[CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model

Alan Greenberg alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
Tue Apr 14 07:30:46 UTC 2015


Reading this after being woken up at 02:50 am makes my head hurt!!!!!!!!!!!!
-- 
Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos.

On April 14, 2015 1:41:41 AM EDT, Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client at icann.org> wrote:
>All,
>
>Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current
>"internal"
>models.  Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it
>appropriate consideration.  As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put
>this together so that it could be given such consideration.
>
>For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model."
>
>In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform
>the
>IANA Functions, as in the current internal model.  However, ICANN 
>would
>enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA
>Functions.  Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions
>itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an
>entity to
>act as IANA Functions Operator.  (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up
>as a
>supervisor, not as an operator.)  Initially (but not perpetually), that
>subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions
>Operator.
>However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances
>designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA
>Functions
>from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a
>third party).
>
>As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only
>member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect
>the
>independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and
>defined) scope.
>
>It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the
>Affiliate.  However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the
>oversight
>and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising
>the
>rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions
>Operator.  In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with
>oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the
>right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP
>and
>potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers
>warranted it.  The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the
>Affiliate,
>created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board
>providing
>oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA
>Functions
>Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA).
>
>Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the
>IANA
>Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the
>right to subcontract for the performance of those services.  Although
>ICANN
>would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as
>the
>member to override the Board were as limited as possible.
>
>While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations
>from
>the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the
>decision-making
>rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN.  As with
>the
>second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be
>functional
>separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN.
>
>While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make
>a
>certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the
>current
>IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely
>form
>of total separation.  The more likely form of total separation would be
>the
>selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be
>structurally separated from ICANN.
>
>More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and
>stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be
>structurally
>separated from ICANN.  It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the
>multistakeholder board.  This would be the primary job of the
>Affiliate,
>putting service accountability front and center.  Yet, it does not
>slight
>separability.
>
>I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due
>consideration.
> One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand
>the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so
>I
>and other don't have to "play lawyer").  In that spirit, I am
>forwarding
>this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this
>"Reverse
>Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered.
>
>Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City.
>
>Greg
>
>
>
>
>
>Kind regards to both
>
>Best
>
>Paul
>
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
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