[CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles

Thu Nov 6 15:42:24 UTC 2014

I agree with Chuck.  "Bottom up" policy development is a fundamental
concept, not a cliche.  It is important to emphasize that the policy
process is "bottom up" -- as we have seen, it is far to easy for "top down"
policy development to be introduced inappropriately.

Greg

On Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 8:07 AM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes at verisign.com> wrote:

>  Mwendwa,
>
>
>
> Regarding your first question,  let me first say that I don’t see
> ‘bottom-up’ as a cliché.  Secondly, it is a fundamental principle of policy
> development.  I think it is important to note that the principle is not
> saying that IANA functions are operated in a bottom-up way but rather that
> the IANA functions operator’s role is to implement changes according to
> such policies.  As I see it, the essence of this principle is not that
> policy development must be bottom-up but rather that “the IANA functions
>  operator should be independent of the policy processes”.  That said, is
> the term ‘bottom-up’ essential to the principle?  No.  And I think that is
> probably your point.  I personally don’t have any problem leaving
> ‘bottom-up’ in the statement but I don’t think removing it if the group
> wants to do that would detract from the principle.
>
>
>
> If we want to keep the principle short and to the point, we could delete
> the second sentence.
>
>
>
> Chuck
>
>
>
> *From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
> cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Mwendwa Kivuva
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 06, 2014 5:59 AM
> *To:* Milton L Mueller
> *Cc:* cwg-stewardship at icann.org
>
> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles
>
>
>
> *Independence of policy from IANA*:  the IANA funtions  operator should
> be independent of the policy processes.  Its role is to implement changes
> in accordance with policy agreed through the relevant bottom up policy
> process [Note:  this does not pre-suppose any model for separation of the
> policy and IANA roles.  The current contract already requires such
> separation];
>
>
>
> Is bottom up a cliche we want to see in our principles?
>
>
>
>  *Diversity of IANA’s Customers:*
> *For ccTLDs,* the IANA should provide a service without requiring a
> contract and should respect the diversity of agreements and arrangements in
> place for ccTLDs.  In particular, the national policy authority or
> legislation (related to the ccTLD operator) should be respected and no
> additional requirements should be imposed unless it is directly and
> demonstrably linked to global security, stability and resilience of the DNS.
>
>
>
> "unless it is directly and demonstrably linked to global security,
> stability and resilience of the DNS"
>
> Is there any example of a policy that can be implemented at the ccTLD
> level that can threaten the DNS?
>
>
>   ______________________
> Mwendwa Kivuva, Nairobi, Kenya
> L: https://www.linkedin.com/in/lordmwesh
> B: http://lord.me.ke/
> T: twitter.com/lordmwesh
>
> "There are some men who lift the age they inhabit, till all men walk on
> higher ground in that lifetime." - Maxwell Anderson
>
>
>
> On 5 November 2014 20:40, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:
>
> I agree 100% with Avri. Separability has to be a principle, otherwise we
> have failed the accountability test.
>
>
>
> *From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
> cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Avri Doria
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 4, 2014 9:16 PM
> *To:* cwg-stewardship at icann.org
> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles
>
>
>
> Hi,
>
> While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may
> be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate
> MUST be a principle any solution is built on.  It may never be exercised,
> but it would be unacceptable for there to be a solution that prohibited or
> did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from
> ICANN.
>
> This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for
> persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory.
>
> avri
>
> On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote:
>
> Avri,
>
>
>
> While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't
>
> think it can be made a principle.
>
>
>
> There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe
>
> that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for
>
> separability does not exist.
>
>
>
> Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a
>
> principle for all solutions.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Guru
>
> On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri at acm.org> <avri at acm.org> wrote:
>
>
>
>   Hi,
>
>
>
> Comments:
>
>
>
>  a.       *Oversight, accountability and transparency*:  the service
>
> should be accountable and transparent.
>
>
>
>
>
> I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here.
>
>
>
>                       i.      *Independence of oversight*:  Oversight
>
> should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the
>
> accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder
>
> community;
>
>
>
>
>
> I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons:
>
>
>
> a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to
>
> the accountability issue.
>
> b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how
>
> it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so
>
> the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case.
>
> Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN
>
> corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as
>
> is ICANN.
>
>
>
> I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section:
>
>
>
> Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship
>
> function should be to the Internet stakeholder community.
>
>
>
> I also think we need to add a principle called separability
>
>
>
> Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its
>
> subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition
>
> of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and
>
> contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA
>
> service provider(s).  The power of removing the function to a different
>
> operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA
>
> function(s)
>
>
>
> Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels
>
> be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the
>
> Internet community on an annual basis.
>
>
>
> thanks
>
>
>
> avri
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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