[CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities

Thu Oct 30 15:21:21 UTC 2014

Agree with you Milton

> On Oct 29, 2014, at 3:00 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:
> 
> I can’t agree with Olivier and Fouad.
>  
> Olivier, help me to understand why the directly affected parties shouldn’t have the primary responsibility for operations they are the direct users of and that their own operations depend on. To me your claim that this constitutes a “conflict of interest” is almost self-contradictory and self-refuting – it is a confluence of interest, not a conflict – but perhaps I am missing something. Please explain.
>  
> What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the former to the latter. In policy development we want “openness, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective.”  In the DNS IANA functions the users are the registries, it’s an intermediate good, it’s all about implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to voice their opinions.
>  
> I do agree with Alan there should be safeguards to prevent the operational and technical functions from being managed in ways that undermine or subvert policy that is made in the MS process. It would be useful to discuss institutional safeguards – including antitrust law – to prevent those kinds of things. But throwing an infinite number of “stakeholders” into looking over the shoulders of those making root zone file modifications accomplishes nothing useful from a public interest perspective, while raising all kinds of risks and inefficiencies. If Alan can recognize the danger that IANA contractors or implementations might compromise the policy process, I hope that he can also recognize the danger that politicized ‘multstakeholdered’ oversight of the technical operations could be abused to circumvent or veto the policies developed by the MS process.
>  
> --MM
>   <>
> From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org>] On Behalf Of Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond
> Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 11:51 AM
> To: cwg-stewardship at icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship at icann.org>
> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
>  
> Hello all,
> 
> irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. 
> There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too.
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> Olivier
> 
> On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote:
> I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day.  It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc.  Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism.  Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.  
>  
>  
> J. Beckwith Burr
> Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
> 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
> Office: + 1.202.533.2932  Mobile:  +1.202.352.6367  / becky.burr at neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr at neustar.biz> /www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/>
>  
> From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya at gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya at gmail.com>>
> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM
> To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray at cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray at cira.ca>>
> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr at neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr at neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship at icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship at icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship at icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship at icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg at npt.no <mailto:elise.lindeberg at npt.no>>
> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
>  
> Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
>  
> The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
>  
> Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
>  
> 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
>  
> 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 
>  
> 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
>  
> 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
>  
> How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
>  
>  
>  
> On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray at cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray at cira.ca>> wrote:
> I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days.  I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
>  
>  
> From:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya
> Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM
> To: Becky Burr
> Cc: cwg-stewardship at icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship at icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise
> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
>  
> Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. 
>  
> However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
>  
> Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
>  
> Regards,
> Guru
>  
> On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr at neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr at neustar.biz>> wrote:
> Thanks Elise, very helpful.  I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes.  Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns?  I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. 
>  
>  
> 
> 
> 
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