[Area 1] Sub Group 1 - Preliminary Draft
Phil Buckingham
phil at dotadvice.co.uk
Fri Dec 26 00:40:21 UTC 2014
Hi Mathieu, Samantha, WG participants,
Happy holidays.
I am very much in agreement with this top down strategic, budgetary control approach to identify “management” accountability mechanisms currently in place and those that will be required in the future.
I think we are all agreed that ICANN is currently a one off hybrid non for profit organisation. With ICANN contracting with 1400+ new TLD Registries over the coming two years ( rather than originally only 22 pre 2013), the whole organisation will have to adapt to a more traditional for profit corporate reporting , accountability environment with the huge increase in reported revenues and the ways to spend it !
With already $357 M received from applications , probably another $100- 200M from auctions , let alone fixed and variable per registration fees ( ICANN is projecting 15M gTLD registrations by close 2016 ) it is clearly imperative that a new accountability structure needs to be put in place. Can I suggest ( or has it already been done) that a corporate tree diagram is draw up , showing the current check and balances that are in place. As I said before, I would “ring fence” the whole gTLD programme, which would aid in the requirement of the AOC to report on the 60 GNSO metrics on its success or otherwise and whether there should be a Round 2 .
Hope that helps and is not too deep at this stage.
Regards,
Phil
From: ccwg-accountability1-bounces at icann.org [mailto:ccwg-accountability1-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Mathieu Weill
Sent: 25 December 2014 20:31
To: Samantha Eisner
Cc: ccwg-accountability1 at icann.org
Subject: Re: [Area 1] Sub Group 1 - Preliminary Draft
Hi Samantha,
My personal view would be to inventory anything that is specific to icann regarding these "management" accountability mechanisms. That would probably include :
- the board selection process, mentioned in the document you shared, as well as it's composition
- the CEO selection process, as well as practices to renew / assess / remove the CEO
- anything that would identify a specific relationship between some member of the staff and the Board, such as staff members who would report at least in part to the board (in some companies, this is the case for audit directors, sometimes the CFO, etc.)
- any external systematic auditors (I know ICANN has its account audited every year)
- and finally, probably any accountability mechanism related to strategy definition or execution.
Happy to hear other inputs and feedbacks.
Happy holidays,
Mathieu Weill
---------------
Depuis mon mobile, désolé pour le style
Le 24 déc. 2014 à 19:19, Samantha Eisner <Samantha.Eisner at icann.org> a écrit :
Hi Mathieu,
If you take a look at one of the initial inventories that ICANN put together as this accountability conversation was starting after the transition announcement ( <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414329/Inventory%20of%C2%A0ICANN%20Accountability%20Efforts%20%286%20May%202014%29.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1418656347000&api=v2> Inventory of ICANN Accountability Efforts (6 May 2014).pdf) you’ll see that there was some of this more management-based work in there. The Area 1 document that we produced was more about redress mechanisms than the management/operations focus. I agree that having clear goals and performing to those goals (be they in the strategic plan or operating plan – which is derived from the strategic plan) is a really important measure of accountability. The question of “is the organization doing what it says it is going to do” is fundamental.
How deep would you prefer for the Area 1 document to go?
Best,
Sam
From: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill at afnic.fr>
Reply-To: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill at afnic.fr>
Date: Wednesday, December 24, 2014 at 5:48 AM
To: Samantha Eisner <samantha.eisner at icann.org>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com>, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl>
Cc: "David W. Maher" <dmaher at pir.org>, "ccwg-accountability1 at icann.org" <ccwg-accountability1 at icann.org>
Subject: Re: [Area 1] Sub Group 1 - Preliminary Draft
Dear Colleagues,
I have reviewed the document, and confirm that it is certainly going to be a cornerstone of our work.
With my CEO hat on, I realized we were not explicitly mentioning any accountability mechanisms regarding the achievement of strategic goals, or delivering certain key projects on time, or within budget.
Is it because we just forgot them ? If that is the case, I think it would be valuable to add this kind of accountability mechanism in our overview of the current situation at Icann. I have a feeling that we have naturally been inclined to overlook this kind of "management" accountability mechanisms.
To give more examples, within Afnic, the CEO is accountable to the Board to achieve certain goals of the strategic plan. And the Board can dismiss the CEO in case performance is not appropriate. The CEO can delegate some of these goals to staff and has the same kind of power (although under more constraints) regarding staff.
And of course, Board members come up for re-election on a regular basis. So if the Board is felt to be not performing correctly, the general assembly can change Board members.
Best
Mathieu
Le 24/12/2014 00:09, Samantha Eisner a écrit :
Dear Kavouss,
The document is on the WG1 draft page at: https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Work+Area+1+-+Draft+Documents
The link to the document in WORD format: https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414329/WS1%20-%20Accountability%20Inventory%20with%20Questions.doc?version=1 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414329/WS1%20-%20Accountability%20Inventory%20with%20Questions.doc?version=1&modificationDate=1419299658000&api=v2> &modificationDate=1419299658000&api=v2 and PDF: https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414329/WS1%20-%20Accountability%20Inventory%20with%20Questions.pdf?version=1 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414329/WS1%20-%20Accountability%20Inventory%20with%20Questions.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1419299650000&api=v2> &modificationDate=1419299650000&api=v2
Best,
Samantha
From: Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh at gmail.com>
Date: Tuesday, December 23, 2014 at 2:51 PM
To: Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl>
Cc: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill at afnic.fr>, Samantha Eisner <samantha.eisner at icann.org>, "David W. Maher" <dmaher at pir.org>, "ccwg-accountability1 at icann.org" <ccwg-accountability1 at icann.org>
Subject: Re: [Area 1] Sub Group 1 - Preliminary Draft
Dear Samantha
Tks for information.
I could not find your doc. on the wiki WG1
May you pls either direct me to the area that I could find that last doc. or send me the doc.
Regards
Kavouss
2014-12-23 15:19 GMT+01:00 Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl>:
Dear all,
As discussed, I suggest the table to be expanded with at least one column
„final say” or „stops the buck” or something, that states where the final
decision lies.
I bet that in most cases we will find that this is the ICANN Board. Which
is not a flaw in the system, but -as I am sure you are all aware- just the
logic result of the present (common) governance structure of the
corporation, whereby board members have a fiduciary duty and ultimately
(only) serve the best interests of the corporation.
As long as the best interests of ICANN the corporation and the „public
interest” are aligned (or are so in the opinion of the board) all is
probably well. If they are not, if the are not in the opinion of the
board, or if the board misinterprets the public interests and/or the
corporations interests, problems arise.
It surely has not always been the case, but in my opinion the board and
CEO have done pretty well over the last years in finding the right balance
(or alignment) between corporate and public/community interests.
No guarantee that that will remain the case indefinitely however,
especially if there’s no longer the NTIA/USG to subtly threaten with
corrective measures...
As far as I understand it, we mean by „enhanced accountability” that
ultimately, when the *stuff* hits the fan, the public interest will be
the decisive interest and NOT the corporation's.
I do not think that can be demanded from the board.
I agree that we should consider multiple solutions to this challenge.
One of which might be assigning the task and the authority required for
it, to an external or semi-external structure, through the bylaws of that
corporation. In such a situation, the members of that structure should
obviously not be appointed by (the board of) the corporation. But by those
representing the public interest.
Cheers,
Roelof Meijer
SIDN
| Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE
NETHERLANDS
T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 <tel:%2B31%20%280%2926%20352%2055%2000> | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 <tel:%2B31%20%280%296%2011%20395%20775> | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 <tel:%2B31%20%280%2926%20352%2055%2005>
roelof.meijer at sidn.nl
| www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/>
On 23-12-14 06:18, "Mathieu Weill" <mathieu.weill at afnic.fr> wrote:
>Thanks Samantha,
>
>Just adding a link to the resource for everyone to access easily :
>DOC version :
>https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414329/WS1%20-%20Accoun
>tability%20Inventory%20with%20Questions.doc?version=1&modificationDate=141
>9299658000&api=v2
>
>PDF version :
>https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414329/WS1%20-%20Accoun
>tability%20Inventory%20with%20Questions.doc?version=1&modificationDate=141
>9299658000&api=v2
>
>
>Mathieu
>
>Le 23/12/2014 02:57, Samantha Eisner a écrit :
>> Hi -
>>
>> I’ve done a first attempt (which is by no means comprehensive) of our
>> assigned task and uploaded to the wiki. I think we’d benefit from
>>seeing
>> what other detail we’d like in there, so I put this out to start the
>> conversation.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Sam
>>
>> On 12/16/14, 1:43 PM, "David W. Maher" <dmaher at pir.org> wrote:
>>
>>> I agree
>>> David
>>> David W. Maher
>>> Senior Vice President – Law & Policy
>>> Public Interest Registry
>>> 312 375 4849 <tel:312%20375%204849>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/16/14 2:04 PM, "Mathieu Weill" <mathieu.weill at afnic.fr> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Samantha, Colleagues,
>>>>
>>>> That is indeed what I understand from the discussion. You could also
>>>>add
>>>> a 3) is it review, redress or check & balance (see Netmundial
>>>>definition
>>>> of Accountability).
>>>>
>>>> Best
>>>> Mathieu
>>>>
>>>> Le 16/12/2014 13:04, Samantha Eisner a écrit :
>>>>> Colleagues,
>>>>>
>>>>> Listening to the discussion, I propose think that one of the new
>>>>> refined
>>>>> tasks that we could undertake would be, for each mechanism that we’ve
>>>>> identified on the inventory, first try to answer the questions of:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1) To whom does this mechanism seek to make ICANN accountable; and
>>>>> 2) For what
>>>>>
>>>>> This could be a starting point for parsing through the next wave of
>>>>> issues
>>>>> that we are agreeing to take on.
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>>
>>>>> Sam
>>>>>
>>>>> On 12/15/14, 9:23 AM, "David W. Maher" <dmaher at pir.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks, Samantha.
>>>>>> On the subject of contractual sources of accountability, it should
>>>>>>be
>>>>>> noted that the proposed withdrawal of NTIA from IANA functions will
>>>>>> remove
>>>>>> NTIA as a source of accountability enforcement.
>>>>>> I propose that the Sub Group look for other contractual sources and
>>>>>>at
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> same time explore the possibility of broadening the scope of
>>>>>> accountability enforceable by contract.
>>>>>> For example, the registries and registrars could enter into
>>>>>>contracts
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> ICANN covering the IANA functions in addition to the following:
>>>>>> 1. ICANN could agree by binding contract not to impose rules on
>>>>>>third
>>>>>> parties (by means of policies, accreditation standards, or required
>>>>>> contract terms) that are not supported by a demonstrated consensus
>>>>>> among
>>>>>> affected parties.
>>>>>> 2. ICANN could agree by binding contract not to impose rules on
>>>>>>third
>>>>>> parties (by means of policies, accreditation standards, or required
>>>>>> contract terms) that do not relate to issues the uniform resolution
>>>>>>of
>>>>>> which is necessary to assure sound operation of the domain name
>>>>>> system.
>>>>>> 3. ICANN could agree by binding contract not to impose rules on
>>>>>>third
>>>>>> parties (by means of policies, accreditation standards, or required
>>>>>> contract terms) that relate to online content or to online behavior
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> does not threaten the sound operation of the domain name system?
>>>>>> 4. ICANN could agree that any claim that it has not complied with
>>>>>>the
>>>>>> previous three obligations may be brought by any adversely affected
>>>>>> party
>>>>>> before an independent review panel that can issue decisions that are
>>>>>> binding on ICANN.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David W. Maher
>>>>>> Senior Vice President Law & Policy
>>>>>> Public Interest Registry
>>>>>> 312 375 4849 <tel:312%20375%204849>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 12/15/14 9:30 AM, "Samantha Eisner" <Samantha.Eisner at icann.org>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi all -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I posted a new version of the document on the wiki page in clean
>>>>>>>and
>>>>>>> redline form. The proposed changes include:
>>>>>>> 1. To address Malcolm Hutty¹s edit regarding contractual sources of
>>>>>>> accountability, I made a ³contract² heading and also listed
>>>>>>>Registry
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> Registrar Contracts under there.
>>>>>>> 2. To address David¹s inclusion of SSAC recommendations as a source
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> accountability, I incorporated a heading under Bylaws that
>>>>>>>accounted
>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>> Advisory Committee inputs. (Note that action is pending on ATRT2
>>>>>>> recommendations regarding ICANN¹s obligations on considerate of
>>>>>>> advice
>>>>>> >from ACs other than the GAC). Because identifying accountability
>>>>>>in
>>>>>>> terms
>>>>>>> of advice did not then seem complete without reference to the
>>>>>>>policy
>>>>>>> recommendations upon which that advice is often given, I referenced
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> policy development/Board consideration of policy recommendations
>>>>>>>for
>>>>>>> each
>>>>>>> of the SOs.
>>>>>>> 3. Inserted summary listings of all ATRT recommendations (1 and 2)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In terms of background documentation, I modified the page to make a
>>>>>>> clear
>>>>>>> delineation between the background info and the drafting work
>>>>>>> ongoing.
>>>>>>> In
>>>>>>> line with David¹s concern and Bruce¹s suggestion, I excerpted the
>>>>>>> presentation I previously circulated, and posted only the part that
>>>>>>> deals
>>>>>>> with the inventory effort, so as not to bring all the questions in
>>>>>>>at
>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>> stage.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I also included an excerpt to the inventory effort undertaken by
>>>>>>> ICANN in
>>>>>>> advance of the first postings on Enhancing ICANN Accountability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Please let me know if you have any questions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sam
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 12/13/14, 4:01 PM, "Bruce Tonkin"
>>>>>>> <Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hello Samantha,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Is it possible to split this presentation from London into its two
>>>>>>>> components?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The first few slides list some of the accountability mechanisms
>>>>>>>> available
>>>>>>>> within the ICANN structure. The ATRT2 review identified some
>>>>>>>> improvements to make to these mechanisms.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The slides from 11-28 are a general presentation about
>>>>>>>> accountability
>>>>>>> >from Professor Jan Aart Scholte, School of Global Studies,
>>>>>>> .University
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> Gothenburg.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> He lists 9 framing questions to consider when looking at
>>>>>>>> accountability
>>>>>>>> mechanisms:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (1) What is accountability?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - processes whereby an actor answers to other actors for the
>>>>>>>> impacts on
>>>>>>>> them of its actions and omissions
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (2) with what components?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - transparency
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - consultation
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - monitoring and evaluation
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - correction and redress
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (3) for what purpose?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - financial review; 'the accounts'
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - performance measurement
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - democratic participation/control
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - moral probity; ecological integrity; peace; etc.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (4) Accountability by whom?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - challenge of pinning down and specifying impact in the context
>>>>>>>>of
>>>>>>>> complex polycentric governance
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (5) for what?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - actual formal mandate
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - desired mandate (content? spam? digital access?)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (6) to whom?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - 'the public' of significantly affected people (but
>>>>>>>>metaphysical,
>>>>>>>> ecological?)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - 'the public' not unitary, as different people are differently
>>>>>>>> affected
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - constituencies (divisions within and overlaps between)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (7) for whom?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - myth of a universal 'global community' with same interests and
>>>>>>>> equal
>>>>>>>> power
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - skewed accountability on lines of age, caste, class,
>>>>>>>> (dis)ability,
>>>>>>>> faith, gender, geography, language, nationality, race, sexuality
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (8) via what channels?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - hegemonic veto
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - intergovernmental multilateralism
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - (global) political parties and parliaments
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - multi-stakeholder arrangements
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - civil society deliberation and mobilization
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - judiciary (court, inspection panel, evaluation exercises,
>>>>>>>> ombudsman)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - mass media
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (9) how accountably?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - 'When you point a finger, you need to do it with a clean hand'
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - transparency, consultation, monitoring and redress of those
>>>>>>>>who
>>>>>>>> (claim to) speak for affected publics
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>> Bruce Tonkin
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Ccwg-accountability1 mailing list
>>>>> Ccwg-accountability1 at icann.org
>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability1
>>>> --
>>>> *****************************
>>>> Mathieu WEILL
>>>> AFNIC - directeur général
>>>> Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 <tel:%2B33%201%2039%2030%2083%2006>
>>>> mathieu.weill at afnic.fr
>>>> Twitter : @mathieuweill
>>>> *****************************
>>>>
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>
>--
>*****************************
>Mathieu WEILL
>AFNIC - directeur général
>Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 <tel:%2B33%201%2039%2030%2083%2006>
>mathieu.weill at afnic.fr
>Twitter : @mathieuweill
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Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06
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Twitter : @mathieuweill
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