
>> >>>> us with that.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole
>> >>>> membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into
>> the
>> >>>> details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is
>> >>>> obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and
>> now
>> >>>> within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust
>> into a
>> >>>> long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it
>> now
>> >>>> they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process
>> is
>> >>>> unstoppable.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in
>> >>>> this
>> >>>> system construction. Removing it requires going back to the
>> >>>> beginning
>> >>>> as it holds everything together.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless
>> the
>> >>>> community model has been implemented. As long as the Board
>> remains
>> >>>> unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has
>> failed
>> >>>> at
>> >>>> ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress
>> Board
>> >>>> actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed
>> in
>> >>>> it is
>> >>>> redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress
>> >>>> mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future
>> redress
>> >>>> mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR,
>> IRP,
>> >>>> ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this
>> >>>> proposal. I
>> >>>> have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine
>> >>>> improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board
>> >>>> configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> My impression is that the majority in the community sees this
>> >>>> indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will
>> >>>> not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after
>> the
>> >>>> IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2)
>> we
>> >>>> will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its
>> >>>> various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a
>> >>>> changing environment. I did call this ³WS 3² and ³ICANN
>> 2020².
>> >>>> And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed.
>> >>>> but
>> >>>> we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good
>> time,
>> >>>> and
>> >>>> leave the future to necessary tweaking.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process
>> of
>> >>>> taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear
>> for
>> >>>> thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and
>> >>>> then to
>> >>>> WS3...
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us
>> in
>> >>>> San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like
>> >>>> stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And
>> >>>> what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small)
>> stumbling
>> >>>> step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and
>> to do
>> >>>> now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to
>> allow
>> >>>> the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be
>> the
>> >>>> end of the story. It will go on.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too
>> much
>> >>>> stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the
>> >>>> best
>> >>>> example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is
>> >>>> preferable,
>> >>>> but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model
>> beyond
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> stumbling phase.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been
>> >>>> patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.'
>> >>>> For
>> >>>> others it is much longer.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait
>> for
>> >>>> transition until we are ready.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> And here is a final observation. To put it like Greg as
>> a
>> >>>> conflict as ³Board on Top² vs. ³Community on Top² is
>> misleading.
>> >>>> Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are
>> >>>> selected by the community. Both are accountable to the
>> >>>> community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we
>> all
>> >>>> are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a
>> >>>> better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with
>> >>>> more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is
>> >>>> real
>> >>>> mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the
>> >>>> community
>> >>>> does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts
>> of
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed
>> >>>> by the
>> >>>> Board for the community. I think many of your comments are
>> colored
>> >>>> by a
>> >>>> pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to
>> >>>> capture
>> >>>> and game.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new
>> >>>> perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the
>> >>>> Board
>> >>>> another part of the community while not representing the
>> community.
>> >>>> For
>> >>>> a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it
>> needs to
>> >>>> give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the
>> >>>> community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can
>> >>>> check
>> >>>> and balance the Board's unilateral power.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two
>> as
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> avri
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Wolfgang
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>> >>>> Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> >>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> im
>> >>>> Auftrag von Avri Doria
>> >>>> Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17
>> >>>> An: accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>> >>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>> >>>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The
>> Last
>> >>>> Mile
>> >>>> Hi,
>> >>>>
>> >>>> The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just
>> >>>> operationalization is impressive.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I do not understand the references to capture unless they
>> mean
>> >>>> capture
>> >>>> by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their
>> >>>> perspective
>> >>>> the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it
>> >>>> gives the
>> >>>> community a share of the power they now hold for
>> themselves. I
>> >>>> think
>> >>>> any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an
>> >>>> analysis who
>> >>>> who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always
>> an
>> >>>> interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to
>> >>>> share my
>> >>>> power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the
>> power
>> >>>> anlaysi, current, potential and likely.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Additionally, I do not understand this statement:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> where the current proposal still warrants much detail
>> that
>> >>>> may not be
>> >>>> achievable
>> >>>>
>> >>>> While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though
>> perhaps
>> >>>> much
>> >>>> less that is being claimed - until it is time for
>> implementaton,
>> >>>> it is
>> >>>> not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an
>> adequate
>> >>>> level of
>> >>>> detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if
>> someone
>> >>>> does not
>> >>>> wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition
>> where
>> >>>> we, as
>> >>>> a community, will have to decide whether we want the
>> transition
>> >>>> so badly
>> >>>> that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have
>> complete
>> >>>> control
>> >>>> without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight
>> ever
>> >>>> again.
>> >>>> The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to
>> >>>> community
>> >>>> oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the
>> transition
>> >>>> should
>> >>>> not go forward.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> avri
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Original
>> >>>> link:
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Working Together Through The Last Mile
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> <
>> https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>> >>>> <
>> https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>> >>>> <
>> https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>> >>>> <
>> https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>> >>>> <
>> https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>> >>>> <
>> https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#
>> >>>>
>> >>>> <
>> https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#%
>> >>>> 3E%3Chttps://
>> www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mi
>> >>>> le#%3E%3Chttps://
>> www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-las
>> >>>> t-mile#%3E%3Chttps://
>> www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the
>> >>>> -last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://
>> www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through
>> >>>> -the-last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://
>> www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-thr
>> >>>> ough-the-last-mile#>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both
>> the
>> >>>> CCWG
>> >>>> briefing to the ICANN Board
>> >>>>
>> >>>> <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>,
>> >>>> and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue
>> >>>>
>> >>>> <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>.
>> >>>> All of our dialogues over the past months have been
>> >>>> illuminating,
>> >>>> challenging and in my opinion, an important and true
>> >>>> testament to the
>> >>>> multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA
>> >>>> Stewardship Transition.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> */We support the important improvements for ICANN's
>> >>>> accountability
>> >>>> contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft
>> Proposal.
>> >>>> We endorse
>> >>>> the goal of enforceability of these accountability
>> >>>> mechanisms, and we
>> >>>> believe that it is possible to implement the key elements
>> >>>> of the
>> >>>> proposal. We want to work together to achieve the
>> elements
>> >>>> of the
>> >>>> proposal within the community's timeline while meeting
>> >>>> the NTIA requirements./*
>> >>>>
>> >>>> As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period,
>> the
>> >>>> Board
>> >>>> wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in
>> >>>> agreement on
>> >>>> key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for
>> >>>> example:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> * Fundamental bylaws.
>> >>>> * Specific requirements for empowering the community
>> >>>> into the bylaws
>> >>>> adoption process.
>> >>>> * IRP enhancements.
>> >>>> * Board and director removal.
>> >>>> * ICANN's mission and core values.
>> >>>> * Strengthening requirements for empowering the
>> >>>> community in the
>> >>>> budget, operational and strategic planning process.
>> >>>> * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments
>> >>>> Reviews
>> >>>> intoICANN bylaws.
>> >>>> * Community ability to enforce the accountability
>> >>>> mechanisms in the
>> >>>> bylaws.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> We have suggestions on how these could be
>> operationalized.
>> >>>> With
>> >>>> regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability,
>> >>>> where the
>> >>>> current proposal still warrants much detail that may not
>> be
>> >>>> achievable
>> >>>> we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable
>> >>>> way, as
>> >>>> increased enforceability must not open up questions of,
>> for
>> >>>> example,
>> >>>> capture or diminishing of checks and balances.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Let's work together on operationalizing the above
>> principles
>> >>>> on which
>> >>>> we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more
>> >>>> detail on how
>> >>>> these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they
>> can be
>> >>>> implemented within the community identified time frame
>> for
>> >>>> the
>> >>>> transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to
>> not
>> >>>> result in
>> >>>> unintended consequences.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> During last night's discussion we shared this feedback.
>> It
>> >>>> was a lot
>> >>>> of information to digest in a call (notes around opening
>> >>>> remarks
>> >>>>
>> >>>> <
>> http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>> >>>> ber/005160.html>,
>> >>>> notes
>> >>>> around 10 points
>> >>>>
>> >>>> <
>> http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>> >>>> ber/005161.html>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> <
>> http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>> >>>> ber/005161.html%3E>),
>> >>>> and we appreciate everyone giving our advice
>> consideration.
>> >>>> We are
>> >>>> committed to submitting our comments into the Public
>> Comment
>> >>>> process
>> >>>> in the next few days, and we look forward to the working
>> >>>> with the
>> >>>> community on further details.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> It is critical that we work together to build enhanced
>> >>>> accountability
>> >>>> forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of
>> the
>> >>>> impressive work already done by the community and
>> complete
>> >>>> the IANAStewardship Transition.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>> >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>> >>>> <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> ---
>> >>>> This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus
>> >>>> software.
>> >>>> https://www.avast.com/antivirus
>> >>>>
>> >>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>> >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>> >>>> <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> ---
>> >>>> This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus
>> software.
>> >>>> https://www.avast.com/antivirus
>> >>>>
>> >>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>> >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>> >>>> <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
>> >>>>
>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>> >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>> >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>> >>>>
>> >>> _______________________________________________
>> >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>> >>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>> >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>> >> _______________________________________________
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>> >> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>> >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>> > _______________________________________________
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>>
>>
>> ---
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