[CWG-Stewardship] Questions regarding InternetNZ's views on the IANA transition

[Jordan Carter]

Hi Paul, all:

Thanks for your email. This is an important discussion for our ccTLD community as well as for all those affected by the transition of stewardship away from ICANN.

In summary, for those who want the short version:

- the principles of distributed stewardship and separability are status quo principles that are in place today. Some seem to want to upend them in favour of One Big ICANN to be the steward of the DNS, and yet such people are claiming black is white, and that those defending the status quo are somehow proposing a revolution. It is the other way around.

- these principles are important to the stewardship of the DNS, not to the operation of ICANN per se - but they do have consequences for ICANN operations and structures, as set out below.

- we need to conduct this discussion in a way that is accurate, not misleading, and that helps the community towards a consensus rather than driving people apart.


Here below the longer version.


Paul, there are several surprising and concerning points made in your email, which Greg Shatan’s earlier reply dealt with in part.

The most significant strangeness is your assertion that distributed stewardship or separability are new principles. 

They are not new. They are the status quo. 

Today, stewardship of the DNS is distributed today: between ccTLD managers, gTLD managers, registrars, ICANN as a policy body, ICANN as the IANA Functions Operator, Verisign as the root zone maintainer, the NTIA as the steward of the system, Internet users as participants and more. Critical to these distributed roles and responsibilities is the independence of many of the players, and the complex web of relationships between them.

Separability exists today because the NTIA assigns the right to operate the IANA functions to ICANN via a contract. NTIA could assign those functions to another party: most easily for names, but still with teeth for the other IANA customers.

The question is, with NTIA stepping out of its crucial role as 
a) a component of the distributed stewardship system and
b) as the core of separability, the granter of the rights to operate IANA,

What should replace it?

Our argument is the conservative one: that we should not create a Big Brother of Internet technical coordination by putting it all in ICANN; that we should retain the status quo of distributed stewardship and separability that we have today.

In contrast, what those critiquing the status quo seem to be proposing is a very significant revolution. The implicit claim in your note and in the arguments Chris has been advancing is that One Big ICANN is an appropriate outcome: that what is today distributed among many parties should be more concentrated in the one institution.

The CWG doesn’t agree, as Greg pointed out. I don’t agree with you. Many others don’t agree. The notion of creating a point of failure with significant power and authority in the Internet’s DNS is not one that anyone caring about the security and stability of the system should endorse. It’s a significant change to the status quo and no argument justifying this change has yet been advanced - other than non-arguments about convenience, or partially . 

So in terms of the stewardship of the DNS system, that’s where the difference is. You want a narrowing of that responsibility to fewer players. I want to see it remain broad based and external to ICANN.

On operations, things are simpler I think. There’s a pretty narrow difference here. We seem to agree on the following points:

- ICANN is operating the IANA functions well at the moment
- There is no desire to remove IANA from ICANN at the moment
- customers should have a key role in oversight of the IANA functions
- There should be a way to remove IANA from ICANN should ICANN fail at operating the functions
- A decision about separating IANA from ICANN would need to meet high thresholds

The point of departure seems to be what vehicle allows for separation should it be required: an internal bylaw, an internal trust, an external trust, an external contract company. That’s an implementation detail in respect of the direct operational question, but it loops back to the broader question of the overall stewardship. An external-to-ICANN option is the status quo and is consistent with the principles we are arguing for. An internal-to-ICANN option is the revolution you propose, and is not consistent with those principles. The principles we set out relate to the transition of stewardship, not to ICANN’s operations. 

What is represented in ICANN’s bylaws is of less interest to me because I don’t want it to be the One And Only steward. I want ICANN to retain its very limited, focused mission on coordinating global policy for a set of Internet identifiers and protocols. I don’t want it to massively grow its mission as you suggest when you say it should be concerned with “the stable and secure operation of the Internet.”


On the matter of a so-called “rigid separation” - it’s my view that if there was ever to be a need to separate the IANA functions from ICANN, it would be because the organisation had truly become dysfunctional. If that was the case, there would be a lot going on - lots of pressure on all participants from the ICANN community, on ICANN staff and governors, and so on.

That would be the very last time you would want to have to rally the community around to try and develop new institutions to take the burden away from ICANN. You don’t build plans for bad situations by saying “let’s sort it out if it happens!”.

It’s that preventive preparation concept which underpins the validity of the CWG’s proposal with Contract Co, or an external trust. It means that now, under the stability and peace of the current settlement, we put a robust mechanism in place should it be needed. It increases the resilience of the system by not leaving all the eggs in one basket. (It retains the status quo, in other words.)

It might be possible to blend approaches wrt an internal trust or golden bylaw so there is an adequate resilience here - Google made a suggestion to that effect with a backup operator concept in their comments to the CWG plan. I don’t know - I assume that’s what the CWG is working on. But it’s sensible to take the status quo position, which I do, without a solid case and proposal being made for why an alternative is better.

The argument for getting rid of the external backstop, and forcing the community to rely on a single institution which would be in crisis should this situation ever need resolving, seems to be to be inexplicable and dangerous. 

It cannot do anything other than pose a threat to the security and stability of the DNS in the long run. 

It assumes that ICANN can be made perfect. I don’t believe that about any institution. There is a reason that balances of powers and distributed responsibilities are common features of every constitution that governs a state, and of every other governance system that is able to be resilient.

[None of this deals with an earlier discussion from the last Singapore ICANN meeting about the desirability of the IANA department becoming, for instance, a wholly owned subsidiary company of ICANN, to give a clearer boundary between the iANA functions operator and ICANN as policy body. That operationally related separation seems to still be in play but I just want to be clear that this discussion isn’t part of it.]


On one other point: this is not a transition to the private sector. 

NTIA is seeking to transition stewardship of the Internet’s DNS to the “global multistakeholder community” as per their comments in their release of 14 March 2014 and all material since. I don’t know why you think that translates to the “private sector” but as a ccTLD manager that blends technical community and civil society perspectives, I know that we in .nz don’t think the private sector is the destination for stewardship. I would be shocked if that was AUDA’s position. 

Can you please clarify? Is it AUDA’s view that the stewardship of the Internet’s DNS should be transferred to the private sector? On the face of it, that would directly contradict NTIA’s requirements.


Finally: your email has the regrettable effect of portraying the orthodox, status quo position I am arguing for as something out of the box, novel and dangerous. 

I ask that you avoid such characterisations in future, for two reasons. 

- As set out above, they are not accurate. This discussion is hard enough without participants misleading each other as to the current situation. 

- Such an approach makes the discussion harder to have, and reduces the likelihood of consensus being achievable once the discussion is over.  Without consensus the transition will run aground.



See you soon in Singapore.

Thanks,
Jordan



> On 5/02/2015, at 7:47 pm, Paul Szyndler <paul.szyndler at auda.org.au> wrote:
> 
> Hi Jordan (and all),
>  
> I wanted to follow up on a few exchanges that Jordan and Chris had over the last couple of weeks regarding the work of the CWG on the IANA transition.
> In particular, I wanted to ask a few questions in order to get a better understanding of the reasons behind InternetNZ’s position and the principles outlined in your submission to the CWG’s consultation.
>  
> Among your key principles, there are some that I obviously wouldn’t question – for example, the ongoing independence and policy development responsibilities of ccTLD managers.
> But there are a few principles upon which you base your position that don’t immediately appear aligned with ICANN’s core mission nor the goals of the NTIA’s intent to transfer the management of the DNS “to the private sector”.
>  
> As you know, the fundamental mission of ICANN is to coordinate the stable and secure operation of the Internet.
> Supporting principles include the introduction of consumer choice and competition, stakeholder participation and the meaningful engagement of other relevant stakeholder bodies and affected parties.
>  
> But neither the ICANN Bylaws nor mission statement refer explicitly to Internet NZ’s proposed principles of separability and a distributed model for stewardship.
> How then, do your proposed principles contribute to ICANN’s ongoing mission, and the resolution of the current transition process? Why are the principles of separability and distributed stewardship afforded such weight?
> In particular, as a ccTLD manager, what has led you to assume and justify the principles of separability and distributed stewardship, when no such principles existed previously?
>  
> My next few questions relate to the fundamental differences of opinion we have exchanged regarding the future of IANA.  
>  
> Even if the principle of structural separation is to be accepted, why does InternetNZ believe that such a significant and rigid act of separation (establishment of a Contract Co) is required at this stage of ICANN’s evolution?
> Is it not equally valid to consider that the codified “ability” to separate in the future is an acceptable outcome?
> Are models, such as a Trust, at least equally capable of delivering a desired result, without issues such as jurisdiction and structure, that are associated with establishing a Contract Co.? 
>  
> I’d welcome your views – both via email and (inevitably) further discussion when we catch up in Singapore.
>  
> Regards,
>  
> Paul
>  

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/attachments/20150206/7d124e5d/attachment-0001.html>