[CWG-Stewardship] The reverse hybrid model starts from a faulty premise (was: The Reverse Hybrid Model)

Tue Apr 14 11:48:40 UTC 2015

[Note: I trimmed the cc: list, since I think this is really just a CWG
discussion now.]

Hi,

On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 08:54:38AM +0000, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

> would at least like to get a high level response from Sidley as to
> whether they think there may be some ideas in the model that could
> be useful.

I don't especially mind if we ask Sidley for an opinion, but I'm
wondering what ideas you think might be in here that are useful.  For
I think the entire model starts from the wrong premise.

As Greg quite correctly notes in his description, Paul Kane has been
clear that the issue for him is stewardship of IANA (see
http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/2015-April/002613.html).
This is because he starts from the position that that stewardship is
currently provided by the US DoC through NTIA.

My claim is that such stewardship does not in fact apply to all the
operational communities, and therefore stewardship of IANA overall is
not actually a problem we ought to be solving (nor one that we can
solve).  Once you reject the stewardship premise, as I argued, there's
actually nothing distinct in the "reverse hybrid" model that ought to
be preserved.  It might provide at best duplication of functions that
ought properly to live within the names policy community.  The only
reason I can imagine for creating such duplication is that one does
not believe that the names community actually can provide the needed
policy checks.  If that's the case, no model will save us: the plan to
move out from under NTIA is doomed.

This is somewhat related to the discussion of "spilling the board"
yesterday.  If the problem we're defending against has to do with some
sort of non-performance or malfeasance of the purely clerical
functions of IANA, then it's absurd to talk about removing ICANN board
members (or even the entire board) when, plainly, much less dramatic
intervention is possible.  But if the problem actually is ICANN board
interference in carrying out the IANA function, or an ICANN board that
insisted IANA act contrary to legitimate legal requirements or
something like that, then removal of the board _would_ be legitimate
to consider.  But this would not be because of some IANA failing, but
because the board was acting contrary to its responsibilities to the
ICANN community.

> Chuck
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan
> Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 4:17 AM
> To: Greg Shatan
> Cc: Client; cwg-stewardship at icann.org
> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The Reverse Hybrid Model
> 
> Hi Greg,
> 
> Thanks for taking the time to lay out this model carefully.  I think it's good to expose it, but I think the exposure makes it clear it isn't worth pursuing in greater depth.  More below.
> 
> On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 01:41:41AM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
> 
> > In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform 
> > the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model.  However, ICANN  
> > would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the 
> > IANA Functions.
> 
> The difficulty I see with the proposal lies in those two statements.
> 
> My view is that ICANN is not the "source of the right" to perform the functions.  The source of the right to perform the protocol parameters function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the IETF), and the source of the right to perform the number resources function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the RIRs).
> 
> The basic problem with this model (and this interpretation of your
> description) is that it requires a fundamental assumption that the functions are welded together, and that there is a single body responsible for "stewardship" of them.  This is something that the other communities simply don't believe.
> 
> I therefore don't think there would be value in further elaboration of study of this model, because anything that proposes a single source of stewardship for all the functions won't fly.
> 
> If, on the other hand, the model is supposed to be one in which the affiliate gets the right to contract for an entity to act as the naming functions operator only, then it isn't clear to me what work this wheel is supposed to do.  In order for it to be an effective steward of only those functions, it basically needs somehow to perform the job of the community for names functions.  But we already have a policy body for names functions, however imperfect: ICANN, or perhaps some subset of it.  So, to perform this stewardship function for names, the affiliate would have to instantiate most (or all) of the accountability measures that ICANN needs anyway.  This seems like an excellent way to re-open a number of prior decisions.  Moreover, it strikes me that it's quite likely to deliver subtle differences with the existing mechanisms, which would offer a tempting opportunity to game the system, a potential for procedural deadlock, or both.
> 
> Therefore, no matter which way I interpret this model, it seems to me that it can't possibly yield enough benefit to be worth exploring in greater detail.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> A
> 
> --
> Andrew Sullivan
> ajs at anvilwalrusden.com
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-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs at anvilwalrusden.com