[CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles

[Milton L Mueller]

I can see why would want to separate IANA from ICANN, and I can see why one might want to separate the policy making organs for DNS from ICANN, but I do not see why one would want to do both. The point of either change is to keep policy making and IANA implementation separate. If you do one, you don’t need to do the other.

--MM

From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya
Sent: Monday, November 10, 2014 9:10 PM
To: Avri Doria
Cc: cwg-stewardship at icann.org
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles


Avri,

While I wholeheartedly agree that separability is required (either as a solution or principle), I believe that the following caveat needs to be noted.

By arguing for separability of IANA from ICANN, you may be unknowingly arguing that the organisational structures for the names community should perpetually reside in ICANN.

I could instead argue for separability of the names community from ICANN (with IANA non-separable and perpetually residing in ICANN) and still achieve the same end objective as yours.

Ideally, the principles should somehow require the separability of both the IANA functions and the names community from ICANN.

NTIA, using the IANA functions contract (and specifically the response of ICANN to NTIA's RFP that is incorporated into the contract by reference), could have ensured transfer of the names community from ICANN as well.

The framing of the debate has somehow limited our thinking to only separability/transferrability of the IANA functions - forcing us to not even contemplate that even the names community may want to shift its organisational structures away from ICANN.

Regards,
Guru
Hi,

While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate MUST be a principle any solution is built on.  It may never be exercised, but it would be unacceptable for there to be a solution that prohibited or did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from ICANN.

This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory.

avri

On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri,



While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't

think it can be made a principle.



There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe

that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for

separability does not exist.



Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a

principle for all solutions.



Regards,

Guru

On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri at acm.org><mailto:avri at acm.org> wrote:



 Hi,



Comments:



 a.       *Oversight, accountability and transparency*:  the service

should be accountable and transparent.





I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here.



                      i.      *Independence of oversight*:  Oversight

should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the

accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder

community;





I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons:



a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to

the accountability issue.

b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how

it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so

the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case.

Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN

corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as

is ICANN.



I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section:



Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship

function should be to the Internet stakeholder community.



I also think we need to add a principle called separability



Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its

subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition

of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and

contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA

service provider(s).  The power of removing the function to a different

operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA

function(s)



Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels

be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the

Internet community on an annual basis.



thanks



avri













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