[CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue

[James Gannon]

Thanks Cheryl,

I would hope that this would be a relatively non-contentious issue as it is designed to reflect the long standing principle that we have been working under since the start of this wild and wonderful journey.

-James

From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org>> on behalf of Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr at gmail.com<mailto:langdonorr at gmail.com>>
Date: Saturday 27 February 2016 at 10:03 p.m.
To: "accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue


I agree Yes this also makes sense to me...

I support yhe "may"  to SHALL and the addition od explanatory material ...

On 28 Feb 2016 8:56 am, "avri doria" <avri at apc.org<mailto:avri at apc.org>> wrote:

Makes sense to me to change the may to a shall and add explanatory material.

avri

On 27-Feb-16 15:03, Drazek, Keith wrote:
>
> Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I’m submitting the following on behalf of
> the undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------
>
> Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,
>
>
>
> We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request
> for clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the
> Empowered Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional
> participants is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2
> regarding this possibility is ambiguous:
>
>
>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on
> this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be
> adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to
> have more SOs or ACs.”
>
>
>
> In our view, there is no question that the thresholds /must/ be
> adjusted if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have
> acknowledged repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there
> should not be a requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered
> Community to exercise its powers. Yet, if there are less than five
> decisional participants, unless the thresholds are adjusted it would
> require unanimous support for the Empowered Community to:
>
>
>
> ·         Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;
>
> ·         Recall the entire Board of Directors; and
>
> ·         Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA
> functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process.
>
>
>
> These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to
> the Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary
> purpose of the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the
> Board has noted in its own formal comments, “Leaving this issue for
> future consideration raises the potential for renegotiation of the
> community thresholds.  This potential for renegotiation adds a level
> of instability and a lack of predictability.”
>
>
>
> Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over
> thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally
> different. There is a great distinction between an SO or AC
> */choosing/* to not participate, and an SO or AC being */blocked/*
> from participation in a specific instance, as was the case in the case
> of the GAC carve-out. We were willing to accept a unanimous threshold
> for Board recall in the unique circumstances of the GAC carve-out,
> where the GAC was blocked from participation, but we believe firmly
> that if any SO or AC */elects/*, whether through a conscious decision
> or an inability to decide, to not participate, then the non-unanimity
> principle must be upheld.
>
>
>
> However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC
> carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to
> resolve this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to
> the official transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when
> it could have significant negative ramifications on the transition
> through a failure to resolve it during the implementation phase.
>
>
>
> Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1
> and Annex 2 be edited to replace “may” with “shall” and add an
> additional explanatory clause:
>
>
>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on
> this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support
> */shall/*be adjusted */to prevent the need for unanimous support among
> the decisional Participants to exercise any of the seven Community
> powers/*. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to
> have more SOs or ACs.”
>
>
>
> Signed,
>
>
>
> Phil Corwin
>
> Steve DelBianco
>
> Keith Drazek
>
> James Gannon
>
> Robin Gross
>
> Ed Morris
>
> Brett Schaefer
>
> Greg Shatan
>
> Matthew Shears
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community


---
This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
https://www.avast.com/antivirus

_______________________________________________
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/attachments/20160227/fa808295/attachment.html>