[CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue

[Thomas Rickert]

Dear Keith, all,
below you find a quick summary of where we are on this with respect to
our report:

- GAC is a decisional participant unless we get a clear signal (as from
RSAC and SSAC) that they don't want to be one.

- All decisional particants can vote yes, no, abstain or do nothing.

- If there is a change in structure, i.e. a decisional participants does
not further want to be one, an SO / AC is closed down or if there is an
addition, we need a bylaw change. This is what the group responded to
the Board's wish to include percentages. The CCWG refused percentages as
we need a bylaw change anyway if a change is taking place.

- Should the Board refuse to make / support a required bylaw change, we
have the tools in our report.

- Any clarification needed to that effect can be made during the
implementation phase.

Thanks,
Thomas

Am 27.02.2016 um 21:03 schrieb Drazek, Keith:
>
> Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I’m submitting the following on behalf of
> the undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:
>
>  
>
> ---------------------------------------------
>
> Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,
>
>  
>
> We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request
> for clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the
> Empowered Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional
> participants is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2
> regarding this possibility is ambiguous:
>
>  
>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on
> this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be
> adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to
> have more SOs or ACs.”
>
>  
>
> In our view, there is no question that the thresholds /must/ be
> adjusted if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have
> acknowledged repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there
> should not be a requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered
> Community to exercise its powers. Yet, if there are less than five
> decisional participants, unless the thresholds are adjusted it would
> require unanimous support for the Empowered Community to:
>
>  
>
> ·         Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;
>
> ·         Recall the entire Board of Directors; and
>
> ·         Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA
> functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process.
>
>  
>
> These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to
> the Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary
> purpose of the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the
> Board has noted in its own formal comments, “Leaving this issue for
> future consideration raises the potential for renegotiation of the
> community thresholds.  This potential for renegotiation adds a level
> of instability and a lack of predictability.”
>
>  
>
> Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over
> thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally
> different. There is a great distinction between an SO or AC
> */choosing/* to not participate, and an SO or AC being */blocked/*
> from participation in a specific instance, as was the case in the case
> of the GAC carve-out. We were willing to accept a unanimous threshold
> for Board recall in the unique circumstances of the GAC carve-out,
> where the GAC was blocked from participation, but we believe firmly
> that if any SO or AC */elects/*, whether through a conscious decision
> or an inability to decide, to not participate, then the non-unanimity
> principle must be upheld.
>
>  
>
> However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC
> carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to
> resolve this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to
> the official transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when
> it could have significant negative ramifications on the transition
> through a failure to resolve it during the implementation phase.
>
>  
>
> Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1
> and Annex 2 be edited to replace “may” with “shall” and add an
> additional explanatory clause:
>
>  
>
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on
> this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support
> */shall/*be adjusted */to prevent the need for unanimous support among
> the decisional Participants to exercise any of the seven Community
> powers/*. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to
> have more SOs or ACs.”
>
>  
>
> Signed,
>
>  
>
> Phil Corwin
>
> Steve DelBianco
>
> Keith Drazek
>
> James Gannon
>
> Robin Gross
>
> Ed Morris
>
> Brett Schaefer
>
> Greg Shatan
>
> Matthew Shears
>
>  
>
>  
>
>  
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

-- 

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